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CHAPTER 1
Meaning and protolanguage
1.1 Introduction: the role of meaning
in the emergence of language
1.1.1 Language and structure
This dissertation is about the emergence of language. The most striking prop-
erty of human language is probably its structural complexity. Have a look at
the following examples:
(1) Which movie does Susan imagine that Sarah saw last night?
(2) Who does Sam know a girl who is in love with?
Sentence (1) is correct English, but sentence (2) is not. And the following three
lines from the English nursery rhyme ‘The house that Jack built’ show that
very long sentences can be built in a language like English:
(3) a. This is the house that Jack built.
b. This is the malt that lay in the house that Jack built.
c. This is the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack
built.
Speakers of English will be able to understand not only sentence (3-a), but
also (3-c). These examples only give us a hint of how structurally complex
human language is. In linguistics, successful accounts have been put forward
that explain the difference between (1) and (2), and that model how sentences
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like (3-c) are produced or understood. The question why humans can do these
things and animals cannot, however, is still largely unanswered.
It is hard to imagine how a system that is so sophisticated and formally
complex could be the product of evolution. To date, many scholars have as-
sumed that syntactic complexity as we see it in modern language emerged not
gradually but in one big leap (see, e.g., Berwick (2011)). To me, this assump-
tion is not satisfactory, because giant leaps are rare in evolution, and as long
as we have no reasons to refute the gradual emergence of language, we should
investigate its possibility. Moreover, postulating that language came into exis-
tence with the rapid emergence of syntactic complexity puts syntax in a rather
special position and does not do justice to observations that the systems nec-
essary for language are deeply intertwined with other cognitive systems (Fitch,
2010; Hurford, 2007; Jackendoff, 2002).
Thus, even though the question how language became so structurally com-
plex is tantalising, we should keep in mind that language is a many-faceted
phenomenon, and that focusing on its structural complexity alone cannot re-
sult in a full understanding of the emergence of language (Fitch, 2010, p. 3).
In this dissertation, I will look at language from a different angle: that of
language as a means to share thoughts and meanings. This point of view does
not address the structural complexity of language directly, but it will allow me
to say something about it eventually (see chapter 7).
1.1.2 Language and meaning
In everyday situations, we use language to convey meanings, and these mean-
ings can be quite complex. For example, when I am in my office, I can ask
my colleague to open the window, but I can also tell her about my weekend. I
can tell her about the things that happened and what I thought about them.
About what would have happened if things had gone differently. Or about what
I would like to do next weekend.
Silly as these examples may seem, they do show the different ways in which
language can be sophisticated. Utterances usually refer not just to one object in
the world, but to combinations of things. And they allow us to share information
in an abstract way. To see this, let us look at the examples above in more detail.
If I ask my colleague to open the window, this is something that is here and
now: the window is closed, and I want it to be open. If for some reason I had to
convey my message without making any sound, I could indicate what I wanted
by pointing at the window and my colleague would probably still understand
me. If, however, I talk about the things I did last weekend, this is a bit more
abstract. The things I talk about are not present in the room. Moreover, the
report of my activities can be quite complex, in the sense that I can refer to
different events that all bear certain relations to each other. For example, if I
say ‘I went to the pub with a friend and we had a good chat about life and
all that,’ my colleague will understand that the chatting took place during the
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pub visit and not after. In other words, I describe two events, the second of
which took place during the first.
Next, imagine that I talk to my colleague about things that could have
happened if certain things had gone differently from the way they did: ‘If I
hadn’t forgotten my raincoat yesterday, I wouldn’t have come home soaking
wet.’ This is, in a way, even more complex: I am talking about things that did
not actually take place. Yet, my colleague understands what I am talking about
and she will probably give me a pitying look. When I talk about my plans for
next weekend (‘I’m going to write all weekend’), my colleague will know what
I mean as well, even though I am talking about something utterly abstract: an
event in the future.
These apparently simple examples show that we use language to do quite
sophisticated things: we talk about things and events in the world. These things
and events can be here or somewhere else, they can take place now, in the past,
or in the future (or in some world different from the actual world). In other
words, humans can ‘build’ abstract meanings and communicate them, without
necessarily having the topic of their conversation in their vicinity.
Humans are the only species that build utterances that are at the same
time meaningful and complex. Other animals do communicate with each other,
and their communication can be used to refer to things in the world (as in,
e.g., the warning calls of cotton-top tamarins, where different calls refer to dif-
ferent predators) or to make complex utterances (as in the elaborate songs of
songbirds, which do have sophisticated structure, but no —referential— mean-
ing), but the combination of meaningfulness and complexity is uniquely human
(Hurford, 2011).
Thus, we have observed that human language is syntactically complex, but
it is semantically complex as well. In this dissertation, I will show that we can
address the origins of syntactic complexity by focusing on semantic complexity.
I will do this by investigating a potential intermediate stage in the emergence
of language, which I will call semantic protolanguage.
1.1.3 Semantic protolanguage
The initial idea for a semantic account of protolanguage was put forward by
Jackendoff (2002), who claimed that sentences in protolanguage were governed
by semantic and pragmatic principles. In other words, according to Jackend-
off, protolanguage speakers made multi-word utterances, and these were not
organised by strict syntactic rules, but instead organised by principles that
are semantic or pragmatic in nature. An example of a semantic organisational
principle is AgentFirst : to put the element that has most control first in a
sentence.1
Jackendoff’s hypothesis that meaning played a role in the structuring of ut-
terances in protolanguage is not mere speculation. Following Bickerton (1990)’s
1For a more extensive description, see below in section 1.4.
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lead, he points out that evidence for such a stage can be found in modern lin-
guistic phenomena like pidgin languages, homesign systems, or the language of
adults learning a second language. These phenomena all emerge in situations
where people cannot use or learn a language normally. The organising princi-
ples that are observed are independent from their surrounding languages and
are said to mirror principles from protolanguage (Jackendoff, 2002).
If there has indeed been a semantic stage in the emergence of language,
the principles by which utterances are organised in such a stage can be seen
as precursors of syntactic rules. In other words, syntactic rules have emerged
out of semantic organising principles. In this dissertation I will investigate the
semantic protolanguage hypothesis. I will discuss and evaluate the evidence
that has been put forward in favour of it, and address the recommendation put
forward by Botha (2003), that a non-ad hoc bridge theory should be formulated
that takes us from modern linguistic data to evolutionary conclusions. More-
over, I will formulate a way to collect evidence in a more controlled way, in a
laboratory environment, and present two studies that allow us to give a more
detailed description of the workings of semantic protolanguage. At the end of
this dissertation we will have a more well-founded and more detailed picture
of semantic protolanguage, that shows that semantic organising principles are
the evolutionary precursors of syntactic rules.
The hypothetical stage sketched above triggers some questions. For exam-
ple: is it at all possible to talk about intermediate stages in the evolution of
language (i.e., did language not appear abruptly)? What are the alternatives to
a view in which semantic principles played a role in the emergence of language?
The remainder of this chapter has as a goal, first of all, to provide answers to
these questions. At the same time, I hope to familiarise the reader with the
language evolution debate and specify my place in this debate.
I will, first of all, sketch the aspects of language that can be studied where
the emergence of language is concerned: I will give a very brief overview of the
subdisciplines of linguistics and their roles in the language evolution debate in
section 1.2. Subsequently, in section 1.3 I will discuss three well known contro-
versies in the language evolution debate and show how these controversies can
be resolved, once we drop the assumption that there is one property of language
that is a ‘core’ property, and adopt the view that language is a complex phe-
nomenon, a composite system of many different capacities working together. I
will show that this view on language leaves open the possibility of so-called pro-
tolanguage stages in the emergence of language. Section 1.4 presents different
accounts of protolanguage and compares them to each other.
1.2 The sub-disciplines of linguistics
The human capacity to use language for communication is a complex skill, and
it requires various abilities: encoding a mental representation in a linguistically
meaningful string; pronouncing that string correctly; perceiving, decoding and
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interpreting strings uttered by others. Many subdisciplines are involved in the
study of this capacity: phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics,
pragmatics. Above, we have seen that I am especially interested in the role of
semantics in the emergence of language, but all subdisciplines play a role in
the language evolution debate. In what follows, I will briefly sketch how.
Semantics is the study of meaning in language. It is generally recognised
that we know many words, and that all these words have meanings. Up until
recently, it was not often discussed in much detail, however, how the meanings of
words are combined, via complex syntactic rules, to form structured meanings,
and how this property of language came about.
Fortunately, recent publications have started to explore the evolutionary
history of human language with meaning in central focus (Hurford, 2007; Jack-
endoff, 2002), or with an emphasis on the origins of compositionality (this is a
principle that tells us that the meaning of a complex whole is determined by
the meaning of its parts and the way in which they are put together) (Smith
et al., 2003; Kirby, 2000).2
The aspects of phonetics and phonology are central when the origins
of speech are studied. See e.g. de Boer (2001), where the origins of human
vowel systems are studied, and section 3 in Fitch (2010), where the origins
of the human vocal tract and phonological structure in human language are
discussed.
Researchers focusing on the emergence of morphology ask themselves
how human language got morphological structure, i.e., internal word structure.
There are two prevailing views. One is that morphology originated from syntax:
free elements in sentences became affixes. But this scenario cannot account for
every form of morphology (it cannot explain alternations like goose/geese in En-
glish), and a second view is that morphological structure already emerged early,
and came into existence through phonological alternations in speech (Carstairs-
McCarthy, 2005). According to this view, stem alternations (e.g., goose/geese
or run/ran in English) existed before affixes came into existence. The emer-
gence of morphology is addressed extensively in Carstairs-McCarthy (2010).
The subdiscipline of syntax has received much attention in the language
evolution debate. A reason for this might be that in a very influential publi-
cation, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) hypothesise that the key step in
the evolution of language is a syntactic step: the emergence of recursion, which
makes more complex syntactic operations possible.
One of the topics that has been explored intensively is the structure of
animal communication systems in terms of the Chomsky hierarchy, or formal
language theory. In formal language theory, languages are seen as sets of sen-
tences, and the rule systems generating these sentences can be arranged in a
mathematical hierarchy. For example, languages that are recognised by a finite
state grammar (finite state languages) are less complex than languages that
2A detailed overview of the discipline of semantics will be provided in chapter 3.
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are recognised by a context free grammar (context free languages).3
The idea that ‘evolution has climbed this hierarchy’4 (in other words: the
more complex the organism, the more complex the classes of languages it can
recognise) has been appealing to many researchers. In Fitch and Hauser (2004),
for example, it was shown that tamarins were able to systematically recognise
strings from a finite state language (the strings used in the experiment were
generated according to the rule (abn), leading to expressions of the form of,
e.g., abab or abababab), whereas they failed to do this for strings from a context
free language (the strings used in the experiment were generated according to
the rule (anbn), leading to expressions of the form aabb or aaaabbbb). Humans
in contrast were able to recognise languages from both classes.5
This kind of experiment has received criticism; see e.g. (Zuidema, 2005,
p. 123–124) and (Hurford, 2011). The latter reports research with birds, where
it is found that some birds do recognise context free languages (see the study
with starlings in Gentner et al. (2006)). Both Zuidema and Hurford note that
the ability to recognise strings from a language with a certain complexity is
hard to measure when these strings have no meaning (Zuidema, 2005, p. 124),
(Hurford, 2011, p. 59).
In linguistics, when syntax is studied from within the Chomskian paradigm,
natural language meaning plays only a marginal role. In the language evo-
lution debate, however, concentrating on syntactic structure alone (divorced
from meaning) seems no longer the dominant approach, as noted in Johansson
(2005):
Syntax, in the Chomskian generative paradigm, is an autonomous
system totally decoupled from questions of meaning and function.
But even though the sleep of colorless green ideas is as grammatical
as it is furious, not a few linguists feel that the Chomskian ‘syntac-
tocentrism’ (Jackendoff, 2002) may be a mistake. Other aspects of
language cannot be neglected, and something central in language is
missing when syntax is divorced from meaning. (p. 9)
A similar attitude towards structure and meaning, but in a slightly differ-
ent context, can be found in Fitch (2010), in a discussion about the ‘syntax’
of birdsong. Fitch notes that the structure of birdsong should be seen as a
phonological phenomenon, and not as a syntactic one, because birdsong does
not have meaning:
3For a full description of the Chomsky hierarchy and formal language theory, and its role
in the language evolution debate, I refer the reader to (Hurford, 2011, chapter 1).
4(Zuidema, 2005, p. 120)
5Everaert and Huybregts (2012) note that Chomsky distinguished between a ‘weak’ and a
‘strong’ generative capacity (respectively, the generation of correct strings, and the generation
of correct strings with the right hierarchical strucutre). This distinction is often neglected
in the literature about the emergence of language, also by Hauser and Fitch, but it adds
complexity to the discussion about evolution ‘climbing the Chomsky hierarchy’.
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Structure in [birdsong] is best treated as phonological (or musical),
because there is no evidence that these vocalizations convey com-
plex propositional information: they are not meaningful sentences.
(Fitch, 2010, p. 183)
Although Johansson’s quote above is—perhaps—a bit polemical, he does
signal an important trend in the field, and I would like to follow the direction
suggested: to no longer divorce syntax from meaning and to look at the origins
of complex, compositional meaning. This might be the place where the roots
of syntax are to be found.
To conclude, language is a complex phenomenon, and if we want to arrive
at a complete account of its evolutionary roots, we need all subdisciplines of
linguistics to contribute. The brief overview provided here has shown that until
the moment we provide a full and complete account of the emergence of lan-
guage, the different subdisciplines can have quite different goals. Sometimes,
however, the subdisciplines can get in each other’s way: when syntax gets too
much emphasis, this may happen at the expense of semantics. When this hap-
pens, we might miss out on an elegant way to explain the origins of syntactic
complexity, which would be a shame. In other words, it is time to look at
the origins of language from the point of view of semantics. I will do this, by
introducing and discussing a semantic account of protolanguage.
But before we can discuss any account of protolanguage, I need to make a
reasonable case for why there could have been something like protolanguage. I
will do this by making a small detour along some of the well known controversies
in the language evolution debate. I will show that these controversies can be
made less problematic once we concede that language is a ‘bag of tricks’ rather
than a ‘monolithic whole’. In other words, we should not try to treat language
as one thing, or even define one aspect of language as a core or central property.
Once we adopt a multi-component perspective on language, we automatically
create room for protolanguage stages in its evolutionary history.
1.3 The many-components view of language
1.3.1 The many-components view resolves contradictions
in the language evolution debate
Because language is such an important part of what makes us human, it is easy
to have strong convictions about its nature and perhaps about its origins. It is
not surprising that language evolution research knows many strongly debated
issues. I will discuss three such issues here, and show that they need not be
controversial, once one thinks twice about how language should be defined. The
controversies I will discuss are the following:
• adaptation vs spandrel: does human language have a function, or is it
rather a by-product of evolution?
8 1.3. The many-components view of language
• gradual vs sudden: was the emergence of language a gradual process
or a sudden step?
• innate and genetically determined vs learned and culturally de-
termined: is the human capacity to use language a largely natural or
cultural phenomenon?6
For each of these issues, I will sketch the opposing positions. Throughout
my exposition, I will show that one central idea offers us a way to solve the
controversy in many issues: this is the idea that language is a phenomenon that
has many different subcomponents (these components being general cognitive
abilities like ‘inference’, ‘Theory of Mind’ and ‘signal learning’) and it should
not be seen as an unanalysed whole.
The idea that language is a phenomenon that has many subcomponents
not only offers a good way to analyse the controversies listed above, but it
also makes it possible to take the idea of assuming an intermediate stage in
the emergence of language (protolanguage) seriously. This step will be clarified
below, in section 1.4.
Let me first explain the many components view of language and its back-
ground, before I continue to discuss the controversies mentioned above.
In linguistics, it has long been customary to stress the extent to which
human language is special and unique to humans. The cognitive and commu-
nicative abilities of animals and their similarities with human abilities were not
seen as relevant by many linguists, until in 2002 a paper appeared in Science
by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (Hauser et al., 2002). They argue that it is no
longer useful to speak of the human language faculty as if it is an unanalysed
whole (the internal component of the mind/brain that is sometimes called I-
language). Instead, they hypothesise that the human faculty of language can be
seen as divided into two parts: FLB (the faculty of language in a broad sense)
and FLN (the faculty of language in a narrow sense). The former, they pos-
tulate, includes many mechanisms that humans share with animals, and only
the latter is uniquely human. They further hypothesise that recursion is the
key property of FLN, and they propose that this hypothesis should be tested
empirically.
After the publication of (Hauser et al., 2002), many researchers focused on
FLN only, making FLN into ‘core’ language. The large body of publications
focusing solely on the role of recursion in language evolution is symptomatic of
this. But in a way, scholars doing this were again attempting to define language
as something narrow and specific. To sum up, the introduction of the terms FLN
and FLB into the language evolution debate has certainly served a purpose: it
has invited many scholars, and linguists in particular, to start thinking about
the emergence of language. However, the sole focus on FLN and recursion as
the key step in language evolution has made the debate quite rigid.
6The issues described here and the terminology to describe them were taken from Johans-
son (2005).
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An attitude towards language that is much more appealing, and that can
help to solve many apparent issues in the language evolution debate, is the one
adopted in a recent book by Tecumseh Fitch (Fitch, 2010), where he argues
that FLB is the interesting phenomenon to study, and we should not look for
a definition of language in which only one aspect of language is singled out:
[L]anguage must be viewed as a composite system, made up of
many partially separable components. Many of these components
are widely shared with other animals (such as the capacity for hear-
ing, memory, basic cognition, and vocalization), but a few differenti-
ate humans from our nearest primate cousins (such as vocal learning
or complex syntax). Crucially, each of these necessary components
of language may conceivably have its own evolutionary history, and
rely upon quite separate neural and genetic mechanisms. Although
language is a system characterized by seamless interaction between
these multiple components, “Language” is not a monolithic whole,
and from a biological perspective may be better seen as a “bag of
tricks” pieced together via a process of evolutionary tinkering. To
the extent that this multi-component perspective is correct, any
attempt to single out just one aspect of language as “core” or “cen-
tral” is a mistake. (Fitch, 2010, p. 5)
Fitch calls this view of language the multi-components perspective, and
from this perspective, many issues about which heated debate exists, e.g., about
innateness or about the question whether language is an adaptive trait or a by-
product of evolution, can be resolved or at least reformulated. Let us have a
look at these issues now.
1.3.2 Controversy 1: adaptation vs. spandrel
In evolutionary biology, a distinction is made between structures that are adap-
tive and structures that appeared as unselected byproducts, ‘spandrels’. In the
language evolution debate, both properties are ascribed to human language.
Bickerton (1998) and Chomsky (1988) consider language to be a spandrel:
they see language as a by-product of evolution, on which natural selection had
no influence. Pinker and Jackendoff (2005), on the other hand, defend the view
that language is an adaptive phenomenon.
The question whether human language is a spandrel or an adaptation pre-
supposes a view of language in which language is one thing: an unanalysed
whole. As we have seen above, this is not a fruitful way to characterise human
language. Once we take language to be a complex trait, consisting of many
sub-capacities (examples of such sub-capacities are the capacity for referring to
objects in the world, Theory of Mind, meaning composition, embedded struc-
ture, etc.), we can hypothesise that some of these components are adaptations
(having been selected for some useful function), while others appeared as span-
drels. At least, this is most likely for occurrences of complex behavior, also in
10 1.3. The many-components view of language
other animals. Thus, instead of quarreling about whether language is adap-
tive or not, we can concentrate on subcapacities of language and make the
discussion more detailed and specific.
Apart from the terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘spandrel,’ there is a third term that
is important, namely that of ‘pre-adaptation’. This concept was already men-
tioned by Darwin, and a pre-adaptation is a trait or organ that was originally
used for some function and was put to some new use in the course of evolution-
ary history. An example of a pre-adaptation is a gill (a respiratory organ found
in aquatic animals). Gills were originally used by sea animals for breathing in
water, but when, in evolutionary history, aquatic animals became air-breathing
and semi-terresteral (and gills were no longer needed for breathing), they were
put to a new use as, among other things, the larynx (Fitch, 2010, p. 63–64).
Function shift is not only common in morphological evolution (the evolu-
tion of bodily organs), but also played an important role in the evolution of
cognition, as was claimed by Gould (1991). In other words, I suspect that there
is at least some truth in the claim that language is a new machine that Nature
built out of old parts (Bates 2003, translated and quoted in (Johansson, 2005,
p. 167)).
To conclude, the question whether language as a whole is an adaptation is
not the right kind of question. Instead, I take the human linguistic capacity
to be a complex capacity, some subparts of which might be adaptations, and
others might be spandrels. Moreover, I suspect that pre-adaptation played a
role in the emergence of language. However, there is no conclusive evidence
yet about the true nature of language concerning the evolutionary role of its
subparts, and I will leave the discussion at this point. The most important
observation is that it makes little sense to try to claim that language as a
whole is either purely adaptive or a spandrel.
1.3.3 Controversy 2: gradual vs. sudden
Another issue that has been discussed intensively is the question whether hu-
mans acquired their capacity for language in one single step, or gradually. The
former position was defended in Chomsky (1988) and Bickerton (1990), but
nowadays, more and more researchers endorse the contrary view: that de novo
evolution of many genes that work together is biologically highly unlikely (Jo-
hansson, 2005, p.170–171).
Also here, it is useful to recognise that the human capacity for language
is not one unanalysed trait, but consists of many sub-capacities. Then it be-
comes possible to look at the genetic origins of all these subparts, and for these
subparts it makes sense to speak of ‘sudden’ phenotypical changes, especially
where old structures are put to new uses (pre-adaptations, or exaptations). In
other words, sudden changes are not ruled out, but they act only on a rela-
tively small scale. Moreover, as is pointed out in Fitch (2010), we should not
overestimate the role of sudden genetic change in the evolutionary origins of
humans:
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There is no a priori reason to reject a refined saltationist hypothesis
of a relatively large phenotypic mutant playing a role in human
evolution (the only variant of the non-gradualistic world view left
standing). Importantly, however, there are no compelling examples
of such changes at present. (Fitch, 2010, p. 55)
A similar position in favor of gradual emergence of language is formulated
in Johansson (2005):
[G]iven the near-impossible odds against the single-step appearance
of something as complex as language, we can conclude that the
evolution of language is overwhelmingly more likely to have been
gradual, in the sense of entailing many small evolutionary steps,
rather than a single leap.
In sum, there is no conclusive evidence whether language emerged gradually
or relatively quickly, but to claim that language emerged in one giant leap is a
very strong claim that has become very hard to maintain.
1.3.4 Controversy 3: innate and genetically determined
vs. learned and culturally determined
The question whether language is innate or not is tightly connected to the
language evolution debate. If one supposes language to be largely innate, then
apparently, much of language has to have a biological explanation: it must be
explained how the machinery necessary for language learning got into place
and which genetic changes have been responsible for the emergence of such a
complex trait. If, on the other hand, one takes language to be largely a cultural
phenomenon, there is not such a biological burden of proof, but it should be
explained how cultural processes could have accounted for a complex system
like natural language.
The innateness question of language has been the subject of very fierce
debate. I do not wish to go into very much detail about this debate, because
its participants take the issue very much as a simple black-or-white dichotomy.
My position is in the middle ground: I agree with a growing body of scholars
that ‘strong innateness’ is not right, but I am not convinced that language
acquisition is just tabula rasa conditioning. Also here, it makes sense to see the
human capacity for language not as an unanalysed monolithic phenomenon,
but as a complex whole. And this form of complex behaviour is guided by both
genetic dispositions and environmental input (Fitch, 2010, p. 31).
Thus, language learning is very likely to be a result of biological as well as
cultural processes. Similarly, the view that also the emergence of the language
learning device (or faculty of language, if you wish) might be a result of both
biological and cultural influences is becoming more and more widely accepted
(see, e.g., Kirby et al. (2007), Fitch (2010), Scott-Phillips and Kirby (2010)).
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The idea behind this is that not only are our learning skills well-adapted to
learn language, but also that language is well-adapted to be learnt by us.
This view of the emergence of language will play a role below, and in later
chapters, so let us have a brief look at it. The structure of language, according
to this line of thinking, is not only the result of biological evolution. Thus, it
is not only genetic change in humans that has made it possible for us to learn
language, but a different process plays a role as well: cultural evolution. The
thought behind this is that when a communication system with some complex-
ity is in place, it has to be learned by individuals. The way these individuals
learn it is partly with the help of their language learning device and partly
by observing utterances made by others. When we assume that the language
learning device is not the only factor that influences language learning, then
these utterances of others are an important factor in the process: Individual
learners who have acquired a language will pass this on to their offspring by pro-
ducing utterances that are observed by their offspring. If an individual learner
changes the language, or makes mistakes, he will produce different utterances
and the changes or mistakes will pass on to future generations (who will again
learn language by observing the utterances of their parents, or other members
of previous generations). In other words, changes in the language are passed
on through generations. It has been shown in computational and laboratory
experiments that these changes tend to make languages more learnable (see
section 2.3).
Language is thus seen as a system that can undergo changes over genera-
tions. In other words, language itself is something that has evolved. Aspects of
language that are not easily learnt will not be picked up by future generations,
and thus, language becomes adapted to learnability. This process is generally
called cultural evolution or glossogeny ; these concepts will become important
below, in section 1.4.1 and 2.3.
1.3.5 Early stages in the evolution of language: protolan-
guage
Above, a picture of language was sketched that presents language as a broad
phenomenon that consists of many sub-capacities, many of which are probably
shared with animals. It was shown that once this many components view of
language is endorsed, controversial issues can be resolved or re-analysed in a
constructive way. In short, it is not right to simply ask: ‘is language innate’ or
‘is language an adaptation’, because that is simply not the right way of looking
at language. Also for questions like ‘did language emerge gradually or suddenly’
and ‘is language organised in modules’, extreme answers are not likely to be the
right ones. Given that language is complex and has many subcomponents, a
sudden emergence of such a system is not likely to have taken place. It is much
more likely that language emerged gradually. Of course, there might have been
sudden lapses in this process, though no evidence for this has been found yet.
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Now that we have established language as a composite system, we can start
to think about earlier stages, in which language had not developed into the
complex system it is nowadays. In other words, we have paved the way for an
investigation of evolutionarily early language, or, as it is called in the literature,
protolanguage:
Since protolanguages constitute hypotheses about what a system
could have been like, before it was linguistic, the very notion of
a protolanguage requires that we abandon preconceptions about
one “core” or central aspect of language. An open-minded attitude
towards different hypotheses about protolanguage thus goes hand
in hand with the multi-component approach. (Fitch, 2010, p. 10)
In the next section, I will reflect on different hypotheses about protolan-
guage, one of which is the semantic protolanguage that will be central to the
remainder of this dissertation.
1.4 Protolanguage
1.4.1 The place of protolanguage in the emergence of lan-
guage
What is protolanguage? The simple answer to this question is ‘an intermediate
stage between the systems of thought and communication present in the Last
Common Ancestor and modern language’ (Fitch, 2010). This simple answer
is, by the way, already quite complex and potentially problematic: because
why would we suppose that there was only one (relevant) intermediate stage
between no language and full language? And if there were more, how do we
distinguish between them (Smith, 2006)? Moreover, the quick definition takes
for granted that we have clear definition of ‘modern language’ and of ’the Last
Common Ancestor’.
But I am not going to be discouraged by these immediate questions and
take comfort in the observation by Tecumseh Fitch that. . .
the necessity for at least one intervening protolanguage stage in
hominid evolution is nearly universally accepted today.(Fitch, 2010,
p. 400)
There is not much consensus about what protolanguage should have looked
like and this section will give an overview of different hypotheses about the
protolanguage stage.
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1.4.2 Accounts of protolanguage: lexical, gestural, musi-
cal, holistic
In Fitch (2010), four different accounts of protolanguage are described: lexical,
gestural, musical and holistic protolanguage. I will briefly describe each, and
sketch how these different accounts relate to each other.
Lexical protolanguage is what Fitch takes to be the view defended by
(among others) Bickerton.7 Bickerton (1991) poses the claim that there is a
‘mode of linguistic expression that is quite separate from normal human lan-
guage’ (Bickerton, 1990, p. 122). Examples are the simple sentences observed
in phenomena like pidgin languages (‘Me no lie,’ ‘flour expensive’) and the
language of children under two (‘me toothbrush,’ ‘mommy lunch’). Bickerton
puts forward the hypothesis that this mode of communication, which he calls
protolanguage, was an intermediate stage in the emergence of human language,
and that the sentences observed in the phenomena mentioned above are living
fossils of protolanguage.8
Bickerton pictures protolanguage as a stage in which there was a lexicon
with meaningful words, but no complex syntax. Thus, this account of protolan-
guage paints a syntax-final picture of the emergence of language: it hypothesises
that complex syntax emerged late in the evolution of language. An advantage
of this view of protolanguage is that it offers an explanation for the existence
of simple language systems (such as pidgin language and child language). A
problem with Bickerton’s conception of protolanguage is that he postulates a
big leap from protolanguage to full language, in which syntax emerged catas-
trophically. Recently, more and more authors agree that this does not offer
a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of complex syntax (Fitch, 2010,
section 12.11).
A gestural account of protolanguage postulates a stage in the emergence
of language where manual communication played a large role. Proponents of a
gestural protolanguage, such as e.g., Corballis (2002) and Arbib (2005), point
to the flexibility of gestures (they can be simple, but also quite complex), as well
as the presence of gesture in our everyday language use (speech-accompanying
gestures, but also emblematic gestures, such as the two extended fingers forming
a peace sign) as evidence for a gestural protolanguage stage. Gestures are capa-
ble of fulfilling a linguistic function, and they are still present in our everyday
behaviour, and this could indicate that gestures were important in human be-
haviour in our evolutionary history. Moreover, apes are quite good at acquiring
relatively complex gestures, indicating that gesture was among the capabilities
of the last common ancestor of humans and chimps. The existence of full sign
languages, however, poses a challenge for proponents of gestural sign language.
If it is possible to have a fully fledged language in the manual domain, why
7Fitch also presents Jackendoff as a proponent of lexical protolanguage, but below we will
see that it is better to call Jackendoff’s account of protolanguage semantic protolanguage.
8A more extensive description of these ‘living fossils’ will be provided below, in section
2.3.3.
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then did we end up using speech instead of gesture? It is quite probable that
gesture did indeed play some role in our evolutionary history, but it is hard to
maintain that there has really been a gesture-only stage.
Holistic protolanguage, proposed by Wray (1998), postulates a stage where
there was both a complex phonological system and a complex conceptual sys-
tem, which were linked to each other without compositional mapping. These
meaning/utterance pairs were transformed into a compositional language via
a process of segmentation. As an example, Wray introduces two imaginary
utterances, /mbita/ and /kamti/, which are associated with the meanings
give her the food and give me the food respectively. After analysing the anal-
ogy between the shared syllable /m/ and the shared meaning ‘singular female
recipient’, speakers of holistic protolanguage will take this regularity into his
inventory (Wray, 1998, p. 55). With segmentation happening bit by bit, phono-
logical units without an ascribed meaning will be omitted and a compositional
language is the result.
An advantage of the holistic account of protolanguage is that it offers a
neat explanation for the existence of formulaic phrases (e.g., How do you do?
or Could you pass me the . . . ). But holistic protolanguage has been subject to
much criticism. One of the points of criticism is that it is cognitively demanding
to re-analyse speech strings into regular patterns, and that this cannot be
expected from early hominids (Tallerman, 2007). Another argument against the
holistic protolanguage hypothesis is that nowadays humans put words together
much more often than they take words apart (Heine and Kuteva, 2007).
A musical account of protolanguage is described and defended in (Fitch,
2010, chapter 14).9 It postulates a stage in which meaningless song-like lan-
guage was the main communication system among our evolutionary ancestors.
This stage, Fitch proposed, is followed by a stage in which ‘songs’ were associ-
ated with meanings in a holistic way: structured strings and complex meanings
were associated with each other in an arbitrary way (thus in the sense of holis-
tic protolanguage, as described above). Subsequently, these complex strings
are broken down into parts and these parts are associated with meanings, so
that a compositional language system emerges, driven by cultural transmission.
Fitch’s musical protolanguage was proposed quite recently, and many of the hy-
potheses still have to be rooted in empirical evidence. The proposal generates
predictions about the relation between language and music (e.g., the expec-
tation that there is overlap between phonological and musical abilities within
individuals), some of which are now being investigated.
An advantage of Fitch’s musical protolanguage is that it offers an explana-
tion for the emergence of complex vocal control in humans: it postulates that
the pronunciation of complex music-like utterances occurred early in our evo-
lutionary history. Moreover, it leaves space for other accounts of protolanguage
9Fitch discusses previous proposals of a musical protolanguage by Mithen (2005) and
Brown (2000), and criticised by Botha (2009a). In this overview I will keep to the more
recent proposal by Fitch himself.
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to contribute to a full picture of the emergence of language. This multi-faceted
picture has a disadvantage at the same time: an elaborate picture like this
needs quite a body of empirical evidence to justify all the steps. Moreover, the
crucial step in the proposed trajectory, the musical step, is slightly puzzling to
me. It is proposed that in the musical protolanguage stage, meaningless song
was the main communication system. Is this supposed to be a mechanism sim-
ilar to that of birds, which also produce structured songs without meaning?
Why, then, are human men and women both endowed with language, whereas
birdsong is mainly a male business?
1.4.3 Semantic protolanguage
A semantic/pragmatic account of protolanguage is described in the work of
Ray Jackendoff ((Jackendoff, 1999) and (Jackendoff, 2002, chapter 8)), and is
partly based on Bickerton’s claims about protolanguage.
As described above, in (Bickerton, 1990), the idea was introduced that we
view linguistic phenomena like the language of under-twos and the language of
trained apes as ‘living fossils’ of protolanguage. Bickterton’s idea was worked
out further, and illustrated with more linguistic data in (Jackendoff, 2002, chap-
ter 8). Jackendoff follows Bickerton’s main idea: the idea that protolanguage
was an intermediate stage in the evolution of language, that this mode of com-
munication is still present in our brains, and that it surfaces when modern
language is disrupted. Jackendoff adds to this the observation that in a simple
language system without consistent syntactic rules, one can still use the linear
placement of words in an utterance in order to convey relations between these
words.
The organising principles behind utterances are then semantic in nature
and two examples of such principles are AgentFirst and FocusLast.
AgentFirst is a principle that says that the NP referent with the highest
control comes first.
FocusLast is a principle that says that the information that is in focus, new
information, should be at the end of the utterance.
Jackendoff points out that exactly these principles can be seen at work in
phenomena that can be called living fossils. One of these is the Basic Vari-
ety. In the process of acquiring a second language outside the classroom, adult
learners go through a stage that has been characterized as being (1) deter-
mined by a small number of organisational principles, (2) largely independent
of the source or target language of the learner and (3) simple but successful for
communication (Klein and Perdue, 1997).
The BV is a system that is put to use in a situation where modern language
is disrupted. The organisational principles that play a role in it are exactly
principles like AgentFirst and FocusLast.
Jackendoff’s line of arguing can thus be summarised as follows:
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• In simple language systems, the linear placement of elements in utterances
can be used as a way to express relations between them.
• This way of structuring utterances is semantic/pragmatic in nature.
• These semantic/pragmatic principles are observed in situations where
modern language is disrupted, and thus must have played a role in pro-
tolanguage.
Unlike Bickerton, Jackendoff does not endorse the view that the step from
protolanguage to ‘modern language’ was one single miraculous leap, and in-
stead speaks of a trajectory that takes us from protolanguage to full modern
language.10
To sum up, Jackendoff observes that language systems without full-blown
syntax do have organising principles, and that these principles are semantic in
nature. He hypothesises that these principles played a role in protolanguage.
In his incremental picture of the emergence of language, the ability to reflect
semantic roles in word order came before full syntactical rules. In other words,
structuring according to semantic or pragmatic properties stood at the basis
of syntax. To me, this is a very appealing picture of language evolution. In
what follows, I will refer to Jackendoff’s hypothetical scenario as semantic
protolanguage and I will further investigate this account of protolanguage.
Note that among the principles that govern protolanguage, according to this ac-
count, are both semantic and pragmatic principles (e.g., the FocusLast principle
could be called pragmatic), but the boundaries between semantics and prag-
matics are not always clear and philosophy and linguistics know a long history
of debate about how semantics and pragmatics should be defined (Bach, 1997).
Within the language evolution debate, Hurford (2011, chapter 6.3) offers a rel-
atively straightforward definition. He defines semantics as sentence meaning,
and pragmatics as speaker meaning. However, it will become clear in chapter
3 that my use of the term semantics in this dissertation is broader than ‘sen-
tence meaning’ alone. For this reason, I will continue to use the term ‘semantic
protolanguage,’ but it should be kept in mind that this is a relatively broad
definition of semantics.
One of the goals in this dissertation is to find out if there is further ev-
idence supporting a semantic protolanguage hypothesis. On the basis of this
evidence, I will specify in more detail which mechanisms are at play in such a
protolanguage.
1.4.4 Holistic versus synthetic (or compositional) pro-
tolanguage
One opposition in the debate about the nature of protolanguage that needs spe-
cial attention is that between holistic and synthetic protolanguage, because this
10Note that Bickerton himself, in more recent publications, has also shifted his position in
favour of a more gradual emergence of language. See Calvin and Bickerton (2000).
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has been discussed thoroughly in recent literature. The synthetic protolanguage
hypothesis can be summarised as follows: language went from structurally sim-
ple to structurally complex. More specifically, single words arose first, and were
combined later in evolutionary history, as syntax evolved (Tallerman, 2007).
The account of protolanguage that will be central to this dissertation, semantic
protolanguage, could be described as a specific instance of synthetic protolan-
guage.
Synthetic protolanguage is called compositional protolanguage in more re-
cent literature (Arbib and Bickerton, 2010), and it is contrasted with holistic
protolanguage (which was described above in section 1.4.2). In the debate be-
tween advocates of the two views Tallerman’s critical analysis of holistic pro-
tolanguage (Tallerman, 2007) takes a rather central place. Part of Tallerman’s
criticism concerns the analysis that is required when multi-syllable words are
decomposed into compositional structure. She argues that this task was too dif-
ficult, partly because of variability in language use: small distinctions between
signals could have been considered potentially significant, and the analysis of
holistic utterances into compositional ones could have been blocked by this.
Another line of criticism she presents has to do with the kind of process that is
postulated by proponents of holistic protolanguage: they claim that new words
come into existence by a process of fractionation. But this process is not (or
hardly) at play in fully fledged languages: “to propose a holistic strategy in-
volving fractionation is to ignore the known processes by which words come
into being in language” (Tallerman, 2007).
Proponents of protolanguage have taken up the challenge to refute the crit-
icisms formulated by Tallerman, and have formulated challenges for a syn-
thetic account of protolanguage that Tallerman proposes. Verhoef et al. (2012)
present an iterated learning study with a set of whistled sounds. In this study,
segmentation of holistic strings is possible because cultural transmission causes
the inventory of sounds to become more predictable. They remark, however,
that the results from their study show that combinatorial structure emerges
so rapidly that a fully holistic protolanguage stage would not be very likely to
have existed over a long time.
Smith (2006) points out that Tallerman has a simplistic account of the
emergence of nouns and verbs, and of initial ordering constraints: she simply
assumes that they were present in pre-human cognition. After pointing out
this criticism, Smith (2006) proposes a way to unify both accounts of pro-
tolanguage: “a holistic protolanguage undergoes analysis to deliver up nouns,
verbs, and some conventionalised ordering principles; the resulting synthetic
protolanguage then feeds into known processes, such as grammaticalisation, to
deliver fully modern language” (Smith, 2006, p. 321). He goes even one step
further and suggests that a holistic and a synthetic stage were probably not
strictly segregated; there could have been a stage where segmentation as well
as composition took place (Smith, 2006, p. 322).
To summarise, semantic protolanguage and holistic protolanguage may ap-
Chapter 1. Meaning and protolanguage 19
pear to be strongly opposing views: one proposes that composition was impor-
tant in the emergence of language, and the other claims that decomposition
had a central place. But these two views need not be mutually exclusive; there
could even have been a stage in which processes of composition as well as
decomposition played a role. How this would work exactly is an interesting
question, but it is not a central concern in the context of this dissertation.
Because I am convinced that semantics has not received as much attention as
it deserves, I will focus on the role of semantics in the composition of elements
in a protolanguage stage.
1.4.5 Protolanguage or protolanguages?
Before I continue to evaluate the properties of protolanguage, there is something
I need to say about the term ‘protolanguage’. The term was introduced into the
recent debate by Derek Bickerton. When he did that, Bickerton had very clear
ideas about the position of a supposed protolanguage stage in evolutionary
history. It was an intermediate stage in which there was no syntax yet, and
words were just put together. The step from protolanguage to full language,
according to Bickerton, was one sudden leap. Thus, for Bickerton it was a very
straightforward thing to claim that there was one single protolanguage stage:
it was at the point in history where multiple words were communicated, but
where there was no syntax at all, and there were no other stages in between
this stage and ‘full language’.
As we have seen, other researchers have picked up the term protolanguage,
and hypothesised about its properties. But these other researchers are not nec-
essarily proponents of the ‘one huge leap’ hypothesis of syntax (even Bickerton
himself has dropped this view in more recent work), and tend to advocate a
more gradual trajectory from no language to full language. But then, the place
of protolanguage in evolutionary history is not straightforward anymore, and
it is no longer sensible to speak of the protolanguage stage.
Should we abandon the concept ‘protolanguage’ altogether, then? Some
authors seem to imply this, by calling protolanguage a speculative concept
(Bidese et al., 2012). I do not think that such hard measures are necessary,
as long as we keep in mind that the term ‘protolanguage’ is more a tool for
hypothesising about the emergence of language, than it is literally a point in
time in the course of evolution. If this is kept in mind, the term protolanguage
can help us to formulate more clearly hypotheses about how language came
about:
The protolanguage debate provides a fascinating test case for the de-
velopment of evolutionary linguistics: it has the notable advantage
that the opposing viewpoints are clearly stated, open to scrutiny,
and pugnaciously defended. (Smith, 2010)
Thus, different accounts of protolanguage then simply emphasise different
processes in the emergence of language. These accounts of protolanguage are
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not necessarily mutually exclusive. If the possibility is left open that there was
more than one protolanguage stage, then one could imagine that there could
be truth in more than one of the accounts of protolanguage mentioned here.
We have seen an example of this in Fitch’s musical protolanguage scenario.
To summarise my attitude towards the different accounts of protolanguage,
I suspect that there is truth in the idea that at some stage in the emergence of
language, semantic properties played a role in the organisation of utterances,
and thus formed a precursor to full syntax. This idea is embodied in the se-
mantic protolanguage account, and in this dissertation I will investigate that
account of protolanguage. I will investigate whether there is further evidence in
support of a semantic account of protolanguage, and hypothesise—on the basis
of this evidence—which mechanisms could have been at play in a semantic pro-
tolanguage. This does not mean that I exclude every other account of protolan-
guage; to me, the hypothesis that there have been several protolanguage-like
stages (each with different characteristics) is still quite attractive. However, in
the context of this dissertation I will not sketch a full trajectory of the history
of language, and rather focus on semantics alone. I hope to make clear that
the role of semantic properties in early language was greater than many people
(including Fitch) suppose it was.
1.5 Conclusion and overview
This chapter had two goals: first of all, to specify and motivate my domain of
interest in the broad domain of the language evolution debate, and secondly,
to give the reader a brief introduction into what is going on in this debate.
The aspect of language I am especially interested in is that of semantics. I
am not primarily interested in the meanings of individual words, but rather in
meaning as a compositional phenomenon: the way word meanings are composed
into complex, structured wholes.
It has been observed in the literature (Jackendoff, 2002) that in simple
language systems, semantic properties of words determine their place in ut-
terances. In other words, semantics drives syntax. From this observation, one
can extrapolate that something similar once happened in the emergence of lan-
guage: when language was still relatively simple, syntactic rules emerged out of
semantic properties. I called this hypothesis about evolutionarily early language
the semantic account of protolanguage. In the remainder of this dissertation, I
will investigate this account of protolanguage. More specifically, the following
questions have come up in the course of this chapter:
• Is there further evidence for a semantic protolanguage?
• What are the mechanisms in semantic protolanguage?
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These questions will be central to this dissertation, and my aim is to answer
them properly. I should warn the reader, though. Because language evolution
is a topic that unifies many disciplines, the range of topics and methods that
I will take up is quite broad. To give some examples, I will focus on linguis-
tic data from adult second language learners, philosophical reflections about
meaning and human cognition, animal behaviour studies, and semantic frame-
works. Moreover, I will present a series of laboratory experiments. All this will
contribute to making semantic protolanguage an account of protolanguage to
be taken seriously.
Chapter 2 will take us from the questions, hypotheses and controversies
that were identified in this chapter to ways to provide answers about the emer-
gence of language. I will, first of all, sketch a series of possible ways to obtain
(indirect) empirical evidence about the emergence of language. Subsequently,
I will zoom in on the approach that investigates protolanguage by studying
restricted linguistic systems. These systems, already described briefly in this
chapter, are claimed to provide evidence for semantic protolanguage. I will
provide an overview of this evidence, evaluate the approach, and list the issues
that should be addressed in order to make a serious case for semantic protolan-
guage. These issues are connected to data collection (how can we collect data
more easily?), as well as to the theoretical underpinnings (how can we make
the step from linguistic data to evolutionary conclusions?).
We cannot make a case for semantic protolanguage, without having a clear
picture of the phenomenon that is studied in semantics: meaning. Chapter
3 will take a tour along philosophical, linguistic and evolutionary accounts of
meaning. It will become clear that there are three possible intuitions about
meaning. Firstly, our words and sentences refer to things in the world, or to
abstract objects: propositions. Secondly, when a speaker makes an utterance,
he typically intends his audience to believe something; in other words, meaning
is dependent on the speaker’s cognitive state. Thirdly, our utterances have the
meaning they have because of linguistic conventions. These last two intuitions
play a role in evolutionary accounts of meaning. I will describe two possible
evolutionary roads to full language: one based on cognition; the other based on
communication.
Chapter 4 takes up restricted linguistic systems where they were left off.
It describes a way to extend the basis of empirical evidence for semantic pro-
tolanguage, by gathering data in a controlled setting, in a laboratory experi-
ment called the improvised communication task. The second part of chapter 4
provides a theoretical underpinning for this approach, by formulating a bridge
theory that employs and combines the cognition-based and the communication-
based views on meaning defined in chapter 3.
Having defined a way to collect empirical data in the laboratory, and having
formulated a well-founded way to draw evolutionary conclusions from the data,
we will turn to actual laboratory studies in chapter 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 investigates how simple propositions are expressed in impro-
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vised communication and extends the observation made by Goldin-Meadow
et al. (2008) that there is one order in which simple events are represented,
by showing that events with different semantic properties lead to different
orderings. A second experiment shows that different orderings in improvised
communication are interpreted differently, thus suggesting that using different
orders really has a communicative function.
Chapter 6 investigates what happens in improvised communication when
information about temporal location is added to simple propositional content.
In other words, how do people communicate that an event took place at some
time other than now, in a communication system that lacks fully developed
grammar? It is shown that the event information and the temporal information
are conveyed separately: temporal information is added to the periphery of
improvised utterances, along the same lines as is observed in restricted linguistic
systems.
Finally, Chapter 7, sums up the results of this dissertation: semantic pro-
tolanguage should be taken seriously as an account of protolanguage. Evidence
for this account can be found in natural restricted linguistic systems, but this
evidence is backed up by results from laboratory experiments. The experimental
approach developed in this dissertation, improvised communication, offers the
possibility to investigate precise hypotheses about the emergence of language
in a controlled setting.
CHAPTER 2
Evolutionary evidence: restricted linguistic systems
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I have introduced the questions that will be central
to this dissertation. This chapter will focus on answers, and it will evaluate
evidence supporting a semantic account of protolanguage. But before focusing
on this particular kind of evidence, I will reflect on the collection of empirical
evidence about the emergence of language in general.
Given the fact that the emergence of language in humans has left no direct
evidence (how nice it would be to have sound recordings of our evolutionary
ancestors!), scholars have started focusing on indirect ways to gather evidence.
We have seen some examples of how evidence is used in the language evolution
debate in the previous chapter, but in this chapter, ways to obtain indirect
evidence will be discussed more systematically.
Indirect data like this can be acquired in the following ways:1
1. By looking at the behaviour of nonhuman animals, to draw conclusions
about the systems of thought and communication of the last common
ancestor of apes and humans (the comparative approach).
2. By modeling communicative situations in a computational setting to
1This set of approaches is an updated and adapted version of the overview of approaches
described in Kirby (2007). The caution the author gives there also applies here: the areas
listed do not give an exhaustive description of the field (for instance, it does not cover the
disciplines of genetics and anthropology), but merely gives a flavour of the predominant issues
at hand.
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draw general conclusions about communicative interaction (the com-
putational modelling approach).
3. by studying the communicative behaviour of participants in a lab situa-
tion, when they are asked to perform communicative tasks or tasks that
involve language learning (language evolution in the lab).
4. By studying situations where people are not able to use their first lan-
guage in a normal way and are forced to improvise, e.g. when a deaf child
grows up in a hearing family that does not know any conventional sign
language (restricted linguistic systems).
In this chapter, I will focus in detail on restricted lingusitic systems. The
approach that studies these systems in order to draw evolutionary conclusions
is also called the windows approach (Botha, 2009b). This approach can provide
us with the kind of evidence to answer the questions formulated in the previous
chapter: is there further evidence for a semantic protolanguage, and what are
the mechanisms at play in semantic protolanguage? I will discuss data from
various restricted linguistic systems and evaluate the status of evolutionary
conclusions drawn from the data. The picture of the windows approach that
emerges from this evaluation is one of an approach that is promising, but that
can benefit from more data and further work on the theoretical underpinnings.
The open issues encountered in this chapter will be addressed in later chapters
of this dissertation.
Before I focus on the windows approach, I will give an overview of all ap-
proaches listed above. This will give the reader an idea of the kind of data that
is studied in the language evolution debate, and it clarifies the position of the
windows approach in the debate.
The ways of collecting data described above have in common that they look
at something other than the emergence of language in order to draw conclusions
about the emergence of language, and one huge advantage of this is that the
focus in the debate is on empirical data instead of hypothesised scenarios.2
Thus, now it is at least possible to falsify evolutionary hypotheses by reference
to data.
A way in which the approaches differ from each other is related to the dis-
tinction between biological and cultural evolution that was introduced in chap-
ter 1. The comparative approach investigates the differences between species,
and thereby focuses mainly on biological issues. The other approaches, on the
other hand, focus on language forms and interaction, thereby focusing mainly
on cultural phenomena. It should be said, though, that these approaches have
something to say about biological issues as well, but in a more indirect way.
In the next section (2.2), I will describe a way to collect evidence about
the biological aspects of the evolution of language. Subsequently, in section
2This has not always been the case; see remarks in (Fitch, 2010, p. 16) on the bad repu-
tation of the language evolution debate.
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2.3, I will describe three ways to investigate cultural aspects of the evolution of
language. Lastly, I will dig deeper into the windows approach: I will look at data
from restricted linguistic systems (in section 2.4) and evaluate the approach (in
section 2.5).
2.2 Studying biological evolution: the compar-
ative approach
2.2.1 Investigating homologous and analogous traits
In the comparative approach, empirical data about the cognitive and commu-
nicative abilities of animals is studied in order to formulate hypotheses about
which features of language are uniquely human. The comparative method was
put to use even before evolutionary biology existed, but the statistical foun-
dations of it were laid by Harvey and Pagel (1991). The comparative method
compares traits among species, but this can be done in two ways. The first is to
look at homologous traits: traits that were present in a common ancestor of
the species under consideration. An example of such a trait is fur in mammals.
The study of homologous traits can be used to reconstruct the last common
ancestor of humans and chimpanzees. Thus, in the language evolution debate,
the study of homologous traits is usually restricted to the study of apes.
A second way of applying the comparative method to study biological evo-
lution is by looking at analogous traits: traits that are not related by descent
and were thus not present in the common ancestor of two species, but evolved
independently in two separate lineages. An example of a structure that evolved
many times, in different species, is the eye. Studying the eyes of species in
different lineages can teach us about the function of vision.3 In the language
evolution debate, scholars have recently taken up the study of birdsong, which
can be seen as analogous to human language: in both, social learning plays an
important role, and there also appear to be many similarities in the way bird-
song and human language are represented in the brain (Bolhuis et al., 2010).
The comparative approach has acquired a central position in the language
evolution debate, partly because many scientists have abandoned the early
Chomskian view that language evolved entirely de novo in humans. Important
in this development was a publication by Chomsky himself (Hauser et al.,
2002). As we have seen in chapter 1, Hauser et al. (2002) propose to distinguish
between the faculty of language—broad sense (FLB) and faculty of language—
narrow sense (FLN). The former, they postulate, includes many mechanisms
that humans share with animals, and only the latter is uniquely human.
Subsequently, they claim that the contents of FLB and FLN must be deter-
mined empirically rather than on an a priori basis and they put forward the
hypothesis that, first of all, FLN essentially contains recursion, and secondly,
3See (Fitch, 2010, p. 46), and the references provided there.
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only FLN is uniquely human. Thus, FLB shares much of its functionality and
structure with animals. They present a body of empirical data that suggests
that their hypothesis is right, but they invite people to continue the empirical
investigation into the correctness of their claim:
Linguists and biologists, along with researchers in the relevant
branches of psychology and anthropology, can move beyond unpro-
ductive theoretical debate to a more collaborative, empirically fo-
cused and comparative research program aimed at uncovering both
shared [. . . ] and unique components of the faculty of language.
Although we have argued that most if not all of FLB is shared
with other species, whereas FLN may be unique to humans, this
represents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further empir-
ical investigation. (Hauser et al., 2002, p. 1578)
Since then, many empirical studies on the communicative and cognitive be-
haviours of various animals have been incorporated into the language evolution
debate. Fitch (2005), for example, gives an overview of comparative studies
on, e.g., perception and interpretation in nonhuman primates: he reports that
many monkeys react appropriately to alarm calls by conspecifics but also to
alarm calls from other species (p. 205). Moreover, they are able to interpret
sequences of calls (p. 205), and this leads him to the conclusion that ‘nonhuman
primates having quite complex minds’ (p. 205).
In a review of the 8th International Conference on the Evolution of Lan-
guage, Balter (2010) notes that the focus on empirical data has done the lan-
guage evolution debate much good. Recent work that is mentioned in this
review is a study on chimpanzee food calls (Schel et al., 2010), which shows
that free ranging chimpanzees were more likely to produce food-associated calls
when individuals in the group that they groom (‘chimp allies’) were present,
rather than absent. This suggests a relation between grooming and communi-
cating.
The increasing attention to birdsong in the language evolution debate is
reported as well in Balter (2010). An example of this is Ohms et al. (2010), who
show that zebra finches were able to distinguish between two similar sounding
Dutch words (wit and wet), even when the words were pronounced by different
(male and female) speakers. They thus show evidence against the claim that
only humans can distinguish between similarly sounding words.
2.2.2 Underlying questions
In Kirby (2007), an inventory of possible evolutionary questions is discussed,
and four categories of questions are distinguished that underly language evolu-
tion research: questions about the uniqueness, structure, function and history
of language:
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Structure: Why is language the way it is and not some other way? How can
an evolutionary approach explain the particular language universals we
observe?
Uniqueness: Why are we unique in possessing language? Which features of
the human capacity of using language are truly uniquely human?
Function: How could language evolve? What were the selective pressures in-
volved?
History: What is the evolutionary story for language? When did it evolve?
Were there intermediate stages? What did these intermediate stages look
like? (Kirby, 2007, p. 5, adapted)
The four categories are quite different from each other and they reflect
the different goals of scholars working on questions about language evolution.
As observed in Kirby (2007), in many cases these questions are only asked
implicitly and it might even be that confusion in the debate stems from the fact
that researchers are asking different underlying questions. However, answers
to the individual questions are not entirely independent; they influence each
other. For instance, when one formulates a hypothesis about the uniqueness
of a certain feature of human language, at the same time one says something,
indirectly, about the structure of language. Let us now look at which questions
underlie the comparative approach.
Work that is carried out within the comparative approach has, first of all,
much to do with the question about the uniqueness of features of language,
especially when one focuses on the features that are presumably part of FLN.
But questions about structure play a role as well: finding that a certain property
is present in animal cognition or communication tells us that we have something
in common with that animal, but at the same time it gives us information about
where that specific feature came from, and how it might have been used by our
evolutionary ancestors. But questions about uniqueness and structure only play
a role when homologous comparisons are made; in the case of analogous traits,
the underlying questions are different.
When studying analogous traits, for example in the case of birdsong and
human language, one is not interested in the properties of a common ances-
tor. Because the traits that are being compared evolved independently (this is
called convergent evolution), and there is no ancestral relation between them,
it becomes possible to answer questions about the function of such a trait. In
some birdsong studies, like the one in Ohms et al. (2010), uniqueness questions
play a role after all.
Answers to evolutionary questions about function and uniqueness will not
contribute directly to questions about the role of semantics and pragmatics in
protolanguage. However, when a semantic account of protolanguage is embed-
ded in a full evolutionary scenario, these questions become relevant after all.
We will see this in chapter 3 of this thesis.
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2.3 Studying cultural evolution:
computational modeling, language evolution
in the lab, restricted linguistic systems
Looking at how animals behave is not the only way to collect indirect evidence
about the emergence of language. In this section I will discuss three ways to
collect indirect evidence that focus not so much on biological properties of
species and their role in the emergence of language, but on cultural processes.
These are the computational approach, the approach that studies language evo-
lution in the lab, and the windows approach, which studies restricted linguistic
systems.
2.3.1 The computational approach
One way to study the cultural dimension of language evolution is to use com-
putational models in order to place constraints on hypotheses about language
evolution. Populations of individual agents are modelled in order to study the
interaction between individual learning mechanisms and the change of linguis-
tic behaviour over time. It is assumed that each agent learns the rules of a
language first of all on the basis of the setup of its language learning device,
but also on the basis of the linguistic output of its ‘parents’ (an earlier gener-
ation of agents). On the basis of the rules an agent learns, it produces output
himself, which is in turn the input for a next generation. After many genera-
tions, a chain exists, and the linguistic output in each generation in the chain
is the input for the next generation. Differences in language use between the
parent and the child lead to change in the language that is used. Things become
interesting whenever there is imperfect information about the target language:
an agent does not see everything of a language it is learning. In real life, the
same situation exist for first language acquisition, and it is called poverty of
the stimulus. If this is the case, language users change the language slightly,
and the input that the next generation of language learners will get is different.
After a number of generations, language will change and optimise for learnabil-
ity. Thus, the structure of a language is (partly) the result of repeated learning
by individuals who learn a language, not by having a fact sheet with grammar
rules, but by encountering a limited set of example sentences in the language.4
One of the many examples of a model that shows how linguistic phenom-
ena can emerge from repeated learning by agents is provided in Smith et al.
(2003). Here, it is shown that individual agents learning a language who are not
shown the full set of examples in order to learn the language entirely do end up
communicating successfully. And, more importantly: gradually, over the gen-
4Zuidema (2003) describes this as ‘the poverty of the stimulus that solves the poverty
of the stimulus,’ because this view on language explains how children that supposedly have
insufficient evidence in order to induce grammar rules can still learn a language.
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Figure 2.1: Three systems involved in the evolution of language, from Smith
et al. (2003)
erations, these agents adapt the language by applying compositional structure.
I.e., if a model starts with random names for objects, then the names will show
systematicity after a number of generations, such that a word for a green ball
will share properties (a syllable, for example) with the word for green block ;
thus, a syllable meaning, roughly, green comes into existence.5
This kind of computational modelling is called iterated learning : language
is seen as a system that is ‘repeatedly transformed from external linguistic
behaviour to internal linguistic representation to external linguistic behaviour
and so on’ (Kirby, 2007, p. 10). A consequence of viewing language in this way
is that it becomes possible to conceive of language itself as an evolutionary
system. It is a system that can change and, under certain circumstances, will
adapt towards becoming more easily learnable. This changing and adapting
happens on a cultural level rather than on a biological level: it is not (only) the
species itself that changes, but the cultural phenomenon, i.e., language itself.
When the possibility of cultural evolution is taken into account, the com-
plete picture of the emergence of language becomes an interplay between bio-
logical evolution, cultural evolution and individual learning; see figure 2.1. In
other words, human genes shape their bearer’s individual learning mechanisms;
these learning mechanisms play a role in shaping language; and finally, language
influences the fitness landscape and thus affects biological evolution.
To sum up, the computational approach aims to show that some features of
language can emerge from individual interactions among agents and individual
learning by the agents. By doing that, it makes a claim about the structure of
language (see the inventory of questions underlying language evolution research
above in section 2.2.2).
The computational models that have been developed are important for this
dissertation, because they show how the human capacity to learn complex struc-
ture, cultural interaction and biological evolution could have interacted with
each other to produce a system as complex as human language. Moreover, the
notion of iterated learning has recently been taken from the domain of compu-
5This example is to illustrate the principle; the model uses more abstract representations
of meanings and utterances.
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tational modeling and put to the test in a laboratory, using human instead of
computational agents. I will describe this development in the next section.
2.3.2 Language evolution in the lab
Recently, iterated learning models have been conducted in the lab using human
participants instead of computational models. In Kirby et al. (2008), a set of
structured meanings was constructed such that each item had one of three
different shapes, one of three different colours and one of three different ways
of moving (e.g., a bouncing blue square). These meanings were paired up with
strings of syllables (e.g., ‘kihemiwi’) and participants were asked to learn a
language consisting of some of these meaning-string pairs; they were told that
they were learning an alien language. After the learning phase (which had only
a subset of the 27 possible items), they were tested on all 27 items (which means
that they were tested on items they hadn’t seen before), and the output of the
first participant was used as the input for the following participant (whose
output was used for the next participant, etc.).
After ten generations, the language had become more learnable, because
only a few different words were used for the different items. In other words,
there were many cases of homonymy. This loss of expressivity of the language
was not random, however: the words underspecified the meanings in systematic
ways. For example, one and the same word would be used for any bouncing
object.
In a second experiment, where all cases of homonymy were removed from
the learning set by the experimenters, the languages produced by participants
became—over the generations—increasingly structured and began to exhibit
compositionality: a string associated with a picture would consist of substrings
representing the color, shape and movement of the item. Thus, the languages
became both more learnable and more expressive. In other words, results ob-
tained in computational models were successfully transferred to human partic-
ipants.
This branch of the iterated learning paradigm has as an advantage that it
can investigate the emergent properties of individual interactions using actual
humans instead of computational agents.
The study described above shows how repeated learning can lead to reg-
ularities in a language. In this study, the language was already in place, and
the participants were asked to learn it. In other experiments, it was investi-
gated how people behave when they are asked to communicate in the absence
of a communication system. In these experiments, not learning but commu-
nicative interaction is the central concept: how does repeated communicative
interaction influence the structure of communication?
Garrod et al. (2007) investigated the emergence of a system of graphical
communication by conducting experiments with a setup similar to the Pic-
tionary game: pairs of participants were asked to communicate about concepts
(such as Clint Eastwood, cartoon or computer monitor) by drawing pictures.
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The task had several rounds, so the same concepts would occur several times
during the experiment. Garrod et al. (2007) show that in several rounds of
communicative interaction (drawing and guessing with feedback), iconic signs
(signs containing many details) evolve into symbolic signs (signs containing less
details).
Fay et al. (2010) compared two graphical communication tasks: one in which
isolated pairs of participants interacted (like in the experiment described above)
and one in which participants engaged in a task as a member of a community,
in this case, where they interacted with seven different partners drawn from
the same pool. Again, several rounds of drawing and guessing were carried out,
resulting, eventually, in signs with less and less detail. It was shown that the
symbolic signs that were the result of the isolated pair-wise interactions were
as effective (in terms of communicative success) as the symbolic signs that
were the result of the community-based interactions. Further, it was shown
that interaction was crucial for the development of a shared sign system: sep-
arate pairs of participants ended up with different local sign systems, whereas
communities of participants ended up with a single sign system shared through-
out the whole community. These results are important to the iterated learning
paradigm, because in this paradigm, individual learning is central, and one-way
intergenerational interactions (children learning language from their parents)
are seen as crucial to the development of language. By showing that interaction
within a community (this is referred to as horizontal interaction) is important
in order to arrive at a shared sign system, Fay et al. (2010) shed a somewhat
different light on cultural evolution.
The method of studying language evolution in the laboratory is relatively
new and it might still be too early to make generalisations about the experi-
ments. Still, the experiments mentioned here show that repeated learning over
generations, as well as repeated interactions across a generation, have an ef-
fect on the structure of newly emerging communicative systems. It has been
suggested (Scott-Phillips and Kirby, 2010) that vertical cultural transmission
(iterated learning) requires that a language is learnable, while horizontal inter-
action requires that a language is expressive.
The horizontal interaction approach will prove relevant for the experiments
taken up in this dissertation (see chapter 4).
The approach discussed in the next section also studies data from modern
humans in order to draw conclusions about the emergence of language, but
within this approach data is not collected in the lab, but ‘in the wild’: it studies
so called ‘restricted linguistic systems’.
2.3.3 Restricted linguistic systems as living fossils
Suppose you are in a situation where you cannot use your native language or
any of the languages you speak. In such a situation you have to improvise, using
anything that comes up to get your message across: using gesture, pointing, or
maybe sounds or an occasional word of a language you don’t know well. In these
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situations there is no opportunity to use sophisticated grammatical structures,
and the kind of language that is used is the very core part, the very essential
elements.
In section 1.1.3 I described the claim that the simple language systems that
emerge in such ‘improvisation’ situations can tell us something about the emer-
gence of language or, to be more specific, about protolanguage. This idea, to
make the step from special linguistic situations to conclusions about the evo-
lutionary history of language, was introduced by Bickerton (1990), and worked
out further by Jackendoff (2002). In the work of Rudolph Botha (e.g., Botha
(2009b), Botha (2006b)), linguistic phenomena that are studied in order to
draw conclusions about aspects of language evolution are called restricted lin-
guistic systems, and the approach that applies this method is called the windows
approach to language evolution. Let me give a quick recap of Bickerton’s and
Jackendoff’s ideas.
Bickerton (1990) introduced the idea that we can view linguistic phenom-
ena like the language of under-twos and the language of trained apes as ‘living
fossils’ of protolanguage. Bickterton’s idea was worked out further and illus-
trated with more linguistic data in (Jackendoff, 2002, chapter 8). Jackendoff
follows Bickerton’s main idea: that protolanguage was an intermediate stage in
the evolution of language, that this mode of communication is still present in
our brains, and that it surfaces when modern language is disrupted. Jackend-
off starts off with the general idea that in a simple language system without
consistent syntactic rules, one can still use the linear placement of words in an
utterance in order to convey relations between these words.
The organising principles behind utterances, Jackendoff claims, are semantic
in nature, and two examples of such principles are AgentFirst and FocusLast.
AgentFirst is a principle that says that the NP referent with the highest
control comes first.
FocusLast is a principle that says that the information that is in focus, new
information, should be at the end of the utterance.
Jackendoff points out that exactly these principles can be seen at work in
phenomena that are called living fossils. One of these is the Basic Variety. In the
process of acquiring a second language outside the classroom, adult learners go
through a stage that has been characterized as being (1) determined by a small
number of organisational principles, (2) largely independent of the source or
target language of the learner and (3) simple but successful for communication
(Klein and Perdue, 1997). The Basic Variety is a system that is put to use in
a situation where modern language is disrupted. The organisational principles
that play a role in it are exactly principles like AgentFirst and FocusLast.
Jackendoff’s line of arguing can thus be summarised as follows. First of
all, in simple language systems, the linear placement of elements in utterances
can be used as a way to express relations between them. Secondly, this way of
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structuring utterances is semantic/pragmatic in nature. Thirdly, these seman-
tic/pragmatic principles are observed in situations where modern language is
disrupted, and thus must have played a role in protolanguage.
Jackendoff’s ideas are interesting and can provide an interesting way to
collect more evidence about the structure of protolanguage. However, there is
still room to strengthen both the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of
the ‘living fossil’ approach. Important work in this enterprise has been done
by Rudolph Botha. In a series of publications he formulates conditions under
which living fossils should be studied and interpreted, and introduces the term
‘windows approach’: the sources of evidence mentioned here can be used to
provide a ‘window’ on language evolution.6
Central to Botha’s foundational work on the windows approach is the de-
mand to make claims about protolanguage (that are made on the basis of
linguistic evidence) systematic and specific. The data that is used as a source
has to be described insightfully, just like the evolutionary conclusions that are
formulated on the basis of it. And most importantly, the step to go from the
former to the latter has to be underpinned by a non-ad hoc bridge theory.
Botha not only stressed the importance of evaluating individual windows
on language evolution, but also initiated a collection of papers in which data
from various so called restricted linguistic systems are presented (Botha and
de Swart, 2009): among others homesign systems, pidgin, unsupervised sec-
ond language acquistion, but also compound nouns. Further, initial steps have
been taken towards the formulation of bridge theories for some of the windows
(de Swart, 2009; Roberge, 2009), and the combination of different windows to
study the same phenomenon (Benazzo, 2009). In sections 2.5.2 and 4.3 I will
focus in more detail on bridge theories. The next section will review data from
various restricted linguistic systems.
In terms of the evolutionary questions formulated in section 2.2.2, what do
restricted linguistic systems tell us about language evolution? The main under-
lying questions of this approach are, naturally, historical questions, as finding
out what intermediate stages in the evolution of language looked like is central
to this approach. Some other questions, however, are addressed indirectly.
For example, if one can show that there has been, at some point in our
evolutionary history, a stable protolanguage stage that was successful for com-
munication, then that answers questions about the function of language: it
shows that at this particular stage, the function of language was likely to be
communication.
To conclude, the windows approach is a growing and promising approach
that offers linguists a valuable way to contribute to the debate. Moreover, it
might help us to find answers to the questions I formulated in the previous
chapter, about the emergence of structured meanings in language, and the
relation between form and meaning in protolanguage.
6Botha discusses not only linguistic data as windows, but also archaeological data (Botha,
2003). The latter falls outside of the scope of this overview.
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In the remainder of this chapter I will focus in more detail on restricted
linguistic systems, and provide an overview of data from various systems and
evaluate this approach to language evolution.
2.4 Restricted linguistic systems: data
In this section I will describe six restricted linguistic systems: the Basic Variety,
pidgin, and three kinds of emerging sign systems (homesign, Al Sayyid Bedouin
Sign Language and Nicaraguan Sign Language) . I will give a general description
of each system.7 This overview will give us a clearer idea of the claims that have
been made about these systems, and it will allow us to evaluate the windows
approach in the next section.
Within the six restricted linguistic systems, I will look at whether Jack-
endoff’s principles AgentFirst and FocusLast are observed, but before we do
that, I will focus on the Topic/Focus distinction as it has been defined in the
literature, because this will help our understanding of the FocusLast principle.8
2.4.1 Topic and Focus
The terms topic and focus have to do with the way in which we structure
information in language. We have seen the terms applied in chapter 2, but at
this point I will give a brief overview of what has been said about topic and
focus in the literature. Topic and focus can be seen as pragmatic phenomena
(because they help a listener to interpret information), but also as semantic
phenomena (because they can change the truth conditions of sentences in some
cases). Below, I will discuss both effects.
Much of our communication takes place in a context, and interpretation of
sentences is said to be incremental : a new sentence is interpreted in the context
of previously uttered sentences. Therefore, many sentences can be analysed as
consisting of two parts: one part connects to the information that is present
in the context already (the information that is given, or old information), and
another part specifies new information. In the literature, various different terms
are used to describe this intuition (e.g., the distinctions ‘topic-comment’ and
‘theme-rheme’), all slightly different from each other. In the overview below, I
will follow the terminology used by de Swart and de Hoop (2000).
7It should be noted that Hurford (2011) gives a similar overview of restricted linguistic
systems. In the book, however, these systems take up a different place in his general line of
argument. Hurford claims that over the years, languages have become increasingly complex,
and that the systems that we have called restricted linguistic systems represent ‘growth rings’
of language. In other words, Hurford claims that we can read off the structure of evolutionarily
early forms of language directly from the simple language forms he discusses. My view on
the way in which we can derive evolutionary conclusions from restricted linguistic systems is
different; I will specify this view in section 4.3.3.
8I am assuming that the other principle, AgentFirst, is straightforward enough to do
without a separate definition. However, section 3.8.3 will focus on the properties of the
Agent relation.
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In modern languages, there are different ways to encode old and new infor-
mation: intonation, word order and morphological markers. The first two are
employed in a language like English. To see how intonation marks new infor-
mation, let us have a look at two examples, in which stress is indicated with
capital letters (from de Swart and de Hoop (2000)):
(1) a. What does Susan want to drink?
b. Susan wants BEER
(2) a. Who wants beer?
b. SUSAN wants beer
In (1-b), ‘Susan’ is the topic and ‘beer’ is new information (focus); this element
of the sentence is stressed. In (2-b), the words of the sentence are exactly the
same, but this time, ‘Susan’ is new information and is therefore stressed.
A second way to give information about the informational status of elements
in a sentence is varying word order. Consider the following two examples (again,
from de Swart and de Hoop (2000)):
(3) a. When did Jane leave?
b. Jane left at six o’clock.
(4) a. What happened at six o’clock?
b. At six o’clock, Jane left.
In sentence (3-b), Jane is the topic, and the time at which she left is new
information. Sentence (4-b) works very well as an answer to question (4-a).
In (4-b), the point in time is the topic, and what happened at that point is
the focus information. The following is an example of a cleft construction, a
construction in which new or particularly interesting information (in this case
‘beer’) is put in the first position:
(5) It is beer Susan wants.
Word order variation to indicate differences in information structure in English
only works in special cases, like the temporal example and the cleft sentence
above. There are languages however (e.g., Hungarian and Czech) in which word
order determines the informational status of clauses more clearly.9
To summarise, sentences can be divided into a part that connects to the
information that is already known to the speaker and hearer, and a part that
provides new information. These parts are called the topic and focus parts of
the sentence, respectively. Full, modern languages have different means to ex-
press the informational status of sentence parts: intonation, word order and
morphological markers. In restricted linguistic systems, Jackendoff (2002) sug-
gests, information is often structured according to the FocusLast principle:
9A third possibility for expressing information structure is to use morphological markers.
This is not possible in English, but it is used in e.g. Japanese, where wa is used to mark the
topic of a sentence. See de Swart and de Hoop (2000).
36 2.4. Restricted linguistic systems: data
focus information is expressed last.
2.4.2 Basic Variety
A striking property of adults learning a second language is that they are so bad
at it. Children are much better than adults at copying the structures that are
used in the target language; adults seem reluctant to copy sentence structures
they do not understand (Klein, 2001). Especially when adults learn a second
language outside the classroom (spontaneous second language acquisition), not
all learners reach the state of speaking the target language flawlessly. They not
only tend to have a heavy accent, but more importantly (at least in the context
of this thesis), they do not apply the grammatical rules of the language they are
learning correctly. Many people, especially when they receive no instruction on
the language they are learning, ‘fossilise’ during the acquisition process (their
learning does not progress any further). In the stage in which most learners
fossilise, they organize their utterances according to rules that are neither part
of their source language, nor of their target language.
Perdue (1993) presents a large set of longitudinal acquisition data of un-
tutored adults learning various second languages (English, German, Dutch,
French, Swedish). Source languages of the speakers varied as well (Punjabi,
Italian, Turkish, Arabic, Spanish, Finnish). Based on these data, Klein and
Perdue (1997) discern a language form they call the Basic Variety (henceforth
BV). The BV is a learning stage during the acquisition process, during which
a target-language-like lexicon is combined with semantic and pragmatic rules
that are independent of source and target language. Around one third of spon-
taneous L2 learners fossilise in the BV stage.
In the BV, speakers have limited knowledge of the target language lexicon,
but they do already use verbs, and their utterances are usually structured
around the verb. They do not, however, inflect verbs. Or, if verbs get inflected,
they are not inflected in a consistent way.
As we have seen above, examples of pragmatic and semantic rules gov-
erning the organisation of the verb and its complements are ‘AgentFirst’ and
‘FocusLast’. The former, AgentFirst, is a semantic rule and tells us that the
NP-referent with the highest control should come first: for most verbs, it is
possible to rank each argument such that one exerts greater control than the
other. For example, in a verb like ‘push’, the pusher is clearly in greater control
than the pushee, but also in a verb like ‘meet’, an asymmetry of control can
still be observed. In copular constructions, on the other hand, there is no such
natural difference in control.
(6) le fille reste avec l’autre dame
the girl stays with the other lady
Starren (2001)
The other principle, FocusLast, has to do with the distribution of old infor-
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mation (topic-information) and new information (focus-information) over an
utterance. FocusLast tells a speaker to put the new information, that which is
in focus, at the end of an utterance.
This pattern becomes clear in data from a film retelling task. Learners were
asked to retell part of an edited Charlie Chaplin film. From a Spanish learner
of French, the following two utterances were recorded (Klein and Perdue, 1997,
p. 316):
(7) il [setruv] avec la fille
he (=Chaplin) finds himself with a girl
(8) il [setruv] avec Chaplin
‘he’ (=the girl) finds herself with Chaplin
Sentence (7) was uttered in a situation where the girl was focus information,
whereas sentence (8) was uttered in a situation where Chaplin was focus infor-
mation.
If a sentence is seen as consisting of two parts, the FocusLast principle could
just as well have been called TopicFirst (Hurford, 2011, section 5.7). The latter
term, however, suggests that there is a source for possible conflict. When the
Agent is not the same as the Topic, two items compete for initial position in
the utterance. This is illustrated in the situation where a Punjabi learner of
English uses the following utterance (Klein and Perdue, 1997, p. 330):
(9) stealing bread girl
This utterance is used in a setting where ‘girl’ is clearly Focus information,
such as after the question ’who stole the bread?’. An English speaker might
have used stress (‘THE GIRL stole the bread’) to signal Focus information in
this setting, or a construction like ‘It was the girl who stole the bread.’ The
Punjabi learner of English, however, puts ‘the girl’ in final position to signal
Focus-hood, thereby violating the AgentFirst principle.
A different speaker, an Italian learner of German, was put in a similar
situation and solved the conflict differently, by saying (Klein and Perdue, 1997,
p. 330):
(10) ma¨dchen nehme brot
girl take bread
This learner follows the AgentFirst constraint, and thereby fails to convey the
right Focus information.
All in all, it has been shown that adult speakers who learn a second lan-
guage without receiving instruction do not simply speak an imperfect version
of their target language. Nor do they just concatenate the words they have in
their inventory into strings that have no further structure and function as so-
called ‘semantic soup’.10 Instead, learners organise their utterances according
10The term ‘semantic soup’ is from (Anderson, 2004), where the term is applied to ape
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to principles that are based on the semantic and pragmatic properties of the
information that they want to convey. Although it has its limits (as we have
seen in the examples with the conflicting principles), the BV is generally a quite
successful means of communication.
Second language learners generally live in a community that does not speak
their language, and because they have only started learning some features of
the target language, they have to improvise. This situation gives rise to the
properties described above. Situations that are similar to that of adult second
language learners are situations in which pidgins and creoles emerge. These will
be discussed next.
2.4.3 Pidgins and Creoles
Pidgins and creoles are language forms that emerge in situations where groups
of speakers that do not share knowledge of a common language are forced to
communicate with each other. Both pidgins and creoles have been described
as phenomena that can tell us something about the emergence and evolution
of language (Bickerton, 1990; Givon, 1997). There is little agreement, however,
firstly about how to draw the dividing line between pidgins and creoles, and
secondly, about the facts on the basis of which evolutionary conclusions should
be drawn from these two phenomena (Botha, 2006b). In a very brief overview,
I will show the different views on pidgins and creoles, and the evolutionary
claims that have been made on the basis of them.
Bickerton (1981) sketches a picture of pidgins and creoles that is both very
influential and controversial. Whereas it is generally accepted that pidgins are
‘simpler’ than creoles, Bickerton describes pidgins as crucially and categorically
different from creoles in the sense that pidgins are not ‘true languages’ whereas
creoles are. In pidgins, there is concatenation of words, but word order is variant
and not related to grammatical function. Creoles, according to Bickerton, are
the languages that are created by children growing up in an environment where
pidgin is spoken. Despite the fact that this input language has little consistency
in structure, and no grammatical features, the language that children start
using is much richer in structure, and has many basic features of established
human languages. This resulting language is a creole. In other words, creoles
emerge rather abruptly in pidgin speaking communities and are created by
children. At least, this is the case for creoles that arose out of a prior pidgin, in
a population where there was enough diversity in the native languages of the
pidgin speaking parents (Bickerton, 1981).
The creoles that fall within Bickerton’s definition show structural similar-
ities and these properties represent, according to Bickerton, the expression of
a biological characteristic of humans: ‘the capacity to recreate language in the
communication: ‘the chimpanzee has a lot going on in his head at a particular moment.
Some of these thoughts correspond to signs he knows, and he produces the corresponding
gestures. The signs that emerge reflect his ideas, but with no particular organization apart
from general contextual salience’ (p. 278).
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absence of any specific model from which the properties of language could be
‘learned’ in the way we normally learn things’ (Bickerton, 1990, p. 171). This
position is known as the Bioprogram Hypothesis, which says that the structure
of creoles reflects our innate grammatical dispositions.
As described above in section 2.3.3, Bickerton proposes that human lan-
guage emerged in two stages: the protolanguage stage, followed by a rapid
transition into full language. Protolanguage did not have structurally organis-
ing principles and can be described as ‘language minus syntax’. Traces of this
protolanguage stage, Bickerton argues, come to the surface in, among other
phenomena, pidgin languages.
As mentioned above, Bickerton’s work on pidgins and creoles has been quite
influential, but many of his claims have been subject to criticism. Let us start
with his primary focus on creoles that originated from pidgins. In Mufwene
(2007), it was shown that certainly not all creoles originated in this way. Also
his claim that a creole can emerge so quickly has been disputed (McWhorter,
1997; Mufwene, 2007). Further, the claim that structures in creole languages
reflect innate dispositions for grammar is challenged by creolists pointing to the
fact that many structures observed in Bickerton’s creoles can be traced back
to their superstrate or substrate languages (Lefebvre, 2009; Mufwene, 2007).
Lastly, Bickerton’s claim that pidgin languages have no structurally organis-
ing principles is disputed: various sources point out that, similarly to the Basic
Variety, (early) pidgin shows evidence for the semantic principles AgentFirst
and FocusLast11 (Bickerton, 1981; Jackendoff, 2002; Roberge, 2009). Givon
adds to these characteristics the phenomenon that units of information that
are related to each other, are placed close to each other in an utterance (Givon,
1997).12
The overall picture that emerges from this discussion of pidgins and creoles
is that Bickerton’s account of sudden emergence of creole out of pidgin is losing
ground, and there is a fair body of literature that supports the view that
semantic or pragmatic principles govern utterances in (early) pidgin. However,
there remain many different views on the nature of pidgins and creoles,13 and
this makes it difficult to state general claims about principles that play a role
in pidgins and creoles.
The two restricted linguistic systems we have seen so far are both spoken
systems. But also in the manual modality, interesting linguistic phenomena
have been observed. These phenomena appear, again, in situations where com-
munication via an existing conventional system is not possible and speakers
have to improvise in order to make themselves understood. Next, we will focus
on newly emerging sign systems. Even though these systems are signed, and
not spoken, some similarities between them and the previously discussed pidgin
11Though ‘FocusLast’ is sometimes formulated as ‘Topic First’.
12This is similar to what Jackendoff (2002) calls ‘Grouping’.
13For instance, Roberge (2009) points out that pidgins should be seen as dynamic systems
(systems undergoing change), while many other scholars (implicitly) assume that pidgins are
stable systems.
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and Basic Variety can be observed.
2.4.4 Emerging sign systems: Homesign
When deaf children are born into hearing families, the hearing family members
do not always know any conventional sign languages. When the child itself
is also deprived from contact with conventional sign languages, it will start to
develop a gestural communicative system in order to communicate with its fam-
ily. The sign systems that emerge in these situations are called Homesign and
the properties of various homesign systems have been observed and analysed.
Children who have developed a homesign system all develop a lexicon of sta-
ble, often highly iconic gestural signs or pointing gestures. With their system,
they are able to talk about the things that are present in their direct envi-
ronment, but eventually also about objects and events that are not here and
now, although they start referring to these displaced entities later than nor-
mally hearing children (Morford and Goldin-Meadow, 1997). Quite possibly,
the developmental pattern of homesign systems, which differs from a normal
first language acquisition pattern in the relation between form and function,
is responsible for this. In first language acquisition, children often use gram-
matical forms before they fully understand the semantic function they serve;
they simply copy patterns they hear and start figuring out the exact meaning
of these patterns only later (Benazzo, 2009). In homesign, on the other hand,
the lack of a conventional system forces the children to first fully understand
a given conceptual function, and then feel the need to communicate about it,
before they can actually incorporate it into their sign system (Benazzo, 2009,
p. 35).
In Goldin-Meadow et al. (2009), it is shown that there are similarities in the
patterning of lexical elements in homesign systems that emerged in different
countries: children growing up in Chinese, English and Turkish speaking com-
munities all show a tendency, when they talk about a transitive action, to omit
the gesture that indicates the Actor (that would be the subject in a sentence
describing the situation). Moreover, they seem to have a preference to gesture
the Patient (direct object) before the Act.
Thus, there are indications that semantic properties play a role in the or-
ganisation of utterances in Homesign, even though individual systems are quite
different from each other in many respects. Jackendoff’s principles AgentFirst
and FocusLast are not reported directly in homesign, but, as mentioned, the
Agent is often omitted, and the principle FocusLast is not described as such,
possibly because homesign was not studied with a topic/focus framework in
mind. To conclude, the fact that at least some systematicity can be found in
the ordering of the constituents in homesign utterances, shows that even in a
situation where a child has had no input from a conventional language, the
organisation of utterances is used to convey information.
Next, I will discuss two recently emerged sign systems that are comparable
to homesign because they were developed by deaf people that did not previously
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have a conventional system for communication, but that have the advantage
that they emerged, not in one individual, but in a community.
2.4.5 Emerging sign systems: NSL and ABSL
In Nicaragua, a school for deaf children was founded in 1977. Prior to the exis-
tence of the school, deaf children were mostly kept at home, and had no contact
with other deaf individuals. When the school was opened, pupils were taught
in spoken Spanish, which did not seem very successful, but among themselves,
the children in the school started to communicate with each other using ges-
tures and over the years, a sign system emerged: Nicaraguan Sign Language
(NSL) (Senghas et al., 2004).
Numerous aspects of NSL have been studied in different generations of sign-
ers. Senghas et al. (2002) showed videos of dynamic events, such as a cartoon
of something rolling downward, to signers of NSL. It was analysed how signers
from different generations signed the manner of movement (e.g., rolling) and
the path of movement (e.g., downward), and it was found that first cohort
signers expressed manner and path of movement simultaneously, i.e., using one
gesture to signify both manner and path. Later cohorts used separate signs
for manner and path, thus gesturing the information sequentially. This shows
that, even though the manual modality has the possibility to convey informa-
tion holistically, sequencing of information is preferred when a system becomes
increasingly conventional.
Al Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL) is a conventional sign
system that emerged over the past 70 years in the Al Sayyid Bedouin group
(Sandler et al., 2005). This relatively isolated group, living in the south of
Israel, has a high percentage of congenital deafness; deaf individuals are fully
integrated into the social structure of the community and ABSL is generally
seen as a second language of the village. ABSL is different from Israeli Sign
Language (ISL); ABSL is unintelligible to ISL signers.
Similarly to homesign systems, subjects are sometimes omitted from ges-
ture strings in ABSL. Moreover, action words (verbs) generally occur in fi-
nal position. To be more precise, the dominant word order of ABSL is SOV
(subject-object-verb), even though the surrounding languages of the village all
have different prevalent word orders. Sandler et al. (2005) report that spoken
Arabic dialect has SVO order, Classical Arabic has VSO order, Hebrew SVO
(or V-initial) and Israeli Sign Language mainly SVO and OSV.
Having SOV order, ABSL shows clear signs of the AgentFirst principle.
Another interesting pattern was found by Padden et al. (2010). They report
that when situations are described where the agent and the patient are both
human (as in the sentence ‘the woman feeds the child’), signers split their
utterance into two separate utterances, the first of which describes the actor
and the second the patient (such as WOMAN SIT; GIRL FEED). A similar
pattern, ‘SVOV’ ordering for events where the actor and the patient are both
human, was found in Nicaraguan Sign Language (Senghas et al., 1997).
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Of both NSL and ABSL, different generations of signers have been recorded,
and it was observed that the sign systems were simpler for early generations
than for later generations. As the emerging sign systems become more sophisti-
cated over time, the signing becomes faster and the sentences that are uttered
become longer (Sandler et al., 2005; Senghas et al., 2002).
Now we have seen a very brief overview of different systems that arose
in situations where ‘normal’ language could not be used. As we have seen,
the systems emerged under quite different circumstances, but still, have some
properties in common. What about these properties? And how can we draw
evolutionary conclusions from them? These issues will be discussed in the next
section.
2.5 Restricted linguistic systems: analysis and
evaluation
2.5.1 Organising principles
The picture that emerges from the restricted linguistic systems described above
is that situations where normal communication is impossible, as unfortunate
as these might be, are a valuable source of linguistic data. The urge to commu-
nicate is apparently strong in humans, and the communication systems that
emerge in situations like the ones described above can tell us something about
which are the core elements of language: those that survive when most of lan-
guage breaks down.
It is clear from all these systems that they are indeed restricted, in the sense
that there is little or no inflectional morphology in them. It is not the case, how-
ever, that in these systems, words are just thrown together without structure or
organisation. Utterances in restricted linguistic systems are organised, at least
to some extent (some systems also show some variability within and among
speakers). The principles according to which the systems are organised could
very well be rooted in semantics. Let us have a look at Jackendoff’s hypothesis
that the principles AgentFirst and FocusLast are organising principles.
One thing that emerges quite clearly from the data is Jackendoff’s principle
‘AgentFirst’: we have seen that in all systems except homesign (where the agent
is often omitted from the utterance), the constituent that has the semantic role
of Agent (the one that has the highest control) is put in first position.
Judging whether FocusLast can be observed systematically in the systems
discussed is somewhat harder, however. First of all, not all systems have been
analysed and described in terms compatible with a principle such as Focus-
Last. This principle is about ‘focus information’, which is often described as
‘newness of information’, and it is not always easy to see which information in
an utterance is new and which is not. Moreover, it should be taken into ac-
count that the orderings found in the different systems are not always entirely
independent of influences from outside (i.e., the circumstances in which they
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arise). For instance, pidgin languages might be influenced by their superstrate
and substrate languages. In order to verify that FocusLast is observed across
restricted linguistic systems, careful analysis of data is necessary; preferably
not isolated sentences, but sequences of sentences.
If we want to establish restricted linguistic systems as a source of indirect
evidence about the emergence of language, there are two further domains that
need additional attention. The first concerns the step from the data to the
evolutionary conclusions: how do we justify this step? The second concerns the
way in which data is obtained from the different systems: because all of the
systems discussed here emerge in unfortunate situations, gathering empirical
data is not straightforward. Both issues will be discussed below.
Subsequently, I will discuss how to proceed, i.e. how to make sure that re-
stricted linguistic systems can be put to further use to investigate the emergence
of semantic structure in human language: by ‘creating’ a restricted linguistic
system in the laboratory.
2.5.2 Linguistic data, evolutionary conclusions and bridge
theories
The linguistic data presented above show that language can exist in situations
where it is hard to communicate, and that this language form is relatively suc-
cessful for communication, and shows similarities across various situations. But
how do we get from the observation that the data are interesting to conclusions
about the emergence and evolution of language? And how can we be sure that
these conclusions are justified?
In a series of publications, Rudolf Botha aims to create a framework for the
analysis of restricted linguistic systems in an evolutionary context. In fact, the
framework is set up not only to look at restricted linguistic systems, but also
at other evidence, such as, e.g., archaeological findings. In the context of this
dissertation, we will focus on restricted linguistic systems only. Botha formu-
lates an approach to language evolution called windows approach. A window
on language evolution is characterised as follows:
[W]indows are shown to be conceptual constructs used for mak-
ing inferences about aspects of language evolution from data or
assumptions about properties of phenomena other than language
evolution.
The particular kind of window that is generated by looking at data from
RLS’s is the analogue window.14 In the analogue window, it is believed that
aspects of the data observed are analogous to particular aspects in language
evolution. Analogue windows are used to draw conclusions about ‘internal as-
pects’ of language evolution: they say something about the function and struc-
14In Botha’s work, this kind of window is contrasted with the correlate window and the
abduction window, but these fall outside the scope of this thesis.
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Figure 2.2: Basic structure of a window on language evolution (Botha, 2009b).
ture of early forms of language. To make this specific, the structure found in,
e.g., the Basic Variety is analogue to the structure of some protolanguage. At
first sight, this does not sound very different from the proposal made by Jack-
endoff, but Botha proposes that windows be treated systematically to make
sure any inferences are made in the correct way. He describes ‘window work’
as a three step process, which starts with observations of some phenomenon
distinct from language evolution, and results via inferential steps in conclusions
about aspects of language evolution, see figure 2.2.
Each step in the process must meet certain conditions in order for a window
to have merit: (a) the data on the basis of which evolutionary conclusions are
to be drawn need to be accurate, (b) the evolutionary conclusions must be
underpinned by a theory of linguistic entities and a general theory of what
evolution involves, and (c) the inferential step must be underpinned by a ‘non-
ad hoc bridge theory’ (Botha, 2009b). Botha has evaluated various windows on
language evolution, by examining if the criteria he formulated are met for each
of these windows. From a series of publications (Botha, 2006b, 2007, 2009a),
the general picture emerges that it is quite hard for any window to meet all
the criteria.
The current situation for restricted linguistic systems is best summarised
as follows: they can potentially make a valuable contribution to the language
evolution debate, but some attention needs to be paid to the underpinnings of
evolutionary conclusions based on the data. Let us have a look at the conditions
formulated by Botha in more detail. Concerning condition (a), it might be hard
for some of the restricted linguistic systems discussed above to prove that the
data are accurate (about pidgins and creoles, for example, there is a lot of
disagreement on the nature of the data to begin with). I will discuss this issue
in further detail below (in section 2.5.3), and subsequently present my own
way to gather data from restricted linguistic systems, in a laboratory setting
(in section 2.5.4).
Concerning condition (b), I have sketched a picture of the language evo-
lution debate, and I have identified the specific topic I am interested in: the
emergence of structured meaning. Moreover, I have specified the place that this
topic takes in the debate. What is still lacking, though, is a characterisation of
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meaning in modern language. This will be taken up in the next chapter.
Condition (c) demands that there is something like a bridge theory from the
data to the evolutionary conclusions. Botha (2006a) formulates the following
question, that needs to be answered for restricted linguistic systems (which
are addressed here as ‘degraded forms of language’) in order to have a proper
bridge theory:
Why does the fact—if fact it is—that AgentFirst and FocusLast oc-
cur in some ‘degraded’ forms of language give these order principles
their so-called evolutionary primitive character, i.e., their language
fossil status? (Botha, 2006a)
Jackendoff answers this question only by indicating that the fact that Agent-
First and FocusLast survive processes in which language is degraded makes
them special, but does not specify the nature of these principles any further.
In fact, when discussing the step from empirical data from simple language
systems to evolutionary conclusions, he adds the following caveat:
It is of course never clear how relevant such evidence is for evo-
lutionary concerns—in particular, to what degree their ontogeny
really recapitulates phylogeny. Nevertheless, this is all the evidence
we’ve got, so we must make the most of it, while recognizing that
it should be taken with a grain of salt. (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 237)
In a sense, Jackendoff is right: making any claim about the emergence and
evolution of language is problematic, because we cannot go back in time and
check the facts. But this should not prevent us from attempting to formulate
precise hypotheses and make the best use of the (indirect) evidence we have.
Fortunately, in recent publications, initial steps have been taken to formu-
late a bridge theory for data from the Basic Variety and from pidgin languages.
These will be discussed in chapter 4.
2.5.3 Collecting restricted linguistic data
It has already been mentioned that collecting data for restricted linguistic sys-
tems is not easy. Not only do many of these systems emerge in unfortunate
situations, it is also quite a challenge to get a reliable set of data. To name a
few problems:
• The Basic Variety data comes from a fairly large database (Perdue, 1993),
for which learners of different languages were studied in longitudinal stud-
ies. As mentioned above, the source languages that were studied were
Punjabi, Italian, Turkish, Arabic, Spanish and Finnish and the target
languages were English, German, Dutch, French and Swedish. Although
the source languages are quite diverse, the target languages are relatively
similar, and, for example, all have SVO as the dominant word order. And
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this word order might have had an influence on the word order in the
Basic Variety (Hurford, 2011).
• For data on pidgins and creoles, there is little consensus about the nature
of the data. Not all linguists have the same conception of what pidgins
and creoles are, and it is not easy to draw evolutionary conclusions from
a phenomenon that is poorly demarcated (Botha, 2006b).
• Gathering data about homesign is quite labor-intensive and existing pub-
lications are often based on data from only a handful of signers.
• There is only a limited amount of data about NSL and ABSL. Moreover,
these systems have developed and changed quite rapidly, which is inter-
esting in itself, but it makes analysis and comparison to other restricted
systems complex.
There is also a more general problem for restricted linguistic systems, which
is the lack of control in the collection of data. Data for the systems is usually
collected in a conversation-like setting. For example, playing children interact-
ing with their peers are recorded to obtain homesign data, and interviews with
language learners are held to obtain Basic Variety data. If one is interested in
a certain construction, one can try to steer informants in a certain direction by
asking them specific questions. This is done, for example, in the ESF project
(on the basis of which the Basic Variety was described). People watched scenes
from a film, and were asked to retell the story (Perdue, 1993). Still, a natu-
ral conversation setting does not lend itself to collection of very specific and
controlled data.
Another general problem is that in these systems, the main focus is on
language production, and no attention is paid to comprehension of restricted
language. However, we need insights about comprehension to analyse the se-
mantics of utterances from restricted linguistic systems.
2.5.4 A restricted linguistic system from the lab
We have observed that restricted linguistic systems are interesting and intrigu-
ing on the one hand, but they still face some problems. Problems concerning
data have been formulated in the previous section, and given these problems,
one could conclude that it is necessary to go out and collect more data on
homesign, pidgin, the Basic Variety, or newly emerging sign languages. And I
definitely think that this would help a lot, especially when similar phenomena
are studied in different systems and then compared to each other. This could
make a valuable contribution to the field.
But I want something different: I would like to be able to collect data on
restricted linguistic systems in a very controlled manner, and study exactly
those issues I am interested in. Moreover, I want to be able to study the inter-
pretation of restricted language as well as the production. To get this, I would
need a laboratory environment, where participants can be given carefully com-
posed and controlled sets of stimuli. Fortunately, a way to ‘produce’ restricted
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linguistic systems in a laboratory has been designed already, although it is not
described in such terms.
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) describe an experiment where participants are
asked to communicate about simple events presented in short animations, using
only gesture and no speech. Participants are thus asked to communicate in a
way they have never done before and cannot use their native language. Goldin-
Meadow et al. (2008) show that participants from four different language groups
show consistency in the ordering of their gestures, and thus organise their
gestured utterances independently of their native language. In chapter 4, I will
elaborate on this method and argue in further detail why the gesture strings
produced by participants in this way can be seen as a restricted linguistic
system. Moreover, I will show that this method allows us to look at, not only
the production of improvised utterances, but also their interpretation, and I
will describe the particular topics that will be investigated in chapter 5 and 6.
2.6 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have shown that there are different ways to obtain
indirect evidence about the evolution of language. One of the approaches pre-
sented, the one that studies restricted linguistic systems, offers a way to look
at those aspects of language evolution I am interested in: the role of semantic
principles in protolanguage.
We have seen data from restricted linguistic systems, and reflected on the
conclusions drawn from them. It was shown that it might indeed be the case
that restricted linguistic systems are governed by semantic and pragmatic prin-
ciples like Jackendoff’s AgentFirst and FocusLast. Some problems still remain,
however, and if we want to establish restricted systems as serious (indirect)
evidence about language evolution, these have to be resolved. The issues that
have come across have to do with, first of all, the principles AgentFirst and Fo-
cusLast themselves. It is not always easy to determine whether these principles
are at work or not, on the basis of the data, and this should be studied further.
The second problem has to do with the evolutionary conclusions drawn on the
basis of restricted data. The step from the linguistic data to the evolutionary
conclusions needs to be underpinned by a bridge theory that tells us exactly
what the nature is of the analogy drawn between restricted linguistic systems
and evolutionarily early language. Thirdly, the data from restricted linguistic
systems reviewed in this chapter only concerns language production; given the
circumstances in which these systems emerge, it is hard to study the interpreta-
tion of restricted language. Lastly, I formulated some practical problems with
the collection of data from restricted linguistic systems. In general, because
restricted systems emerge in exceptional situations, data is not easily available.
To solve the last two problems, a new method to collect restricted linguistic
data was announced. This will be described in further detail in chapter 4. To
solve the other problems, we need to establish a firmer theoretical basis on
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which evolutionary hypotheses can be built. This issue will be addressed in
chapter 4 as well. But before we will be able to do that, we need to know more
about what we will be studying: meaning. What is meaning? Which concepts
are important when we describe meaning in natural language? What do these
concepts presuppose about the emergence of meaning? These issues will be
addressed in the next chapter, and this will help us to prepare the ground for
restricted linguistic systems to make a serious contribution to the language
evolution debate.
CHAPTER 3
Meaning and evolution1
3.1 Introduction
What is meaning? The answer to this question depends on who you ask. Among
those who think about the nature of meaning are philosophers and linguists,
and the discipline that studies meaning in natural language is generally called
semantics.
If phonetics is where linguistics makes contact with physics, and
syntax is where linguistics meets mathematics and computer sci-
ence, semantics is the branch of language study that consistently
rubs shoulders with philosophy. This is because the study of mean-
ing raises a host of deep problems that are the traditional stomping
grounds for philosophers. (Fitch, 2010, p. 119)
Thus, in this chapter, we will look at characterisations of meaning by
philosophers and by linguists. In the first part of this chapter (section 3.2)
I will provide a brief overview of theories of meaning in the philosophy of lan-
guage. Many — very different — proposals have been made about the nature
of meaning, either in a formal, logical context, or in an informal, philosophi-
cal context. I will sketch the differences between the major existing views on
meaning. It will become clear that there are three different intuitions behind
these views: that meaning should be defined in terms of reference, in terms of
1Part of the research presented in section 5 of this chapter was originally published as
Schouwstra (2008).
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intentions, or in terms of conventions. These three intuitions all capture impor-
tant aspects of meaning, and I will show that these intuitions play a role when
meaning is studied in an evolutionary context.
Philosophers of language focus on the meaning of modern language, and
do not primarily concern themselves with the evolutionary history of natural
language meaning, and, as will be shown, it is not clear for every account of
meaning how it would fit in an evolutionary scenario. What happens when
meaning is studied in an evolutionary context? This will be the topic of the
second part of the chapter (sections 3.3–3.7). I will sketch a picture of the
emergence of meaning as provided by Ga¨rdenfors (2004b). Ga¨rdenfors draws a
close connection between meaning and cognition and sketches how the emer-
gence of sophisticated cognition was important for the emergence of modern
language, and this is in fact an evolutionary version of meaning defined in terms
of intention.
I will show that this assumption (roughly, ‘cognition before language’) is
present in the work of many others in the language evolution debate. But
there are also arguments against it. After discussing these arguments, I will
sketch an alternative view on the emergence of language, based on the work of
Ruth Millikan (e.g., Millikan (2005)). In this view, the fact that language is a
public phenomenon deserves more attention; Millikan’s view can be seen as an
evolutionary version of conventional meaning. Thus, I will characterise two evo-
lutionary scenarios: a cognitive/intentional and a communicative/conventional
road to meaning in natural language.
The two possible roads to language are, I will claim, not mutually exclusive:
they present extremes of a scale, and the actual evolutionary history of language
will probably contain elements of both. The two roads, however, represent ways
of thinking about language evolution, and they will prove to be helpful in
the next chapter, where I will formulate a full justification for evolutionary
conclusions on the basis of restricted linguistic systems.
Thus, focusing on definitions of meaning will provide tools for thinking and
talking about the emergence of language. But we do not only need general and
broad ideas about meaning. We also need to zoom in on language and meaning,
to study utterances made in natural language, the meaningful units that can be
distinguished in them, and the contribution these units make to the meaning
of complex wholes. In the last part of this chapter (section 3.8), I will look
at meaning from the perspective of a linguist. Whereas philosophers tend to
prefer to sketch big pictures and philosophers of language look at language and
meaning as a general phenomenon, linguists study language more closely by
looking at the meanings of individual utterances. I will have a look at what
linguists say about how structured meanings of utterances are built, and I
will discuss two phenomena: compositionality and thematic relations. This will
provide us with terms and concepts necessary for thinking further about the
role of meaning in protolanguage.
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Figure 3.1: Language, thought and world
3.2 Meaning in philosophy of language
Before I discuss how meaning is defined in philosophical literature, let us have
a look at some basic intuitions about meaning. When we formulate sentences,
the expressions we use refer to things in the world. In other words, if I say:
‘My bicycle is green,’ I say something about a particular object, namely my
bicycle, and I state that it is green. But expressions also have much to do with
thought: the sentence ‘My bicycle is green’ has some relation with the mental
representation I have of my bicycle and its properties, and whoever hears the
sentence, will form a mental representation of my bicycle too.
This very simple example shows that the meanings of the expressions in
our language have a certain relationship with thought, but also with the world.
This basic intuition, that meaning has something to do with the relationship
between language and the world on the one hand, and with the relation between
language and thought on the other (see figure 3.1), proves to be important when
we look at what has been said about meaning in philosophy and linguistics.
In this section, I will provide a very brief overview of some of the many
existing theories of meaning that were put forward in philosophy of language
and linguistics, starting out with a description of propositional semantic the-
ories that were formulated in philosophy of language, followed by Chomsky’s
account of meaning, Grice’s definition of meaning, and concluding with Lewis’s
conventional account of meaning.2 I am aware that this is a very crude sum-
mary of what has happened in linguistics and philosophy in the past centuries,
but the highlights I chose will provide us with useful tools to think further
about the emergence of meaning in human language.
2The selection I made is loosely based on the overview provided in Speaks (2010).
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3.2.1 Meaning as a proposition
In philosophy of language, theories of meaning have as a goal to describe the
semantics of natural language, but in a very abstract sense. Theories like these
will not look at detailed differences between the semantics of e.g. French versus
the semantics of English. Neither do they go into the analysis of the semantics
of one very particular kind of expression. Instead, they provide a general idea of
what meaning is. Some accounts of meaning postulate meanings as entities that
correspond to sentences in natural language, and discuss the content of these
entities. The entities corresponding to natural language sentences are generally
referred to as propositions; hence the title ‘meaning as a proposition’.
Meaning in terms of reference
To look at propositional semantic theories, let us first look at a definition
of meaning in terms of reference. A theory of meaning in terms of reference
underlies all propositional theories of meaning, so it is important to understand
this account and its problems first.
A definition of meaning in terms of reference pairs expressions with the
contribution these expressions make to the determination of the truth values of
sentences in which these expressions occur. The following examples illustrate
this.
(1) Barack Obama is a Democrat.
The name Barack Obama in (1) refers to the person Barack Obama, and the
predicate ‘. . . is a Democrat’ refers to the set of Democrats. The sentence is
true if and only if Barack Obama is a member of the set of Democrats (which
is the case, so the sentence is true). By contrast, the following sentence is not
true.
(2) Sarah Palin is a Democrat.
Sentence (2) is false, because the person denoted by the name Sarah Palin is
not a member of the set of Democrats.
To summarise, the parts of the sentence refer to individuals, properties or
relations, and the sentence as a whole combines the referents of the parts and
thereby states the truth conditions for the sentence.
From the example above, the referential account of meaning seems intuitive
and effective: sentence (1) is true, because of what the name ‘Obama’ refers to,
and sentence (2) is false, because of what the name ‘Palin’ refers to. However,
the analysis of meaning in terms of reference has major problems.
One of these problems is a problem with intensional contexts. Consider the
following two sentences (taken from Gamut (1991)):
(3) John is looking for the supreme commander of the US armed forces.
(4) John is looking for the president of the United States of America.
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The underlined expressions in (3) and (4) always denote the same person. Still,
it might be the case that sentence (3) is true, while sentence (4) is false: it might
be that John is looking for the supreme commander of the US armed forces,
without realising that the president of the USA is always also the supreme
commander of the armed forces.
Problems like this3 point out that the meaning of an expression cannot
simply be identified with its reference. Instead, it must have something extra,
something that is called propositional content.
Propositional content
Using the term ‘propositional content’, we can formulate the problem described
above as follows: it is possible for two expressions to have the same referent,
but to have different contents. Propositional content can be seen as an extra
level in between the expression and the reference of the expression.
Various ways have been proposed to define meaning as some entity that
leads from the expression to the reference; see Speaks (2010) for an overview.
For the purpose of this very brief overview, I will describe just the essentials of
one of these theories, possible worlds semantics.
Possible worlds semantics defines the meaning of an expression s as a func-
tion from the circumstances of evaluation of s to the reference of s. In other
words, an expression is not what it stands for in the world (the way it is de-
fined in the referential theory of meaning), but rather a rule that tells you what
an expression would stand for if the world were a certain way. This is nicely
illustrated with an example in Speaks (2010):
The idea is that the meaning of an expression is not what the ex-
pression stands for in the relevant circumstance, but rather a rule
which tells you what the expression would stand for were the world
a certain way. So, on this view, the content of an expression like
‘the tallest man in the world’ is not simply the man who happens
to be tallest, but rather a function from ways the world might be
to men—namely, that function which, for any way the world might
be, returns as a referent the tallest man in that world (if there is
one, and nothing otherwise).
Thus, in possible world semantics, an expression like ‘the tallest man in the
world’ doesn’t simply lead to one individual, but it gives us a recipe to arrive
at the right individual: if John’s height is the greatest of all men, then John
is the tallest in the world, but if Sam’s height is the greatest, it is Sam, etc.
This has as a consequence that, according to the theory, we can understand
the meaning of the expression ‘the tallest man in the world’ without actually
knowing who the tallest man in the world is.
3More problems have been formulated; see Speaks (2010) for examples and references.
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In possible worlds semantics (like in other propositional accounts of mean-
ing), the analysis of the semantics of linguistic expressions takes a tight con-
nection between expressions and reference as a starting point but introduces
an extra layer, in order to solve problems where expressions have the same
referent, but do not mean the same thing.
Thus, reference is an important concept when we talk about meaning in
human language. It captures the intuition that we use words to refer to things
in the world. Full blown accounts of meaning can be formulated on the ba-
sis of a tight relationship between expressions and reference, as long as some
‘extra level’ is postulated to solve problems like the one described above with
intensional contexts. This ‘extra level’ inevitably has something to do with
the understanding of meaning, and thus, a (loose) connection is made between
language and thought.
The account of meaning discussed next takes an entirely different relation-
ship to be a good basis for a theory of meaning: one between language and
mental representations.
3.2.2 Chomsky on meaning
One of the critics of reference based views of meaning is Noam Chomsky. In this
section, I will briefly summarise the view on meaning that Chomsky proposes
instead. In fact, three basic assumptions are important in Chomsky’s position:
• Meaning should not be analysed in terms of reference.
• Linguistics is a naturalistic enterprise.
• Naturalistic inquiry should be carried out on those aspects of language
that are realised in the language user’s brain, and not on language as a
public phenomenon.
Chomsky (2000) argues that it makes no sense to associate meaning with
mind-independent objects, because the things we refer to with language are
far too nebulous to be part of a linguistic theory. As an example of the way
in which objects can be nebulous, consider Amsterdam. Amsterdam is located
in the Netherlands, but everyone would agree that it could in principle be
moved to some other place. Alternatively, everything in Amsterdam could be
radically altered over time (as many things have been), but Amsterdam would
still be Amsterdam. Given these observations, it becomes hard to give a precise
definition of the object that the word ‘Amsterdam’ refers to. This, according to
Chomsky, is a reason not to attempt to explain meaning in terms of reference.
What, then, are the meanings of the words we use? According to Chomsky,
we are born with lots of innate conceptual resources from which we construct
concepts. These concepts are mental constructs that are realised, at some level
of abstraction, in the human brain (and coded for in our DNA). The goal of
linguistics, according to Chomsky, is to study those features of language that
are represented in the brain. This is to be done in a naturalistic way, hoping
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that that leads, eventually, to unification of linguistics with the ‘core’ natural
sciences (Chomsky, 2000, p. 106).
The properties of structures of human language that are realised in the
heads of individual speakers are called I-Languages, where ‘I’ stands for internal
or individual. I-Languages are contrasted with E-Languages, which are what
are generally understood as shared public languages. The latter, according to
Chomsky, are mysterious entities that are not suitable for precise, naturalistic
inquiry (for reasons similar to the reasons for not studying the referents of our
terms: it is not clear where one public language stops and the next one begins).
As long as linguistics has not been unified with the ‘core’ natural sciences,
we can describe I-Language in linguistic terms: as consisting of a computational
procedure and a lexicon. The lexicon is a collection of items that have features.
The computational procedure puts the items with their features together into
complex arrays of features. The role of meaning in this process is altogether
quite modest, and Chomsky even questions the rationale of the existence of
semantics:
It is possible that natural language has only syntax and pragmatics:
it has a ‘semantics’ only in the sense of ‘the study of how this
instrument, whose formal structure and potentialities of expression
are the subject of syntactic investigation, is actually put to use in
a speech community’.(Chomsky, 2000, p. 132)
Summing up, symbolic objects generated by the I-Language do have se-
mantic features, but the role of these features is quite modest and essentially
subordinate to syntactic processes. Thus, what Chomsky says specifically about
meaning is mainly that the role of meaning is rather small. Further, he does not
mention the existence of compositional meaning: as far as meaning plays a role
it is strictly at the level of the lexicon. Moreover, the emphasis on I-language
has as a consequence that in a Chomskian model of language, language is
strictly internalistic and individualistic. Only mental processes in individuals
are deemed interesting, and communication among individuals plays no role at
all.
How does Chomsky’s view on language (and meaning) relate to the propo-
sitional accounts of meaning we have seen above? In figure 3.1 we have seen
that, intuitively, language has some connection with both the objects that our
linguistic expressions refer to, and the mental representations we have of the
things we talk about. There are many ways to describe the differences between
the two accounts of meaning we have just seen a description of, but let me
express the differences in terms of the triangle: the main difference between
propositional accounts of meaning and Chomsky’s is that in the former, refer-
ence is important and in the latter, the emphasis is on the processes that take
place in the language user. This difference is depicted in the triangles in figure
3.2 and 3.3.
Of course, there is a lot more to say about the differences between propo-
sitional meaning and Chomsky’s account of meaning. But the distinction be-
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Figure 3.2: Language vs world:
propositional accounts of mean-
ing stress the relationship be-
tween language and the world,
and define meaning in terms of
this relation.
Figure 3.3: Language vs
thought: according to Chom-
sky, the role of meaning in the
study of language is rather
small, but language is taken
to be interesting only in an
internalist sense: it is to be
defined in terms of mental
processes.
tween propositional meaning and ‘mental’ meaning seems to characterise a very
essential difference between ways to think about meaning. It is therefore not
surprising that this distinction can be seen in various other overviews of theories
of meaning (such as the one in Fitch (2010)).
There is a second account of meaning that takes the relation between lan-
guage and thought to be important: the account of meaning formulated by
Paul Grice (Grice, 1969). This account of meaning differs from Chomsky’s
in the sense that, first of all, it gives meaning a serious and central place in
the analysis of human language, and secondly, it gives a central place to the
property of language that it is used for communication. By introducing com-
munication, Grice introduces a dimension that is not present in the triangle in
figure 3.3. The next section sketches Gricean meaning.
3.2.3 Grice: meaning and intention
The aspect of meaning that is stressed in the work of Paul Grice is the fact
that a speaker of a certain utterance that bears a meaning intends something
with this utterance. Let us have a look at the following example, from Grandy
and Warner (2009):
[I]magine you are stopped at night at an intersection, when the
driver in an oncoming car flashes her lights. You reason as follows:
“Why is she doing that? Oh, she must intend me to believe that
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my lights are not on. If she has that intention, it must be that my
lights are not on. So, they are not.”
This example shows that there is an intuitive relation between the meaning
of a sign (in this case not an utterance, but the flashing of lights) and inten-
tions and beliefs. Grice defines the meaning of utterances in a similar way. His
definition of speaker meaning is the following:4
a means p by uttering x if and only if a intends in uttering x that
1. his audience come to believe p,
2. his audience recognize this intention, and
3. (1) occurs on the basis of (2)
Thus, according to Grice, meanings of expressions are to be explained in
terms of what speakers mean by utterances of them. Meanings of the utterances
of a speaker are to be explained in terms of the intentions of the speaker.
Moreover, the intention of the speaker should, according to Grice, be recog-
nised by the hearer. By putting the roles of speaker and hearer in such a central
position in his theory of meaning, Grice not only puts an emphasis on the re-
lationship between utterances and intentions of the speaker, but he also takes
communication to be important in the analysis of language. Below in section
3.2.4, however, we will see an account of meaning where this is done even more
radically: Lewis’s conventional account of meaning. Before that, let us have a
look at the differences between a Chomskian and a Gricean account of meaning.
Above, I have sketched a dichotomy between theories of meaning that em-
phasise the relation between language and the world (or truth values) versus
theories that emphasise the relation between language and the mind. We saw
that an important body of theories in philosophy of language has emphasised
the relation between language and the world.
The view of meaning in Chomsky’s work, as well as that in Grice’s work,
however, has a very different emphasis: meaning is seen as something that has
much to do with what is going on in someone’s mind when he uses language.
Chomsky takes the study of language to be essentially internalistic, and what
is important about meaning (as far as meaning plays any role at all) is defined
in terms of mental processes. Grice defines meaning in terms of the intention
of the speaker.
What are the main differences between Chomsky’s account of meaning and
Grice’s? Let us have a look at a distinction once made by David Lewis (1970):
I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages
or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are
associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description
of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one
4As formulated in (Grice, 1969, p. 159).
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of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or
population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics. (Lewis
(1970), quoted in Speaks (2010))
Lewis distinguishes between accounts of meaning where the world is in a
central place, and accounts in which the psychology of the speaker is more
important, just like we did above. But Lewis’s distinction gives rise to a second
way of dividing theories. This way is described in Speaks (2010) and it takes
as a dividing line the way in which different accounts of meaning explain or
describe meaning. In fact, two kinds of questions can be answered when talking
about meaning:
1. What is the meaning of a certain expression (for a particular person or
group)?
2. In virtue of what facts about that person or group does an expression
have a certain meaning?
Theories that have the second question in mind are called foundational
theories of meaning. Their goal is not to give an account of some already existing
entity, meaning, but to dig deeper: they would like to give an account of in
virtue of what expressions mean what they mean.
The difference between propositional accounts of meaning and Chomsky’s
account of meaning on the one hand and Grice’s account of meaning on the
other can be described in exactly these terms. in both propositional accounts
of meaning and in Chomsky’s, meaning is taken as a given. In the former,
meanings are taken to be abstract entities that should be described by some
theory, and in the latter, what is taken to be important about meaning is
innate.
Grice, when studying meaning, does not take meaning for granted. In other
words, he is not only interested in the kinds of meanings that are expressed in
natural language. By defining meanings of expressions in terms of intentions of
language users, he attempts to address the facts by virtue of which expressions
have a meaning.
In fact, his description of natural (e.g., ‘Those spots mean measles’) and
non-natural meaning (e.g., ‘Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean
that the bus is full’) in Grice (1975) points towards an analysis of the origin
of meaning, although he explicitly addresses this topic only in a much later
paper, Grice (1982).5 In that paper he proposes that non-natural meaning is a
descendent of natural meaning.
A fundamental difference between natural and non-natural meaning is that
natural meaning is factive (the spots that mean measles cannot stop meaning
measles), and non-natural meaning is non-factive (the bus driver can ring the
bell three times while the bus is not full at all). As an example of something
5See also the reconstruction in Avramides (1997).
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that is a case of natural meaning but can grow towards non-natural meaning,
Grice mentions groaning. A groan is a natural sign of pain, when someone
groans involuntarily. It is possible, however, to produce a groan voluntarily, to
deceive the audience. Then, the perceiver will be led to the conclusion that the
groaner is in pain, but this happens on the basis of the natural meaning of
groaning.
Using this example, Grice shows, in a tentative way, that there is a concep-
tual connection between natural and non-natural meaning. This account has
not been worked out further, and Grice did not intend to sketch a historical or
evolutionary picture of meaning, but the fact that he addresses the transition
from natural to non-natural meaning shows that Grice’s interest really lies in
explaining meaning, rather than just describing it.
Thus, Grice is interested in where meaning comes from, and does not take
meaning as given, as is done in propositional theories of meaning and in Chom-
sky’s conception of language. By taking up this attitude, Grice expresses his
interest in language as a means of communication. In fact, communication takes
a central place in Grice’s definition of meaning: he defines meaning in terms
of what someone intends to convey in an act of communication. This emphasis
cannot be seen in Chomsky’s work.6
Even though Grice is interested in language as a means of communication,
he defines meaning entirely in terms of intentions of individual speakers. In the
next section, we will focus on an account of meaning that takes the public char-
acter of language to be a central aspect: the conventional account of meaning
formulated by David Lewis (Lewis, 1975).
3.2.4 Conventional meaning
We have now seen accounts of meaning that stress the relation between lan-
guage and the world, or between language and the mind. There is a third way
to look at meaning and in this third conception of meaning, the fact that lan-
guage is a conventional activity is taken to be central. When I use a certain
utterance to describe a state of affairs, I do this because I know that this utter-
ance will be meaningful to the listener. How do I know that an utterance will
be connected to a certain meaning? Because I know that there is an existing
convention, in the language I speak, to connect that meaning to that utterance.
More specifically, if I say
(5) Mijn fiets is groen.
to a speaker of Dutch, I know that this speaker will come to understand that
my bicycle is green, because he knows what the utterance means.
The first philosopher to provide a conventional account of meaning was
David Lewis (in Lewis (1969) and Lewis (1975)). Above we have already seen
that Lewis (1970) distinguishes two topics when it comes to the characterisation
6To the contrary; he is not interested in language as a public phenomenon.
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of language: language as a formal system, and language as a social phenomenon.
Lewis (1975) uses this contrast to build a conventional account of meaning: a
distinction is made between languages (specific instances) and language (the
phenomenon).
Languages are sets of strings and meanings such that to each string, a
meaning is assigned. Those meanings he describes in terms of possible worlds
(like we have seen above in the section on propositional meaning). Thus, a
language is a set of pairs of strings and meanings (which are sets of possible
worlds): each string means something, and this meaning is expressed in terms
of possible words.
Language, on the other hand, is mainly a social phenomenon. It is a sphere
of human action in which speakers produce strings of sounds in order to bring
about beliefs or action in a listener (note that this characterisation has very
clear Gricean influences). Within a linguistic community, there are regularities
between (1) beliefs held by a speaker and the utterances he produces, and (2)
utterances of a speaker and the beliefs or actions they bring about in listeners.
These regularities (or at least some of them; see (Lewis, 1975, p. 135)) are
conventions of language.
Now we know that languages are sets of strings and their ascribed meanings,
and language is a convention-governed social activity. The two can be connected
to each other in the following way:
• A language L is used by a population P if and only if there prevails in P
a convention of truthfulness and trust in L, sustained by an interest in
communication.
In a Lewisian account of meaning, propositional meaning (meaning in terms
of possible worlds) is connected to Gricean meaning (meaning in terms of a
speaker’s intention). Propositional accounts of meaning make meaning into
something rather rigid, by connecting utterances to meanings without taking
speakers into account. Gricean meaning, on the other hand, makes meaning
totally dependent on the speakers, without explaining how speakers and hearers
coordinate their communicative intentions by exploiting a pre-existing practice
(Rescorla, 2011). Lewis fills this gap by using the concept of convention.
To wrap up, what is it for a linguistic regularity to be a convention? Speaks
(2010) summarises (and simplifies) Lewis’s conventional account of meaning as
follows:
A sentence S expresses the proposition p if and only if the following
three conditions are satisfied: (1) speakers typically utter S only if
they believe p and typically come to believe p upon hearing S, (2)
members of the community believe that (1) is true, and (3) the fact
that members of the community believe that (1) is true, gives them
a good reason to go on acting so as to make (1) true. (Speaks, 2010)
Thus, in Lewis’s account of meaning, language as a medium for commu-
nication is taken even more seriously than in Grice’s account, and ‘linguistic
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conventions’ are used to explain how speakers understand each other’s utter-
ances.
3.2.5 Conclusion
In my overview of theories of meaning I have attempted, not only to describe
some of the main theories of meaning, but also to give an idea of how the
theories relate to each other. We have seen that three intuitions play a role in
defining language:
reference The things words and sentences refer to are important when we
want to know their meaning.
intention and belief When a speaker makes an utterance, he typically in-
tends his audience to come to believe something.
convention Our utterances have the meanings they have because these utter-
ances have been used by other speakers in similar situations.
These three intuitions can be seen as competing accounts of meaning, but
they all capture an aspect of natural language. We will see that all three con-
cepts will play a role in the next part of the chapter, where the emergence of
meaning in human language is discussed.
Speaking about meaning in the context of the language evolution debate
poses certain demands on one’s claims: an evolutionary account of meaning
has to take into account the fact that there has been a transition, from an-
imals with very primitive communicative means and limited cognitive skills,
to humans with sophisticated cognitive and communicative capabilities. When
embedded in the language evolution debate, we cannot simply assume that hu-
man skills are of a different kind than those of animals and then continue to
describe meaning in an exclusively human fashion. Put differently, an evolu-
tionary account of meaning cannot take meanings as given entities; it has to
say something about ‘where they come from’.
Formulated thus, it would seem that in the language evolution debate, ac-
counts that define meaning in terms of reference cannot play an important role,
because they define meaning for existing languages without going into the ques-
tion where meaning comes from. But this is not true. Such accounts capture
the intuition that we use language to refer to things in the world, and they
have an appealing account of how the meaning of a sentence depends on the
meanings of the parts of that sentence. In other words, propositional accounts
of meaning provide a way to describe how the meanings of sentences are built
up compositionally. The only thing they do not provide is a way to tell why
meaning is there.
This very propensity, the built-in assumption that “words mean
things”, is perhaps the most basic biological prerequisite of the
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semantic component of human language. It is this assumption, I
suggest, that leads humans to attribute magical powers to names
and words, and it is this same intuition that underlies the realist
stance towards linguistic meaning. [. . . ] The evolution of this refer-
ential assumption is one of our core explananda in a theory of the
evolution of language. (Fitch, 2010, p. 125)
Thus, propositional accounts of meaning capture a central aspect of natural
language: that words are used to refer to things in the world.
A Gricean account of meaning defines meaning in terms of what the speaker
of an utterance intends, and thus makes language depend on the mind of the
speaker. Thereby, Grice avoids making the assumption that meaning is some-
thing given. If we would put a Gricean account of meaning in an evolutionary
context, we could picture the emergence of meaning in human language as a
process that comes along with the emergence of the human mind. An example
of such an account is given in section 3.4.
Lewis defines meaning in terms of convention. Speakers use utterances be-
cause they belong to a certain linguistic community and they know that certain
utterances apply in certain situations. In this account, meaning is defined with
an appeal to previous language users. An evolutionary picture of the emer-
gence of meaning in human language in which this idea takes a central position
is sketched in section 3.6.
3.3 Meaning in an evolutionary context
3.3.1 New demands on accounts of meaning
In the previous section, we have seen various theories of meaning and we have
distilled three central ideas that are important when meaning is concerned:
reference, belief and intention, and convention. These central ideas will continue
to play a role in the following chapters, where we are going to look at empirical
evidence about the emergence of meaning and language. But before we do
that, we will first have a look at more recent work in philosophy, in which the
nature of meaning is discussed explicitly in an evolutionary context. In other
words, we will now broaden our view and look at, not just characterisations of
natural language meaning, but proposals that describe how meaning in human
language came about.
As stated above, when looking at accounts of the emergence of meaning,
different things become important, because we can no longer take meaning ‘for
granted’. In other words, we cannot just assume that meaning is out there and
that the concept of meaning will take care of itself. This is so, because we
are no longer only looking at human language. By considering the emergence
of meaning in language, it is the transition from animal-like communication
systems to human language that is under consideration. The concepts that are
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used to describe this process have to be suitable to describe this transition, and
it is no longer enough to use concepts that are only applicable to humans. This
need for clear concepts has been recognised by other authors too:
One of the primary needs is to formulate a lasting framework of
properties and principles that can be understood across disciplines,
and that can be used as a set of standards for comparison among
species. (Oller and Griebel, 2004, p. 3)
The goal in this part of the chapter is to look at such properties and prin-
ciples that have been put forward in the literature. It is very hard, however, to
develop a conceptual apparatus that will be used to describe the emergence of
meaning, without actually saying something about the emergence of meaning
itself. And this is exactly what we will see: concepts that were proposed in the
literature come with a set of hypotheses about the nature of the process of the
emergence of meaning. My task is now to present concepts proposed in recent
literature and the evolutionary assumptions that come with them.
I will start out (in section 3.4) by describing the work of Peter Ga¨rdenfors,
and focus on the concepts he uses to describe animal and human communi-
cation and cognition, and the evolutionary trajectory sketched by him. It will
become clear that Ga¨rdenfors emphasises the role of cognitive structures in
the evolution of language, and he argues that sophisticated cognitive struc-
tures were present in the last common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees.
In other words, he claims that sophisticated semantic structures in cognition
predated sophisticated structures in language.
After describing Ga¨rdenfors’s work, I will discuss the work of other authors,
who seem to make similar assumptions about the relation between language and
mental representations (in section 3.5.1). I will point out that these underlying
assumptions play a role when empirical data is interpreted, and sketch some
problems with the Ga¨rdenfors-like line of thinking (in section 3.5.2).
Subsequently, I will give an overview of the philosophical work of Ruth
Millikan about the emergence and nature of meaning (in section 3.6). Her
approach to natural language meaning is slightly different from Ga¨rdenfors’s,
in that she emphasises the conventional character of language. Millikan does
not endorse the view that sophisticated cognitive skills predate language, and
she lays a great emphasis on the way in which language has changed the way
in which we think. Taking notice of her view might help us to find, eventually,
a balanced starting point to do empirical work from.
As mentioned above, the accounts of meaning in this part of the chapter
are not about meaning in human language alone. In fact, they describe what
role meaning plays in the behaviour of animals, and then speculate about the
trajectory that takes us from animal meaning to human meaning. Both Ga¨rden-
fors and Millikan refer to studies of animal behaviour in order to show how the
concepts they develop apply. In the discussion of their work, I will focus on
two animal species in particular. The first is genetically very much unrelated
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Figure 3.4: This illustrates how the angle of the waggling part of the dance
corresponds to the direction of the food source: the angle between the waggling
part and a vertical line is compared to the angle between the line from the hive
to the sun and the line from the hive to the food source.
to humans, the honeybee. The second is genetically quite closely related to
humans, the chimpanzee. Let me introduce these briefly, and explain why their
behaviour is interesting in the context of this chapter.
3.3.2 Honeybees: wonders of animal behaviour?
Honeybees are an interesting species to study in the light of language evolution
because they are genetically quite remote from humans on the one hand, but
they have a quite sophisticated means of communication on the other: the
honeybee dance. Honeybees have a very specific method of communicating
about the location of food sources. Whenever they come from a food source
and arrive at the hive, they make specific movements, while waggling their
tails. This is what is called the honeybee dance. If the food source is relatively
close (closer than approximately 150 meters) to the hive, they dance in circles,
and when the food source is further away, the dance has a figure-eight shape.
Different properties of the dance correspond to different properties of the food
location, in the following way:
• The angle of the middle axis of the figure-eight corresponds to the direc-
tion of the food source. (See the illustration for a more detailed explana-
tion.)
• The speed of the dance corresponds to the distance of the food source.
• The liveliness of the dance corresponds to the desirability of the food
source.
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And the bee dances not only for food, but also for other things, whenever
they are needed, such as waxy materials, when a new hive is being built, and
possible locations for a hive when a subpart of the bee colony is planning to
move out of the existing hive. The latter application of the dance is especially
impressive. When a new hive location is being searched for, several bees fly out
to explore the environment. When they come back they make a dance about
some possible hive location they have spotted. Then, the different dances of
the scouting bees are compared, and the most desirable location is picked.7
Many researchers have been impressed by the honeybee’s communicative
behavior. Gould and Gould (1995), for example, decribe it as “one of the seven
wonders of animal behavior”. Some researchers even call the bees’ communi-
cation system a language. Crist (2004) presents a list of prominent biologists,
who all claim that the honeybee dance has a property that has been defined as
a core property of human language: symbolism (see (Crist, 2004, p. 19)). There
have also been researchers who claim that it would be a mistake to call the
honeybee communication system a symbolic language (see Crist (2004) and,
e.g., Sjo¨lander (1997)).
Sjo¨lander (1997) warns us that when we describe the behaviour of animals,
using concepts that apply well to humans, we might overestimate animals:
[A]n important lesson is that we may—in the myriad of different
cognitive systems that the animal kingdom offers—find many phe-
nomena which in humans are explained by a rather complicated
cognitive mechanism, but in animals may be the effect of a direct-
wired connection evolved for the specific purpose, not as an effect
of a general cognitive capacity.
In this line, Sjo¨lander argues that the honeybee dance cannot be symbolic.
Rather, he describes the dance as highly ‘ritualized intention movement’. In-
tention movement is a term from biology for an incomplete pattern of behavior
that provides information to other animals.8 According to Sjo¨lander, the hon-
eybee dance is nothing more than a concatenation of initial flight movements,
broken off and started over again. The angle of the waggling part corresponds
to the direction of the food location, simply because the initial flight movement
is one in the direction of the food source. These intention movements can be
used by other bees to predict certain things, but this is not the same as saying
that the dancing bee is intentionally transmitting symbolic information.
To conclude, honeybee dance is certainly intriguing. It has led researchers to
saying mystical things about bees, and caused them to make grand claims about
the status of honeybee communication, even though honeybees are, genetically
speaking, quite remote from humans. The honeybee language discussion shows
us that it is important to have clearly defined concepts, and that we should
7See Gould and Gould (1995) for a very extensive description of the honeybee’s commu-
nicative behavior.
8See also Tinbergen (1964).
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be careful with our use of concepts that apply well to human behavior, in
describing that of animals.
3.3.3 Chimpanzees: still waters run deep?
The chimpanzee, it is said, is the closest genetic relative of humans, which
means that they share the most recent common ancestor with humans. In fact,
the chimpanzee family (pan) consists of two subspecies: the common chim-
panzee (pan troglodytes) and the bonobo (pan paniscus). The genetic similarity
between humans and pan troglodytes is around 96 to 98.75 percent, and chimps
and humans diverged from their common ancestor about 5 to 6 million years
ago.9 Thus, the divergence of humans and chimps is relatively recent, and their
genetic makeup is quite similar. Still, there are very important differences in
human and chimpanzee behavior : whereas humans have a very sophisticated
means of communication (language), chimpanzees don’t; they do communicate,
but their ‘utterances’ lack the syntactic and semantic complexity of human ut-
terances.
It has become clear from research that, even after a lot of effort is put into
trying to teach them language, apes only have a rudimentary ability to build
and comprehend sentences.10 But on the other hand, apes score much better if
you look at their linguistic capacities in terms of communicative goals, instead
of syntactic structure.
Given the apparent discrepancy described above (little genetic difference
between humans and chimps, but large behavioral, and linguistic, differences),
a huge variety of opinions exists about the cognitive capacities of chimpanzees:
how is the external world mentally represented in the chimpanzee? There is
reason to believe that, despite the fact that they have no language, chimpanzees
have a rich mental life (because of the genetic relatedness to humans), but on
the other hand, there is reason to believe that the chimp’s cognitive capacities
are restricted (because of the absence of a complex language).
Even though numerous behavioral studies have been carried out, there is
no conclusive evidence for either position. We will focus on this debate below,
after the description of Ga¨rdenfors’s evolutionary account of meaning.
9About both the issue of similarity and divergence, there is quite some discussion. But for
both topics, the discussions are technical, and not relevant here. See e.g. Navarro and Barton
(2003) and the subsequent discussion for more details.
10Much disagreement exists about what exactly primates are capable of. See e.g. the con-
trast between Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) and Wynne (2004), about the linguistic abilities
of a bonobo named Kanzi.
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3.4 From cognition to meaning
3.4.1 Ga¨rdenfors: cued and detached representation
Ga¨rdenfors sketches the emergence of complex meaning in language, and he
does this by first describing the emergence of mental representation and sub-
sequently connecting this to communication.
The behavior of very simple organisms is guided, to a great degree, directly
by what they perceive from the external world. This very direct perception-
based behavior is still present in humans, for example when we touch something
very hot. But our relation with the world consists of more than only direct
sensory information. We categorize what we perceive, and think about things
even when they are not there. In other words, we make representations. Also
it can be said of many animal species that they categorize the world, or think
about things that are not present, though not as extensively as humans do.
In order to describe the differences between animals and humans, Ga¨rdenfors
introduces two notions: cued and detached representations.
“A cued representation stands for something that is present in the current
external situation of the representing organism.” (Ga¨rdenfors, 1996a, p. 266).
Detached representations, on the other hand, “may stand for objects or events
that are neither present in the current situation nor triggered by some recent
situation” (Ga¨rdenfors, 1996a, p. 266). To clarify the role of detached repre-
sentations, Ga¨rdenfors relates it to an idea from Craik (1943).
If the organism carries a ‘small scale model’ of external reality and
of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out
various alternatives, conclude which are the best of them, react to
future situations before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past
events in dealing with the present and future, and in every way to
react in a much fuller, safer and more competent manner to the
emergencies which face it (Craik, 1943, p. 61, quoted in Ga¨rdenfors
(1996b)).
Ga¨rdenfors defines the ‘small scale model’ as the collection of all detached
representations the organism has in its repertoire. In other words, all things
the organism can actively think about.
Ga¨rdenfors describes the evolution of human thinking as a process in which
more and more representations become detached. The distinction between cued
and detached, however, is not a sharp one: it is possible for a representation
to have a degree of detachment, and representations with a detached flavor are
present in animals. An example of this is the chimpanzee who fetches a stick to
fish for termites. The behavior of the chimpanzee can only be explained if we
assume that it has a detached representation of the stick (Ga¨rdenfors, 2004a,
p. 238).
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On the level of utterances, Ga¨rdenfors uses the distinction between signals
and symbols that was introduced by C.S. Peirce.11 The reference of a symbol is
a detached representation; a signal refers to a cued representation (Ga¨rdenfors,
1996b). Because a signal refers to a cued representation, and a cued represen-
tation is always about things that are present in the current outer environ-
ment, signals can be described as referring to things in the outer environment.
Symbols, on the other hand, refer to detached representations, so they can be
described as referring to things in the ‘inner environment’. Because language is
symbolic, possession of language presumes, according to Ga¨rdenfors, something
like an inner environment.
3.4.2 The path to human cognition and language
Now that we have seen the basic elements of Ga¨rdenfors’s conceptual frame-
work, let us see how they are put together.
For his sketch of the transition from animal to human, Ga¨rdenfors dis-
tinguishes 6 kinds of communication systems, as depicted in figure 3.5. The
two dimensions along the lines of which the systems are formed are the type
of representation (cued or detached) on the one hand and complexity of the
communication system on the other. In communication systems, Ga¨rdenfors
distinguishes three levels of complexity. Systems with single elements are
communication systems where only single signs, icons or symbols are used. In
compositional systems, signs or symbols are combined in a compositional
way. Systems with grammar are systems where the composed expressions
contain different kinds of grammatical markers, and constraints on word order
(Ga¨rdenfors, 1995).
In the resulting six types, Ga¨rdenfors envisages the following evolutionary
order:
• The starting point is type 1, primitive animal signals, which are cued and
have no structure.
• Then, type 4 follows, where the ‘inner environment’ is developed and
referred to with one-word utterances.
• Then, limited combinations are introduced: a communication system of
type 5, protolanguage. In the protolanguage stage, symbols are combined,
but utterances do not contain grammatical elements. As an example of
such communication systems, Ga¨rdenfors quotes Bickerton (1990), where
it is proposed that living fossils of once-existing protolanguages can be
found in e.g. child language and first generation pidgin languages.
• Eventually, after the development of more arbitrary symbols and syntac-
tic rules, grammaticality arises, and we arrive at type 6.
If the path to human language features type 1, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, what
about type 2 and 3? No example in practice of a type 3 communication system
11See Atkin (2010).
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Figure 3.5: Six types of communication systems, according to (Ga¨rdenfors,
1995, p. 7).
has been found, Ga¨rdenfors claims. And communication systems of type 2 are
rare, Ga¨rdenfors points out, but they are the ones that are found in honeybees.
Ga¨rdenfors’s analysis of the honeybee dance is perfectly in line with the
position we have seen above: that we should be careful in applying the term
‘symbolic behavior’ to the bee’s dance. So Ga¨rdenfors does not call honeybee
dance a language. But how does honeybee behavior fit into Ga¨rdenfors’s frame-
work? In order to answer this question, let us focus on two supposed properties
of the honeybee dance that Ga¨rdenfors comments on in his work.
First of all, the honeybee dance, supposedly, displays displacement, in the
sense described in Hockett (1960): by dancing, the bees transmit information
about things that are not here and not now. In Ga¨rdenfors’s terms this would
translate into the bees having detached representations, and communicating
about them. But Ga¨rdenfors does not share this view. Referring to the fact
that honeybees only dance right after returning from a food source, he claims
that honeybees use their dance ‘in a cued manner’ (Ga¨rdenfors, 1996b).
A second property of honeybee dance that comes across in Ga¨rdenfors’s
work is compositionality. Bees convey information about the direction and
the distance of the food source in one dance movement, in such a way that
one aspect of the dance corresponds in a systematic way to one aspect of the
information that is given, and another aspect of the dance to another part of the
information. Hence, the honeybee dance is described as being compositional.
Ga¨rdenfors agrees with this view, and the concept of compositionality occupies
a special position in his picture of the transition from animal to human.
Ga¨rdenfors’s schema is not very fine-grained, and it might benefit from fur-
ther specification. But with the schema, he specifies his hypothesis about the
emergence of language in the course of evolution. Moreover, along the way, he
shows that the concepts of cued and detached representations are useful for
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sketching a picture of the evolution of language. Much of his position, however,
remains unarticulated. In order to get a clearer and more explicit picture of
Ga¨rdenfors’s position, I focus on two properties of the scheme and the way
in which the concepts ‘cued’ and ‘detached’ are put to use in it. First of all,
in figure 3.5, two dimensions are discerned: one about mental representation
(the vertical dimension) and one about (complexity of) communication (the
horizontal dimension). This is not without reason: Ga¨rdenfors is of the opinion
that the dimensions of speech and thought are independent, and should be an-
alyzed independently. Secondly, when we focus on the evolutionary order of the
different communication systems Ga¨rdenfors proposes, the step from cued to
detached representations was made first, and the complexity of communication
increased only after that.
These two aspects of Ga¨rdenfors’s view become important when it comes to
the description of chimpanzees in terms of the framework. Speech and thought
should be analyzed separately, but there is a certain dependency between the
two: one needs to have an inner environment in order to have symbolic com-
munication. In other words, mental capacities are prior to communicative ca-
pacities. In Ga¨rdenfors (2004b) a quite specific list of mental capacities is given
that are prerequisites for language, but it is possible, as Ga¨rdenfors posits, to
have many cognitive functions without actually having language (Ga¨rdenfors,
2004b, p. 171).
Ga¨rdenfors’s way of describing things is compatible with a picture of chim-
panzees (and other primates) that have a relatively rich inner life, but no ad-
vanced communication system. And this fact will become important below,
when we compare this view to that of other authors. But before we do that,
there is one last facet of Ga¨rdenfors’s view I would like to say something about:
how does Ga¨rdenfors describe the goings on in human minds and human lan-
guage (i.e., modern language)?
3.4.3 Ga¨rdenfors on meaning in modern language
We have seen above that Ga¨rdenfors prefers to analyze mental representation
and communication separately. When it comes to the content of communicative
utterances in human language, however, he postulates a quite strong relation:
the contents of utterances in human language correspond directly to a mental
representation. This is directly visible in the way Ga¨rdenfors defines symbols
(see above): as referring to things in the ‘inner environment’. Ga¨rdenfors realizes
that this position is not universally accepted:
If symbols refer to the inner world, the meanings of words must be
located in the head and not out in the world. This opinion stands
in sharp contrast to many philosophical theories that claim that
language is about the external world. (Ga¨rdenfors, 2004b, p. 145)
I will briefly go into the specifics of the philosophical discussion that is
connected to this below, but see also Ga¨rdenfors (1993) for a full specification
Chapter 3. Meaning and evolution 71
of his position and an embedding in the current philosophical literature. For
the moment, let me illustrate how Ga¨rdenfors’s position concerning language
connects to his hypothesis about the order of things in the course of evolution.
Note the following claim about symbols:
Symbols referring to something in the inner world of a person can
be used to communicate as soon as the listeners have, or are pre-
pared to add, corresponding representations in their inner worlds.
(Ga¨rdenfors, 2004b, p. 145)
Meaning is conceptualization in a cognitive model (not truth con-
ditions in possible worlds). Ga¨rdenfors (1999)
From these claims it becomes clear that Ga¨rdenfors’s position concerning
this point connects well to his hypothesis that in the course of evolution, de-
tached representations are first fully developed, and communication becomes
more complex only later: for symbols to refer to the inner environment, it is
necessary that the inner environment be ‘ready’ first. This claim is central to
Ga¨rdenfors’s position.
To sum up, Ga¨rdenfors sketches an evolutionary trajectory where mental
capacities develop prior to communicative capacities. This is compatible with a
picture of meaning that defines modern language meaning in terms of mental
representations. I will call this view of the emergence of meaning the cognitive
road to meaning. In recent literature on the emergence of language, many au-
thors seem to have such a picture of meaning in mind. I will review some of
these in the next section, and subsequently discuss criticism of the emphasis
on cognition.
3.5 Evaluating the cognitive road to language
Above, we have seen that the cognitive road to meaning is a picture of the
emergence of meaning that postulates that in the course of evolution, sophisti-
cated mental representation developed first, and complex meaning in language
emerged only afterwards.
3.5.1 In defense of a cognitive road to language
Jim Hurford’s 2007 book ‘The Origins of Meaning’ offers a very rich and inter-
disciplinary inquiry into the emergence of meaning. It describes the cognitive
capacities of many animals, quoting empirical results from behavioral biology
and psychology and other areas, and proposes an evolutionary trajectory where
cognitive representations of animals are the ancestors of abstract thought in
humans and of meaning in human language.
Hurford shows that many features of human language have their roots in
animal cognition. An example is the connection between object permanence
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(to be aware that an object continues to exist, even when it is not perceived)
in animals and displaced reference in language. When a speaker expresses in-
formation about an event in the past or the future, she refers to something
that is not present ‘here and now’. This property of human language, that it
can be about things that are remote in time or space, is called displaced refer-
ence and has been indicated as interesting from the point of view of language
evolution as early as the 1960s. Charles Hockett, in an article on the origin of
speech (Hockett, 1960), lists four design features that are unique (or practically
unique) to human communication. Displacement is one of them:
Man is apparently almost unique in being able to talk about things
that are remote in space or time (or both) from where the talking
goes on. (Hockett, 1960)
Displaced reference is present in human communication, and seems to be
absent in animal communication. But, according to Hockett, it would not be in
principle impossible to have displacement in simple communication systems:
It is also possible to see how faint traces of displacement might
develop in a call system even in the absence of productivity, duality
and thoroughgoing traditional transmission. (Hockett, 1960)
Before we look at the ways in which displaced reference is realised in re-
stricted linguistic systems, we will briefly look at a connection between dis-
placed reference and the cognitive capacity of object permanence.
The fact that displaced reference is present in human communication and
not in animal communication, but that faint traces of it might develop in simple
call systems, makes the notion interesting to study in the light of language
evolution. Moreover, displaced reference seems to exist not only in language:
Something akin to communicative displacement is involved in lug-
ging a stick or a stone around; it is like talking today about what
one should do tomorrow. (Hockett, 1960)
Thus, displaced reference is something that not only belongs to language
but is recognised in behaviour in a more general sense. Hurford (2007) suggests
that the property of language called displaced reference has its roots in the
cognitive systems of the language-using individuals as the capacity of object
permanence. Object permanence is the capacity of being aware that an object
continues to exist, even when it is not perceived. The emergence of this capacity
was first studied in children (Piaget, 1954), and later also in different animal
species (see Hurford (2007), p. 38–40, for a brief overview and references).
When an animal has achieved object permanence, it is aware that an ob-
ject continues to exist, even when no sensory information about the object is
available. There are an enormous number of articles about object permanence
in the literature on animal cognition. In these articles, results are presented
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from tests done on various animals, in order to see whether they have achieved
object permanence. To test an animal for the capacity of object permanence,
two kinds of test can be distinguished.
Visible displacement: an object is visibly (to the animal subject) moved
behind an obstruction, and the animal is tested to see whether it searches
for the object behind the obstruction.
Invisible displacement: an object is, in sight of the subject, placed inside
a box. Then the box is moved behind an obstruction and the object is
removed from the box, without the animal seeing this. Then the subject is
shown the empty box, and the experimenter observes whether the animal
looks behind the obstruction. (Hurford, 2007, p. 38)
As might be clear from the descriptions, invisible displacement is a more
complex task than visible displacement. The results of these tests, as summa-
rized in Hurford (2007) for different animal species, are the following:
• Most vertebrates that were tested (including avians, non-primate mam-
mals, and primates) succeed in the visible displacement test.
• Some animals, including domestic dogs, parrots and apes succeed in the
invisible displacement task.
• Every animal that is able to do invisible displacement is also able to do
visible displacement.
• Within primates, the closer the genetic relation to humans, the greater
the chance that the animal will succeed in the invisible displacement task.
• Surprisingly, parrots perform better than some monkeys.
Thus, there are animals that solve the invisible displacement task, and this
shows that in these animals, the representation of an object is controlled by
knowledge (or memory), and not merely perception. Moreover, the fact that
primates that are closest related to humans perform best at the displacement
task suggests that displacement is a key capacity in the development of animals
towards a linguistic capacity. Or, to put it in Hurfords words:
The capacity to know something about an object, even when ‘it
isn’t there’ is a first step along the road to the impressive charac-
teristics of human languages, their capacity for displaced reference.
(Hurford, 2007, p. 72)
Here a path is sketched, starting from animal cognition, that results in dis-
placed reference in human language, on the basis of evidence from comparative
studies.
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Another example that Hurford provides is the relation between transitive
inference, and social ‘reasoning’. Transitive inference is the human ability to
conclude, given that A is taller than B and B is taller than C, that A is taller
than C (given that ‘taller than’ is a transitive relation). Social ‘reasoning’ is
observed in social animals like primates: individuals are often able to keep track
of e.g. dominance relations among the group members. They seem to be aware
that if individual A is stronger than B, and B is stronger than C, then A is
stronger than C. In the wild, many primates behave according to such rules;
they know who is dominant over whom, even when the groups in which they
live are big (and for big groups it is quite unlikely that all dominance relations
are stored separately in memory, because this would be a very long list). In
the lab, many animal species were tested with artificial dominance relations:
they would be trained with a set of stimuli, in which stimulus A yielded a
bigger reward than B, and B a bigger reward than C. Many animal species
(like macaques, rats and pinyon jays) showed that they were able to infer, after
being trained to choose A over B and B over C, that they should choose A over
C.12
This behaviour can be seen as the root of human transitive inference. How-
ever, Hurford notes, there is a lot of discussion, especially around lab experi-
ments in this domain, and in general, ‘transitive inference’ in the case of animals
is much more domain specific than it is in the case of humans (Hurford, 2007,
p. 45–49).
After showing several respects in which animals approach human cognitive
capacities, Hurford goes on to claim that animals (at least mammals) represent
the world using what we could call proto-propositions. In the second half of the
book, Hurford examines the evolution of communication. He notes that:
Books necessarily have linear structure, and the separation into pri-
vate and public evolutionary developments is an expository conve-
nience, not implying that the evolution of private conceptions and
of social behaviour were not intertwined; they certainly were.
Despite this remark, Hurford’s sketch of evolutionary history is very much
in line with Ga¨rdenfors’s, in the sense that Hurford lays an emphasis on the
emergence of complex cognitive structure in animals. It seems that in his picture
of the emergence of complex meaning, the private comes before the public. In
other words, in primates, cognitive structure is there, but it is not used in
communication.
We have seen that animals lead quite rich cognitive lives, with signs
of the beginnings of much of what has often been taken to be distinc-
tively human. But mostly they keep this rich content to themselves.
(Hurford, 2007, p. 164)
12In many studies the lists of items were longer than 3, ranging from four or five up to
fifteen (Hurford, 2007, p. 45–49).
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Hurford is not the only one implying this order of events in evolutionary
history. A similar stance is taken by Fitch (2010). When the latter sketches the
properties of the Last Common Ancestor of humans and chimps, he emphasises
its cognitive capabilities and, like Hurford, states that its communication was
limited.
The LCA [Last Common Ancestor] had a rich suite of conceptual
tools, forcing the conclusion that our shared ancestor could form
concepts and memories, exhibit goal-directed behavior, draw ba-
sic inferences such as transitive inference, predict the movement
of invisible objects, and learn complex serial orders, including at
least some involving hierarchical tasks. Our prelinguistic hominid
ancestors were sophisticated tool users. They lived complex social
lives, requiring elaborate cognitive representations, and had well-
developed concepts of space, time and causality. [. . . ] In sharp con-
trast, [. . . ] the communication systems of modern primates, and
thus of the LCA, are far more limited. (Fitch, 2010, p. 173)
3.5.2 Criticising the cognitive road to meaning
Bickerton (2008) In a review of Hurford (2007), Bickerton (2008) character-
izes two possible problems one can run into when talking about the emergence
of language:
• The lower you rate the cognitive capacities of apes, the harder it becomes
to explain how we (humans) got language.
• The higher you rate the cognitive capacities of apes, the harder it becomes
to explain why they did not get language. (Bickerton, 2008, p. 285)
Hurford, Bickerton goes on to claim, is very much aware of the first problem,
but thereby does not take the second seriously enough. To be more specific,
according to Bickerton, Hurford gives animals the benefit of the doubt in too
many cases, thereby positioning them too closely to humans in terms of cog-
nitive abilities. When working from this position, it naturally becomes hard
to address the second possible problem, but also the claim itself (that animals
approach human cognition) has been a recent subject of criticism, for example
in Penn et al. (2008).
Penn et al. (2008) In Penn et al. (2008), the claim is defended that there is
a discontinuity between animal and human minds. Citing work from behavioral
biology and psychology, the authors compare the cognitive capacities of humans
and animals in different domains, such as causal and spatial reasoning and
transitive inference. When they treat the latter topic, they give, like Hurford,
an overview of research concerning serial ordering and transitivity, both in the
lab and in the wild. They even report observations of fish in the wild being able,
after seeing a series of pairwise fights, to keep track of a dominance ordering
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among five rival males. Still, after presenting these and other results, they claim
the following:
[N]one of the available comparative evidence suggests that nonhu-
man animals are able to process transitive inferences in a system-
atic or logical fashion, even in the social domain. (Penn et al., 2008,
p. 116)
Their motivation for this claim is that the domains in which animals display
this capacity are very much restricted:
[T]he comparative evidence accumulated to date is nevertheless con-
sistent with the hypothesis that nonhuman animals’ understanding
of transitive relations is punctate, egocentric, non-logical, and con-
text specific. (Penn et al., 2008, p. 117)
In an inquiry after an explanation for the discontinuity between animals and
humans, they arrive, first of all, at the conclusion that language is not the factor
that made the difference (Penn et al., 2008, p. 120–123). To give a very short
account of their arguments for this: they suggest that the kind of hierarchical
structures one needs to speak complex modern languages most likely did not
develop solely for language and that there are good reasons to assume that
these hierarchical structures developed in cognition before language emerged.
Thus, the crucial difference between animals and humans should be looked for
in the domain of cognition, and eventually described in cognitive terms.
To explain the cognitive discontinuity between humans and animals, they
propose the relational reinterpretation hypothesis. In short: “humans alone pos-
sess the [. . . ] capability of reinterpreting [. . . ] perceptually grounded represen-
tations in terms of higher-order, role-governed, inferentially systematic, explic-
itly structural relations” (p. 127). Penn et al. do not provide a fully worked out
account of this hypothesis, so let me summarize at this point what is impor-
tant in the context of this chapter: Penn et al. strongly argue against (a) the
cognitive continuity between animals and humans and (b) the identification of
language as the crucial difference between animal and human.
As was also noted in Bickerton (2008), the conclusions in Hurford (2007)
and Penn et al. (2008) are based partly on, the same empirical research results.
This shows that it is not straightforward to interpret empirical data and put
them in a broader context, as is done in these publications.
If we focus on the specific example of ‘transitive inference’ in animals and
humans, we see that Hurford is willing to describe what he sees (or what is
reported by the researchers he quotes) in animal behavior as cases of actual
transitive inference. Penn et al. (2008), on the other hand, are not. Even though
they are looking at the same body of data, they draw different conclusions.
Partly, I suspect, this difference is connected to whatever the authors define as
‘being a case of transitive inference’. It seems that Hurford is more willing to
ascribe the concept to what he sees in animals than Penn et al.. This means
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that it is not only an empirical issue that is at stake here, but also a definitional
one: is the term ‘transitive inference’ a term we should reserve for humans only,
or should we loosen the term a bit and allow what is going on in some animals
as cases of transitive inference too?
To recapitulate: the two publications I described—Hurford (2007) and Penn
et al. (2008)—both provide analyses of and conclusions about empirical research
on the behavior of animals. The disagreement between Penn et al. and Hurford
illustrates that what is sometimes taken to be empirical evidence for one au-
thor, can be used as empirical evidence for the opposite view by another. This
illustrates that for a uniform interpretation of empirical data, it is important
to have well defined concepts, especially when the behaviour of both humans
and animals is concerned. Moreover, although it seems intuitive to endorse the
view that cognition, in evolutionary history, matured before language arrived,
that is not necessarily the actual order of events.
3.5.3 Conclusion
We have seen an evolutionary picture sketched by Ga¨rdenfors, in which the con-
nection between cognitive structures and natural language meaning is deemed
important, and in which, in the course of evolution, sophisticated cognition was
in place before language became more complex. The evolutionary assumptions
made by Ga¨rdenfors can also be seen in the work of other authors focusing on
the emergence of meaning, and I have called this common view the cognitive
road to natural language meaning. We have also seen that this view faces prob-
lems: first of all, because the higher you rate the cognitive capacities of apes,
the harder it becomes to explain why they did not get language. Secondly, be-
cause the empirical evidence that should prove that the cognitive capacities of
various animals are sophisticated is not easy to interpret. In the literature, we
have seen that behavioural studies that have been used to show complex traits
in animals, have been used by different researchers to show that the behaviour
under discussion is not that sophisticated, or at least very context specific.
I do not pretend to know the unique correct way to interpret studies of
animal behaviour, nor do I have any idea how smart our closest cousins the
chimpanzees, or any other species, really are. But I do think we need to be
cautious, both when ascribing certain cognitive capacities to animals, and when
saying that they do not have these capacities. The terms that are used to
describe capacities are simply not clear enough to make such claims: what
exactly is reasoning or transitive inference when it comes to species other than
our own?
I am convinced that the cognitive road to meaning is a viable one, despite
the problems described above. For many centuries, it has not been recognised
at all that animals have capacities that approach human capacities in any way.
The fact that animal cognition is now taken seriously as a discipline has opened
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a lot of doors in the language evolution debate.13
On the other hand, we have observed that a characterisation of the tran-
sition from animal to human with too much emphasis on cognition might be
unbalanced. To sum up, Ga¨rdenfors’s view that natural language meaning and
cognition are closely connected is reflected in his sketch of the transition from
animal to human, and this picture has been subject to criticism. In order to
arrive at a balanced view let me recapitulate the first part of this chapter. We
have observed that there are roughly three intuitions about the nature of mean-
ing in natural language: first of all, the intuition that words and sentences refer
to things in the world (referential theories of meaning). Secondly, the intuition
that when a speaker makes an utterance, he typically intends his audience to
come to believe something (meaning in terms of intention and belief). Thirdly,
the intuition that our utterances have the meaning they have because these
utterances have been used by other speakers in similar situations (conventional
meaning).
So far, in this chapter, we have seen that the first intuition is not a good
starting point for an evolutionary account of meaning (see section 3.2). The
second intuition is the one underlying Ga¨rdenfors’s work, of which we have
seen that it might need to be adapted in order to become more balanced. The
third intuition is what we will turn our attention to next, because I suspect
that when the conventional and communicative character of natural language
is taken more seriously, this might result in a more balanced picture of its
emergence. In other words, we will deviate from the cognitive road to meaning
to see where a more communicative road leads us.
In the next section we will look at the work of Ruth Millikan, who, like
Ga¨rdenfors, introduces terms to talk about cognition and communication in
animals and humans, and about the transition from animal to human. Unlike
Ga¨rdenfors, Millikan does not focus so much on cognition, when she discusses
meaning, but rather relates meaning to convention. After describing Millikan’s
work, I will compare the two roads to natural language meaning and sketch
how these two scenarios will be used in the remainder of this dissertation.
3.6 Meaning and communication
3.6.1 Millikan: Pushmi Pullyu Representations
In order to be able to describe animal behavior in a way that is useful in the
context of the language evolution debate, Millikan introduced the notion of a
pushmi pullyu representation (PPR). A PPR is a primitive kind of represen-
tation that conveys descriptive and directive information at the same time. In
order to give a clear picture of what Millikan means by directive and descriptive
information, let me quote a passage that she uses to illustrate it:
13See (Fitch, 2010, p.144–147) for a brief historical overview of this development.
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A list of groceries, Professor Anscombe once suggested, might be
used as a shopping list, telling what to buy, or it might be used as
an inventory list, telling what has been bought (Anscombe 1957).
If used as a shopping list, the world is supposed to conform to the
representation: if the list does not match what is in the grocery bag,
it is what is in the bag that is at fault. But if used as an inventory
list, the representation is supposed to conform to the world: if the
list does not match what is in the bag, it is the list that is at fault.
(Millikan, 2005, p. 166)
The first example, with the shopping list, is an example of directive infor-
mation. The list represents, or directs, what is to be done. The second example,
with the inventory list, is an example of descriptive information. Here, the list
represents what is the case. As pointed out above, a PPR combines directive
and descriptive information, but is more primitive than either directive or de-
scriptive representations. To put this in Millikan’s words, PPRs tell “in one
breath both what is the case and what to do about it” (Millikan, 2004a, p. 18).
Although PPRs convey two kinds of information, they are highly inarticu-
late and are only fit for very specific tasks. They are only useful in situations
where some kind of description and some kind of desired action is appropri-
ate at the same time. Let me illustrate this with the following: an example of
a PPR is what happens in the mental realm of a mother bird when it sees
the open beaks of its young. When this happens, the mother gets descriptive
information: ‘these are the open beaks of my young’. But it also gets direc-
tive information: ‘put food into these beaks’. The two kinds of information
are present in the PPR at once; the mother cannot see the open beaks of the
young without getting both the descriptive and the directive information. In
other words, when the mother bird sees her young she cannot do anything but
have the urge to feed them. Moreover, the two kinds of messages are in no way
articulated in the representational state of bird. So, although PPRs are called
representations, they are not representations in any classical sense of the word.
Millikan applies her notion of PPR not only to mental representation, but
also to communication. An example of the latter is what is represented in the
food call of a hen: when a hen sees food, she makes a particular sound to call her
chicks over to the location of the food. Here we see as well that both directive
and descriptive information is conveyed: in one undifferentiated breath, the hen
says ‘there is food here’ and ‘come over to get it’. Notice that when this kind
of message is conveyed, the directive and the descriptive part play an equal
role: it is not the case that one can be ‘deduced’ from the other. Moreover,
as mentioned above, the directive and descriptive parts of the PPR are not
articulated; when a PPR is communicated, both parts are transmitted directly.
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Figure 3.6: The emergence of human thinking, according to Millikan.
3.6.2 From PPRs to modern language
PPRs allow animals to react appropriately in numerous situations. The kind
of behavior animals display may even look quite advanced, for example in the
behavior of a cat who washes its ears by rubbing them with its paws, which it
then licks clean. But at the same time the behavior is not flexible, and cannot
be applied in different situations. So, the same cat does not know how to use
its paws to “clean out the yummies at the very bottom of an emptied can of
cream” (Millikan, 2004b, chapter 13).
More flexible behavior is only possible when an organism is able to under-
stand a perceived situation without having to act on it. Then, the descriptive
information that is used in one situation can be transferred to other situations.
Millikan describes the evolution of more sophisticated organisms in exactly this
way: she describes the transition from animal to human as a process in which
PPRs get decomposed into their directive and descriptive parts (see figure 3.6).
When an animal becomes able to take in descriptive information without nec-
essarily carrying out a certain pattern of behavior, it starts to become able
to represent things without directly using them. And thus it becomes able to
mentally simulate different situations. To apply this to the cat example: if the
cat were able to comprehend the technique it uses for washing its ears, without
actually washing its ears, it could start to apply this technique in a situation
where there is an almost empty can of cream. Thus, decomposing PPRs and
storing various instances of descriptive information in order to apply them in
different situations allows an organism to behave more and more flexibly.14
A crucial difference between humans and animals is thus, according to Mil-
14In Millikan (2004a), Millikan puts forward the hypothesis that the ability to decompose
PPRs ran parallel with the evolutionary development of the forebrain and the division of
what are called the ‘dorsal’ and the ‘ventral’ streams (p. 22).
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likan, that humans have a lot of descriptive information that they cannot and
need not apply directly. Although humans have developed these kinds of repre-
sentations that go beyond PPRs, they still make use of PPRs, both in commu-
nication and mental representation. This situation is common in evolution: old
mechanisms are typically not entirely replaced by newer ones. An example of
a PPR in human mental representation would be the eye-blink reflex (see Mil-
likan (2004b)): if something approaches the eye, the information that something
is approaching the eye is represented at the same time and indivisibly together
with the directive information that you should close your eye. An example of
a PPR in human communication is a smile. Smiles tell us that “something po-
tentially rewarding has just been done and to keep doing it” (Millikan, 2004b,
chapter 13). But PPRs, Millikan claims, also occur in human language, such as
in an English sentence like ‘We don’t eat peas with our fingers’ (Millikan, 2005,
p. 179): an expression like this describes and prescribes at the same time. In
this case, the prescribed information is the same as the described information
(namely, that we don’t eat peas with our fingers). Note that in this example,
like in the cases described above, the directive and descriptive parts of the
message are transmitted at the same time. So the mechanism that plays a role
here is, according to Millikan, not a Gricean implicature (Grice, 1975): it is
not the case, according to Millikan, that the directive part is deduced from the
descriptive part by the receiver, using conversational implicatures.
Given the concept of PPR, how do we describe the honeybee dance? Here
the term can be put to use directly: what is represented in the honeybee dance
is a PPR. When a honeybee dances to transmit information about a food
source, it puts across two messages at once. First of all, that there is nectar at
a certain location X, and, secondly, that the receiver of the message should go
there to get it. The two parts of the message are not articulated, and cannot
be transmitted separately; the receiving bee cannot observe the dance without
actually obeying the order. This analysis of the honeybee dance differs in an
important respect from Ga¨rdenfors’s: in his terminology, the honeybee dance
refers to a cued representation of the food source. The fact that the observer of
the dance ‘should go over to this food source’ is not part of the message, and
should be ‘inferred’ by the observing honeybee (see also section 3.7.2).
Working from within Millikan’s conceptual framework, what can we say
about the chimpanzee, a species that is closely related to us in genetic terms
but has much less sophisticated means of communication? We do not find a
direct answer to that question in Millikan’s work. Although she recognizes that
in the higher animals, representations start to emerge that are less PPR-like,
and start to look more like ‘descriptive’ representation, she also points out that
much of the knowledge that is stored by these animals is connected to future
use. In Millikan (2004a), she points out three things that humans are able to
do, but that she suspects animals are not:
• To represent pure facts that concern situations or objects of a sort that
have not yet proved to be of use either to the animal or to prior members
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of its species.
• To represent facts about world affairs that have entirely unknown rela-
tions to the animal.
• To be motivated by representations that do not originate from the ani-
mal’s perception of its current needs and/or current environment. (Mil-
likan, 2004a, p. 26)
In other words, when thought becomes less PPR-like, representation is less
connected to action. A representation can be stored just for the sake of repre-
senting, and it can be connected to an action later. Concerning the third item
in the list, the claim that animals cannot be motivated by representations that
do not originate from current perception, Millikan notes that
Even our most respected and intensively studied relatives, the mon-
keys and apes, seem to derive their motivation entirely from per-
ception of the current situation. (Millikan, 2004a)
In contrast, humans know all kinds of things that they don’t have any
particular use for, either now or in the future. And in order to learn these things,
they do not need to be motivated by anything in the current environment.
But that is not the only difference between animals and humans: we not only
represent facts we don’t know the use for; we also communicate these facts.
And of course, there is a connection between the property of mentally storing
so many facts and having a sophisticated public language. But the direction of
this relation is not necessarily such that the fact that we store facts explains that
we have language. On the contrary, the fact that we have language, according
to Millikan, changes the way in which we perceive the world drastically:
[A] very large portion of our [human] conceiving is done mainly or
entirely through the medium of language (Millikan, 2005, p. 104).
I will not go into the discussion about what it means to perceive directly
through the medium of language, but one thing is important here: according
to Millikan, the fact that we have language makes a crucial difference for the
way we perceive the world. Since chimpanzees do not have a public language in
the way humans do, their mental capacities are of a different order than those
of humans. Thus, Millikan has much less confidence than Ga¨rdenfors in the
mental capacities of chimps. This difference between Ga¨rdenfors and Millikan,
and some others we hinted at in this section, will be the topic of section 3.7.
But let us first look at what Millikan says about meaning in human language.
3.6.3 Millikan on meaning in modern language
Contrary to both Ga¨rdenfors and Grice, Millikan does not see a direct connec-
tion between the content of an utterance and what is mentally represented by
the speaker of the utterance:
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Linguistic meaning of a public language makes no direct reference
to thought. (Millikan, 2005, p. 96)
Instead, according to Millikan, it is important to distinguish between two
kinds of meaning: the meaning a speaker has in mind when he communicates
and conventional meaning :
Language is a tool used in communication; linguistic meaning is
derived, somehow, from the ways in which people use linguistic
devices in intentional communicative acts. Still, in finding ways to
communicate, we do not need to start from scratch each time. There
develop certain linguistic conventions—recognisable patterns in the
way in which people use linguistic expressions and grammatical con-
structions in order to communicate. And so a distinction emerges
between the meaning that a speaker intends to convey on a partic-
ular occasion, and the meaning conventionally associated with the
words that the speaker has used. (Price, 2007, p. 766)
Here it shows that Millikan’s view on meaning is influenced by Lewis’s
account of conventional meaning (the one we have seen a brief description of in
section 3.2.4). Conventions, Millikan claims, are generally patterns of behaviour
that are reproduced, and (some of these) conventions regulate coordination.
Coordination is achieved when two individuals’ combined actions achieve a
goal together, and conventions help to streamline behavioural patterns so that
coordination is achieved more easily. This description of convention applies to
language (we choose certain utterances in certain situations because they serve
the communicative goal we had in mind), but also to very basic behavioural
patterns like a handshake (when we shake hands upon meeting someone, we
know exactly how to move our hand in order to make the handshake work
properly; this involves harmonising the arm movements of both ‘handshakers’)
or moving something heavy, like a sofa, together (in such situations, usually
one of the two movers takes the lead, and the other adjusts his movements in
order for the moving to run smoothly). This characterisation of coordination
shows that Millikan pictures conventions as something very much entrenched
in behaviour, something that can work unconsciously. The knowledge needed
to control such coordination, knowledge of conventions, can be stored in a very
primitive form like PPRs (Millikan, 2005, chapter 5). Thus, Millikan shows
that conventions are not a product of purely rational minds (and this sets her
position apart from Lewis’s; see (Millikan, 2005, chapter 1)), but instead they
are deeply rooted in behaviour in general, and it is easy to see that even animals
coordinate their behaviour in this way on some occasions. As an example of this,
Millikan mentions intention movements in the behaviour of animals as described
by Tinbergen (1952). Intention movements are movements from which another
animal can infer what is likely to be happening next. These movements can
be useful to animals, for example, when by making an intention movement for
fighting, they can actually prevent real fighting from taking place.
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Public languages are just many conventions thrown together:
A public language is a huge web of crisscrossing lineages of repro-
duced patterns consisting of tokens of linguistic forms and responses
to them. [. . . ] Words, idioms, syntactic forms, tonal inflections, and
so forth are handed down from one person to others because these el-
ements are helping to serve coordinating functions. (Millikan, 2005,
p. 60)
It is not necessary for a convention to be followed at all times by all indi-
viduals. I can secretly take a certain syntactic expression to mean something I
made up myself, or understand someone else’s utterance in my own way. What
I have in mind when I say something is less important, according to Millikan,
than what my utterance means according to the running convention.
With this statement, we are where we started this section: I wanted to illus-
trate that, according to Millikan, linguistic meaning is not directly connected
to a speaker’s intention, but is rather something conventional. Conventional
meaning can be understood in a Lewisian manner, but Millikan’s account dif-
fers from it in that she sees conventions much less as something purely rational,
and much more as something rooted in behaviour in general.15
It is clear that both the evolutionary scenario Millikan sketches and the
account of meaning she has worked out are different from Ga¨rdenfors’s, but
their work also shows similarities. In the next section we will focus on these
similarities and differences.
3.7 Two roads to language
The preceding sections introduced us to the work of Ga¨rdenfors and Millikan.
Both have worked on describing the emergence of language, with an emphasis
on meaning. To make this description, they introduced new concepts, that aim
to describe a gradual transition from animal to human, and they sketched
evolutionary scenarios of this transition. Let me recapitulate.
Ga¨rdenfors introduced the concepts of ‘cued’ and ‘detached’ representation.
He described the transition from animal to human as a process in which
organisms are first able to form detached representations, subsequently
form an ‘inner environment’ and then start to communicate using so-
phisticated structure. We called this view the cognitive road to language,
because it postulates that sophisticated cognition was there before so-
phisticated communication, and it is compatible with a view of natural
language meaning that explains meaning in terms of mental representa-
tions.
15See Rescorla (2011).
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Millikan introduced the concept of ‘pushmi pullyu representations’ (PPR)
and described these as primitive representations that include informa-
tion both about what is at stake and about what must be done. PPRs
play a role in both cognition and communication. The trajectory from
animal to human involves decomposing PPRs into separate descriptive
and directive representations, which makes it possible to divorce descrip-
tive information from action. Natural language meaning is pictured by
Millikan as something essentially conventional, and she shows that these
conventions are deeply rooted in behaviour in general, thus providing a
biological account of convention.
From this description it is clear that there are many differences between
Ga¨rdenfors and Millikan, but let us first focus on something they share.
An important common emphasis in the accounts of Millikan and Ga¨rdenfors
is the emphasis on the detachment of representations from the here and now
and the directly necessary. Both authors stress the importance of representing
things without actually carrying out an action that is connected to the things
represented. This makes organisms able to test hypothetical situations, and
thereby their behavior becomes more flexible: they can store knowledge for
future use, without necessarily having to act.
This common emphasis is interesting because it shows that both authors
recognise that humans are more ready than other species to store knowledge
without using it immediately. They do take different positions, however, when
it comes to an exact characterisation of the differences between humans and
other animals, as well as the order of events in the evolutionary history of
human language and the properties of meaning. Let us have a look at these
differences.
3.7.1 Different evolutionary scenarios
Whereas Ga¨rdenfors defends the hypothesis that chimps have a cognitively
rich life but do not have language, Millikan claims that chimpanzees, like other
animals, are mainly motivated by factors that are present in the immediate
environment and that they differ crucially from humans in this respect.
If we look at these claims in an evolutionary setting we can conclude the
following. Millikan’s line of thinking is compatible with a scenario in which
the development of certain cognitive capacities that humans have now emerged
only after the development of a sophisticated communication system, whereas
Ga¨rdenfors’s ideas are more in line with a scenario where a great deal of the
cognitive capacities have matured before language emerged.
When we focus on more general questions about the relation between lan-
guage and thought, and the role of this relation in evolution, we see differences
between Ga¨rdenfors’s and Millikan’s approach as well. Millikan stresses that
human mental capacities are at least in part dependent on linguistic capacities.
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Ga¨rdenfors, on the other hand, emphasizes that complex mental capacities are
possible without linguistic capacities.
Of course, the two positions are not mutually exclusive. Ga¨rdenfors does not
deny the influence of language on modern human thought and Millikan does
not claim that it was the emergence of full modern language alone that made
human thinking more sophisticated. What I have sketched here is a difference
in emphasis.
3.7.2 Different views on meaning
Both Millikan and Ga¨rdenfors have not only written about meaning in an
evolutionary setting, but also about meaning per se. In other words, both have
made claims about the nature of natural language meaning, and we have seen
short descriptions of these claims in the preceding sections.
The main difference between the two at this point is that Ga¨rdenfors claims
that the content of an utterance corresponds directly to a mental representa-
tion. According to Millikan the relation between the two is mediated by a
linguistic convention.
When it comes to the connection between an utterance in language and a
mental representation present in the speaker, Millikan postulates a much looser
connection than than Ga¨rdenfors. This becomes clear when we focus on what
they define as communicative success. Ga¨rdenfors would claim that there is
communicative success when the hearer recognizes the belief that the speaker
intends to express, whereas Millikan defines success as the cases where the
hearer recognizes the linguistic conventions the speaker had been following.
Let us have a look at the honeybee dance again. According to Millikan the
dance transmits two messages in one breath; a descriptive and a directive act
takes place at the same time. According to Ga¨rdenfors, the dance is a signal
that refers to a cued representation of the food source. And because a cued
representation is a representation of something that is close-by or triggered
by something that is close-by, the dance can be seen as representing the food
source itself. That the receiving bee should go over to the food source to get
the food, is something that is not conveyed in the message. It is a conclusion
that is drawn by the receiving honeybee itself.
The latter kind of analysis seems quite parallel to what Grice (1975) de-
scribes as going on in language use: receivers make—consciously or uncon-
sciously—inferences from the received message and thereby decide what the
full meaning of the message is.
Thus, we noted that the way Ga¨rdenfors would characterize honeybee com-
munication fits well in a Gricean school. Millikan’s analysis of the honeybee
dance, on the other hand, is much less compatible with a Gricean approach.
According to her, no ‘inference’ takes place in the receiving honeybee; the di-
rective part of the message is properly part of the message, and is interpreted
in a very direct way.
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3.7.3 A cognitive and a communicative road to language
Above, we have connected Ga¨rdenfors’s view on the emergence of language to a
general attitude towards the emergence of language, described as the cognitive
road to language. It was pointed out in section 3.5.1 that many authors seem to
have the same conviction as Ga¨rdenfors, that complex cognition developed (to
some extent) prior to complex language, and that linguistic meaning should be
explained in terms of cognitive structures.
We have also seen, in section 3.5.2, that this picture faces problems, and that
it would be attractive to consider other views, in order to lessen the emphasis
on cognition and create a more balanced picture of the emergence of language
and meaning.
Let us see if the picture sketched by Millikan could fulfil this function. As de-
scribed above, Millikan puts less emphasis on cognition than Ga¨rdenfors when
it comes to describing meaning in natural language. Instead she stresses the
conventional nature of meaning. When describing the evolutionary trajectory
of the emergence of language in humans, she uses the same concept (PPRs)
for describing both communication and cognition. Moreover, she stresses that
having language has changed the way we see the world enormously.
Because of the role she ascribes to communication, and the role that con-
ventions (which are much more principles of communication than of cognition
alone) play in her description of linguistic meaning, I will call her view of the
emergence of language and meaning in language the communicative road.
Now we have two ‘roads to language’, it would be natural to claim that
one of the two is a better view. I will not do that, however, because I think
that both views capture aspects of language and language emergence that are
important, and choosing sides would only lead us away from a balanced picture
of the emergence of language.
Instead of choosing sides, I formulate the following take home message: in
the literature, there is much emphasis on a view like the cognitive road to
language, but in order to arrive at a more balanced picture of the emergence
of language, and to account for the conventional nature of language, we need
to take into account the communicative road to language as well.
Thus, I am not going to choose sides, but neither am I going to devise a
philosophical account that should serve as a combination of the two pictures.
I think we have seen enough concepts and abstract proposals by now, and I
would like to focus, again, on empirical data. In the next chapter, empirical
data that should tell us something about protolanguage is discussed, and I will
discuss how the two roads to language presented here can help us to interpret
the data in a justifiable manner.
The accounts of meaning discussed so far in this chapter mainly discuss
the properties of meaning in general ; they look at meaning as a general phe-
nomenon. But if we want to arrive at a complete overview of what has been said
about meaning, we should also look at the meanings of our utterances in a more
detailed way, by looking at what happens when words are put together into
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sentences and complex meaningful structures are formed. This is how linguis-
tic semanticists generally approach meaning, and we will follow this approach
by looking at two phenomena in which structured meaning plays a role: com-
positionality and thematic relations. This will equip us with the terminology
necessary to analyse the utterances made in restricted linguistic systems.
3.8 Meaning in linguistics:
the structure of meaning
As stated above, linguists take meanings of utterances to be the point of focus,
rather than meaning as a general phenomenon. They take as a starting point the
assumption that sentences or utterances express propositions, and they study
the structure of these propositions, possibly in a formal modeling context.
In this section, I will discuss two concepts that can help us analyse meaning-
ful structures. First is the concept of compositionality, a term that is central
to the discipline of formal semantics. Semanticists construct mathematical mod-
els of natural language, in which they assume (at least, this is done in many
existing formal models) that the meanings of words, together with the way they
are put together, make up the meanings of sentences. Secondly, I will discuss
the notion of thematic relation, a term that one can come across in syntactic
theory and in semantics (but not so much in model theoretic semantics), and
that categorises arguments of verbs into different classes, each class having its
own special characteristics.
As I have said, both concepts (‘compositionality’ and ‘thematic relation’)
have something to do with the formation of complex meaning in natural lan-
guage, and they will be of importance in the last three chapters of this disser-
tation.
3.8.1 Compositionality
Formal semanticists construct models of natural language, in order to describe
the meanings of utterances with logical and mathematical means. Formal se-
manticists might start from a general account of natural language meaning,
but for their models, they look at language in a more detailed way: they inves-
tigate how utterances get their meaning. Many semanticists take the principle
of compositionality to be a leading notion. This notion is generally defined as
follows:
The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning
of its constituents and the way they are put together.16
16See Szabo´ (2008) for a similar definition, and an overview and discussion of related
definitions.
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It was observed in Chapter 1 that looking at the origins of meaning in human
language is most interesting if we do not take meaning to be only a property
of words, but something that has complexity: complex meanings can be built
using language. The principle of compositionality captures this intuition.
Formal semanticists generally take care that their models of natural lan-
guage are compositional as well: these models build the meanings of sentences
by taking the meanings of individual words and combining them, using infor-
mation about the syntactic structure of the sentence.
As an argument in favour of the compositional nature of language, it is
often pointed out that language is productive:
Argument from productivity: Since competent speakers can un-
derstand a complex expression e they [have] never encountered be-
fore, it must be that they (perhaps tacitly) know something on the
basis of which they can figure out, without any additional informa-
tion, what e means. If this is so, something they already know must
determine what e means. And this knowledge cannot plausibly be
anything but knowledge of the structure of e and knowledge of the
meanings of the simple constituents of e. (Szabo´, 2008)
Another argument in favour of compositionality is the argument of system-
aticity. This argument says that anyone who understands the expression ‘the
rug is under the chair’ also understands ‘the chair is under the rug’. In other
words, there is systematicity in the way we understand sentences. The only way
in which this could be the case is that the meanings of complex expressions
depend systematically on their constituents and their structure.
These two arguments show that natural language must be compositional,
at least to some extent, but there are cases where natural language does not
seem to be entirely compositional. For example, do all who understand ‘within
an hour’ and ‘without a watch’, also understand ‘without an hour’ and ‘within
a watch’?17
Most formal semanticists recognise that language is to some extent compo-
sitional, but that not all of natural language is compositional. Some even state
that there are no empirical reasons to model natural language compositionally,
but that we can choose to model meaning compositionally, because it leads to
elegant theories (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 2005).
Thus, it can be seen that semanticists do not fully agree on whether compo-
sitionality should be seen as an empirical property of language or as a starting
point taken for modeling reasons. The take home message that I would like
to distill from this discussion about compositionality is that language clearly
shows the properties of productivity and systematicity at least to some extent.
Thus, when we focus on the meanings of sentences, we need to take into account
that they are at least partly determined by their constituents and the way these
17The example is from Szabo´ (2008); it is mainly an argument against the systematicity of
language. The same publication also lists arguments against the principle of compositionality.
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constituents are put together. An interesting evolutionary question is how this
systematicity came about. In short: how did the property of compositionality
come about?
3.8.2 The emergence of compositionality
Two opposing views of the emergence of compositionality can be found when
we analyse discussions about protolanguage. In Chapter 1, several accounts of
protolanguage were described, and it was noted that there is an opposition
between holistic and synthetic protolanguage. Those proposing that protolan-
guage was holistic hypothesise that utterances with unanalysed structure were
uttered and, through usage, chopped up into a systematic system. Those argu-
ing in favour of a synthetic protolanguage (such as e.g. Bickerton) hypothesise
that protolanguage consisted of units that were very much like words in full
language and that were put together into sentences. These two views indi-
rectly say something about compositionality. Proponents of holistic protolan-
guage claim that language became compositional by decomposition: unanal-
ysed multi-syllable words were decomposed into analysed, complex structures
with compositional meaning (this process is described in, among others, Kirby
(2000); Wray (1998)). As described in Chapter 1, Wray illustrates her account
of protolanguage with two imaginary utterances, /mbita/ and /kamti/, which
are associated with the meanings give her the food and give me the food respec-
tively. After analysing the analogy between the shared syllable /m/ and the
shared meaning ‘singular female recipient’, speakers of holistic protolanguage
will take this regularity into their inventory (Wray, 1998, p. 55). With segmen-
tation happening bit by bit, phonological units without an ascribed meaning
will be omitted and a compositional language is the result. The process that
Wray described, segmentation of unanalysed strings into a compositional lan-
guage, was replicated with computational models (Smith et al., 2003; Kirby,
2000), as well as with participants in an iterated learning experiment in the lab
(Kirby et al., 2008).
To connect the concepts of compositionality and protolanguage to Ga¨rden-
fors’s and Millikan’s views presented in the previous section, the basic idea
behind holistic protolanguage is found in Ruth Millikan’s work as well:
It is a serious mistake to suppose that the architectural or com-
positional meaning of a complex sign is derived by combining the
prior independent meanings of its parts. Rather, the meanings of
the various significant parts or aspects of signs are abstracted from
the prior meanings of complete signs occurring within complete sign
systems. (Millikan, 2004b, chapter 4)
Ga¨rdenfors, on the other hand, portrays protolanguage as a synthetic system
(Ga¨rdenfors, 1995, section 5), a view of protolanguage which I will discuss next.
Proponents of synthetic protolanguage claim that protolanguage already
had a compositional character (but this was not necessarily fully developed
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yet). In recent literature, synthetic protolanguage is called ‘compositional pro-
tolanguage’. We will focus on two such accounts to see how the emergence of
compositionality is depicted.
In both Jackendoff (2002) and Hurford (2011), a two step procedure is
depicted that led to compositional structure in language: first concatenation of
different meaningful units into proto-utterances, then more systematic usage of
word order. Let us have a closer look at how they sketch this process. Hurford
distinguishes a stage in the emergence of language where utterances were purely
pragmatic: words were put together, and the relation between these words was
to be retrieved from the context. In this stage, he claims, there is already a
rudimentary form of compositionality present:
In the purely pragmatic mode, with no grammatical rules or conven-
tions for putting words together (beyond mere concatenation), there
is already a simple systematic relationship between the meaning of
a whole string and the meanings of its constituent words. For exam-
ple, the meaning of Mommy sock is something to do with Mommy
and something to do with a sock. The meaning of the whole is any
proposition that a hearer can extrapolate from shared background
knowledge and contextual clues, provided that this proposition is
somehow about Mommy and a sock. The meaning of Daddy car is
not the same as the meaning of Mommy sock, exactly because of
differences among the meanings of Mommy, Daddy, sock and car.
Thus, compositional language was preceded by a stage in which words were
put together, of which the meanings had something to do with each other.
According to Hurford the meaning of such proto-utterances was to be derived
by the hearer in this stage, because the order of the different words in the
utterances did not contribute information (hence, this stage had only a ‘rudi-
mentary form of compositionality’ and not full compositionality). Thus, what
appeared first was the combination of meanings in a rough manner, without
paying attention to word order. Jackendoff (2002) sketches a similar stage and
calls this the stage in which ‘concatenation of symbols’ takes place.
The principles ‘AgentFirst’ and ‘FocusLast’ (described in Chapter 1.4.3)
of Jackendoff can be seen as an answer to the question how we got from a
rudimentary compositional stage into full compositional language: semantic and
pragmatic principles determined the position of different words in utterances.
Or, as Jackendoff puts it, the placement of symbols conveyed information about
basic semantic relations. I will focus in more detail on these ‘basic semantic
relations’ in the next section.
To conclude, when the properties of protolanguage are discussed, compo-
sitionality turns out to be a central concept, and two intuitions exist about
the emergence of compositionality. According to those proposing a holistic pro-
tolanguage stage, compositionality emerged ‘by decomposition’. According to
those proposing a synthetic (or compositional) account of protolanguage, com-
positionality emerged ‘by composition’, and in two stages. In the first stage,
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words were combined into multi word utterances, but the order of the words
was not systematic. In the second stage, the position of the words was used in
order to convey additional information. Thus, in the second stage, the meaning
of an utterance is the combination of the meanings of the words and the way
they are put together.
In this dissertation, we will focus in further detail on synthetic protolan-
guage, and particularly on the second stage mentioned above: how did word
order in protolanguage utterances contribute to their meaning? In the next
section, I will describe a phenomenon that will help us to describe this process:
thematic relations.
3.8.3 Thematic relations
Virtually all languages have verbs and nouns. Verbs typically describe actions,
and nouns persons or objects. Nouns can act as arguments of verbs: they denote
participants in the action described by the verb. Actions can have different
participants, and the possible ways to participate in an action are described as
thematic relations.
Thematic relations describe the roles a participant in a certain action plays
with respect to the action. For example, in a situation where John throws a
ball, the action is throwing, and John and the ball are the participants in the
action. John does the throwing, so his role is the role of agent. The ball is
affected by the throwing, so the role of the ball is that of patient. Semantic role
theories aim to provide a list of roles that can apply to any argument of any
verb. When that is done, verbs can be analysed in terms of the arguments they
take.
Inventories of thematic roles were proposed by researchers working on syn-
tax and semantics and empirically studied by psycholinguists. In the literature,
lists of thematic roles have been proposed that have, among others, Agent, Pa-
tient, Experiencer and Theme as well known members. The following is a list
with descriptions of these thematic roles from Dowty (1989).
• Agent — a participant which the meaning of the verb specifies as doing
or causing something, possibly intentionally. Examples: subjects of kill,
eat, hit, smash, kick, watch.
• Patient — a participant which the verb characterizes as having something
happen to it, and as being affected by what happens to it. Examples:
objects of kill, eat, smash, but not those of watch, hear and love.
• Experiencer — a participant who is characterised as aware of something.
Example: subject of love, object of annoy.
• Theme — a participant which is characterized as changing its position
or condition, or as being in a state or position. Example: object of give,
hand, subject of walk, die. (Dowty, 1989, p. 69)
These examples can be seen as representative examples of how thematic
relations are formulated. However, there is no systematic account of thematic
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roles, and there exists little agreement about which thematic relations exist
and how they should be defined exactly,18 even though some researchers do
not recognise this and take the notions for granted.
An analysis of thematic roles that is still quite influential was put forward
by Dowty (1991). Dowty proposes that different roles should not be seen as dis-
creet categories, because making such a discreet categorisation will always run
into problems. Instead he proposes that there are two proto-roles: Proto-Agent
and Proto-Patient. Each proto-role has contributing properties. For instance,
a Proto-Agent is typically volitionally involved in the event or state, whereas
a Proto-Patient typically undergoes a change of state. A Proto-Agent typically
causes an event or state in another participant, while a Proto-Patient is sta-
tionary relative to the movement of another participant.19 These contributing
properties do not necessarily all play a role in each predicate: in ‘John is ignor-
ing Mary,’ John is volitionally involved, but he does not cause an event or state
in Mary. Rather, the properties of the proto-roles can help us in determining
which roles are associated with which grammatical relations. This proceeds in
the following way:
In predicates with grammatical subject and object, the argument
for which the predicate entails the greatest number of Proto-Agent
properties will be lexicalized as the subject of the predicate; the
argument having the greatest number of Proto-Patient entailments
will be lexicalized as the direct object. (Dowty, 1991, p. 576)
With the help of the two proto-roles, Dowty successfully analyses a number
of problematic issues in lexical semantics (Dowty, 1991). His work indicates
that among the vast number of possible thematic relations, agent and patient
are the most important. Let us have a look at what role these relations play in
the language evolution debate.
3.8.4 Thematic roles in language evolution
To see thematic relations at work in an account of the emergence of language,
we will focus on Jackendoff’s work on protolanguage.
As we have seen above, Jackendoff sketches a picture of the emergence of
language in which there are two important stages: first, words are put together,
but no importance is given to the order in which they are put together. Subse-
quently, the position of the words in the utterances is used to signal additional
semantic information. One of the rules that expresses these relations is Agent-
First. This is a rule that tells us that the individual with the thematic role of
Agent is put first in an utterance (see also the description in section 1.4.3).
18‘There is perhaps no concept in modern syntactic and semantic theory which is so often
involved in so wide a range of contexts, but on which there is so little agreement as to its
nature and definition as [. . . ] thematic relation’ (Dowty, 1991, p. 547).
19See (Dowty, 1991, p. 572) for the full list of properties.
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Thus, it is suggested that in the protolanguage stage, information about
thematic roles is used in the organisation of utterances. In other words, in a
semantic protolanguage, thematic role is one of the sources of information on
the basis of which utterances are organised (besides other sources of informa-
tion such as e.g. ‘newness of information,’ as in the rule FocusLast). In the
chapters that follow, several sources of information for utterance structure will
be reviewed, and a more detailed picture of the organisation of utterances in
protolanguage will be sketched, and empirical evidence for this more detailed
sketch will be provided.
Above we have seen that the two proto-relations Proto-Agent and Proto-
Patient are associated with the syntactic categories subject and direct object.
Of course there are exceptions (some are discussed in Dowty (1991)), but in
full language, it is almost always the case that an argument one would describe
as agent in semantic terms is indeed also the subject of the sentence, and the
patient is the direct object. Given Jackendoff’s AgentFirst principle, it would
be expected that many languages have a word order in which the subject comes
first. This is indeed the case: a fair share of the languages of the world has either
SOV or SVO as its dominant order. This phenomenon will be discussed in more
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
To conclude, thematic roles are one of the sources of information on the
basis of which language systems without full syntax are organised. Their effect
is still visible in restricted linguistic systems, and they can be hypothesised
to have played a role in the emergence of language, as precursors of syntactic
rules.
3.9 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter we have seen that natural language meaning is studied
in many ways. Linguists and philosophers have engaged in discussions about
the nature of meaning and about the way meaningful structures are built when
we interpret utterances. It is difficult to distill one analysis from the overview
that was given in this chapter, but we have come across concepts and ideas
that are important in the analysis of meaning, and that might be important
when we investigate the evolutionary history of meaning. I will now give a list
of these concepts and ideas. We will use them in later chapters as ‘tools for
thinking’ about semantic protolanguage. For clarity, I will display the most
important concepts in boxes.
3.9.1 Defining meaning: reference, intention/belief and
convention
This chapter started with a very brief overview of the theories of meaning that
were put forward in the 19th and 20th century. Many theories of meaning do
not account for the fact that language evolved; they simply look at language as
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an existing system. Still, these different accounts told us something about what
is important about meaning; we have seen three intuitions about meaning that
should be taken into account:
reference The things words and sentences refer to are important when
we want to know their meaning.
intention and belief When a speaker makes an utterance, he typically
intends his audience to come to believe something.
convention Our utterances have the meanings they have because these
utterances have been used by other speakers in similar situations.
The first intuition is the basis of propositional accounts of meaning, and
these capture a very prominent fact about language: that we use it to refer to
things in the world. This capacity is very prominent in humans, and it allows
us to talk about things that are not present here and now. This property of
language will be discussed further in chapter 6.
Further, a central problem for referential theories of meaning, that of inten-
sional contexts, will show up later in this dissertation: in Chapter 5, I will show
that intensional expressions possibly had a special status in protolanguage.
The second and third intuitions form the basis of two evolutionary sce-
narios of the emergence of language and meaning: the cognitive road and the
communicative road to language. Thus, the overview of different accounts of
meaning has not given us a theory to work with immediately, but has pointed
out prominent facts about meaning in natural language.
3.9.2 Roads to language: cognition and communication
In the second part of this chapter, we focused on concepts that were introduced
by philosophers in order to get a more satisfactory description of the transition
in evolutionary history from animals to humans. These concepts focused on
cognitive structures and on meaning in language or communication in animals
and humans.
We observed that the concepts introduced by Peter Ga¨rdenfors fit very
well in a set of hypotheses about the evolutionary history of meaning in which
cognition develops before meaning. This position is taken as a starting point
by many other authors who have written about the emergence of meaning in
human language.
We discussed a second framework of concepts, introduced by Ruth Millikan,
which focuses less on cognition and emphasises the conventional properties of
language, and compares language to other cultural phenomena: behavioural
96 3.9. Conclusion
patterns which are copied by individuals, like the habit of shaking hands when
meeting in many western societies.
There is much to say for a Ga¨rdenfors-like approach to the emergence of
meaning, which emphasises the relation between cognitive structures in lan-
guage users and their utterances, because it points our attention to the cogni-
tive properties of our ancestors (animals). Cognitive capacities found in them
might be ancestors of features of our linguistic capacities. Much interesting
research has been carried out already to describe these links (Fitch, 2010).
The line of thinking introduced by Ruth Millikan, however, points our at-
tention away from cognitive structures to conventions, to language as a public
phenomenon. Millikan denies that there is a one to one relationship between
the meaning of an utterance and what is mentally represented by the speaker or
the hearer. By emphasising the conventional nature of linguistic meaning and
grounding conventional behaviour biologically, she takes the communicative
nature of language into account.
A cognitive road to meaning: an evolutionary scenario in which cog-
nitive capacities are central, and are held responsible for the structure
of the emerging language.
A communicative road to meaning: an evolutionary scenario in
which the dynamics of communication and the formation of
conventions are central.
In the next chapter we will continue to discuss the claim that the struc-
ture of utterances in protolanguage was governed by semantic and pragmatic
principles. The two roads to meaning described here will help us to analyse the
nature of this scenario: are the principles governing protolanguage essentially
cognitive or communicative?
3.9.3 Building a proposition: compositionality, thematic
roles and topic/focus
In the last part of this chapter I focused on the formation of complex meaning-
ful structures in language. I described two phenomena, compositionality and
thematic relations, and I described the role of both phenomena in the evolution
of language.
First of all, I pointed out that two different claims have been made about
the emergence of compositionality in natural language, and these connect to
the accounts of protolanguage discussed in Chapter 1. More precisely, holistic
and synthetic protolanguage each make different claims about the emergence
of compositionality.
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Holistic protolanguage: compositionality emerged by decomposition
and reanalysis
Synthetic (compositional) protolanguage: compositionality
emerged in stages, by composition
Secondly, I described the role of thematic roles in language evolution. There
is a natural connection between the role of Agent and the syntactic subject, and
the role of Patient and the syntactic direct object. Thematic roles are one of
the sources of information on the basis of which language systems without full
syntax are organised. Thematic roles can be seen as the precursors of syntactic
categories. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Agent → Subject
Patient → Direct object
To conclude, this chapter has equipped us with a set of useful terms and
concepts to describe meaning and its origins. These terms and concepts will
be put to use in the next chapter, where we will focus on restricted linguistic
systems ‘in the wild’ and in the laboratory.

CHAPTER 4
Cognition and communication ‘in the wild’ and in the
lab1
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have seen a detailed analysis of meaning in natural
language. In this chapter I will show how we can operationalise the concepts
described there. To be more precise, I will show how we can use these concepts
to collect stronger and more detailed evidence for a semantic protolanguage
account. Let me summarise what I have said about semantic protolanguage
earlier in this dissertation.
Chapter 1 proposed and developed a description of the semantic account of
protolanguage: the hypothesis that semantics (and pragmatics) had a role in
the structure of protolanguage. This hypothesis goes back to ideas advanced by
Ray Jackendoff, and we have reviewed some of the sources of evidence he used
to support his claim. Moreover, a brief overview of observations from different
restricted linguistic systems shows that semantic properties could play a role
in the organisation of these systems.
We concluded that this approach (looking at restricted linguistic systems)
is promising, but that it would be good if we would have more data. We also ob-
served, however, that evidence is not easy to collect, because restricted linguistic
systems typically emerge in unfortunate and exceptional situations. Moreover,
the step from restricted linguistic systems to evolutionary conclusions is still
1Part of the research presented in section 3 of this chapter was originally published as
Schouwstra (2010).
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unsatisfactory, because it is not clear how the analogy between restricted lin-
guistic systems and protolanguage works.
In other words, in order to make the semantic protolanguage account strong-
er, we need to do three things.
1. Collect more data from restricted linguistic systems.
2. Develop a more detailed account of how we can draw evolutionary con-
clusions from data of simple language systems.
3. Describe in more detail the principles that may have played a role in
semantic protolanguage.
In order to address issue (1), I will present a new way of collecting restricted
linguistic data: by ‘creating’ restricted systems in the laboratory (in section
4.2). This method will allow us to collect data in a more controlled way than
the data that is at hand now. Subsequently, in section 4.3, I will address issue
(2) and specify how the data obtained in the lab can lead to evolutionary
conclusions. In other words, I will sketch how the analogy works between the
observed data and the evolutionary conclusions we can draw from them. I will
do this by first discussing different existing bridge theories and formulating a
bridge theory that serves my purposes. In this discussion of bridge theories, the
concepts that were discussed in the chapter on meaning will play an important
role.
From the discussion of meaning in an evolutionary context I distilled two
possible views on the trajectory towards full language: the cognitive road
and the communicative road. The former view stresses the fact that language
sprouts from cognitive abilities of individual language users, and seeks an anal-
ogy between meaning in language and mental representations in speakers and
hearers. The latter focuses more on language as a public phenomenon: it stresses
the conventional nature of language. If language took the cognitive road, it is
hypothesised, much of language matured in the cognitive domain before it was
used as a communicative system. If language took the communicative road, its
structure does not necessarily mirror cognitive structures, but communicative
pressures are taken to be important. According to this view, communicative in-
teraction is responsible for the structure of language. The distinction between
the cognitive and the communicative road to full language is not meant as
a rigid distinction; the two trajectories represent two complementary ways of
looking at language. In fact, I will put forward the hypothesis that both cogni-
tive and communicative principles played a role in protolanguage, and specify
how they interacted (in section 4.3.4). This hypothesis will be tested in the
next chapter.
In the last part of this chapter (in sections 4.4 and 4.5), I will address
issue (3) from the list above and formulate new empirical questions that can
be investigated: one about the emergence of word order, and the other about
temporal displacement. I will look at data from existing restricted linguistic
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systems to see if answers can be found there. After this is done, the ground
is prepared for the two chapters following this one, where we will study the
newly formulated questions (about the emergence of word order and temporal
displacement) in an improvised communication setting.
4.2 Creating restricted linguistic systems in the
lab
In chapter 2 we have seen that restricted linguistic systems (Basic Variety, pid-
gin, homesign and newly emerged sign languages) all arise in situations where
‘normal’ communication is not possible. Even though the circumstances for the
individual systems are different (for instance, the situation of ABSL signers is
quite different from L2 learners), the systems show striking similarities, and
the data that are gathered may offer us a valuable peek into the workings of
protolanguage.
We have also seen that the collection of data from restricted linguistic sys-
tems is not easy because these systems emerge in exceptional situations, and
usually occur in unfortunate circumstances. Moreover, interviewing people in
these situations does not give researchers optimal control over the kinds of con-
structions and utterances made by the speakers. Finally, in existing restricted
linguistic systems, it is usually only language production that is studied, and
if we want to take the communicative character of language seriously, it is
necessary to look at interpretation of utterances as well.
In this section, I will describe a kind of laboratory experiment that can
serve as a way to collect restricted linguistic evidence, and does not face the
problems described above: the improvised communication task. Subsequently,
I will reflect on evolutionary conclusions drawn on the basis of the lab data:
what bridge theory do we need in order to establish firm ground for evolutionary
assumptions made on the basis of the experimental data?
The improvised communication task was introduced by Goldin-Meadow
et al. (2008).2 They asked participants from four different language groups
to communicate about simple events that were presented in short animations.
The participants were not allowed to speak, and were asked to communicate
using gesture. The participants were not familiar with any conventional sign
language and they were encouraged to use improvised, iconic gestures to make
clear what was depicted on the vignettes.
The events used as stimuli in the experiment were simple events in which
some motion was involved (‘motion events’). All vignettes depicted an Act
(some action involving motion), an Actor (the performer of the Act) and a
Patient (the undergoer of the Act).3 Examples are ‘man carries baby’ or ‘boy
2The term ‘improvised communication’ is not theirs, however; it was introduced by Langus
and Nespor (2010). See also the descriptions of these two publications in section 5.
3Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) also used vignettes with only an Actor and an Act, but we
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tilts glass to mouth’. Note that Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) use terminology
similar to that of the thematic roles discussed in chapter 3 (Actor and Patient
correspond to Dowty’s proto-agent and -patient).4 Recall from section 3.8.4
that there might be an evolutionary connection between the semantic classes
Agent (Actor) and Patient, and the syntactic classes Subject and Direct Object.
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) address this connection as well, albeit implicitly,
when they discuss the correspondence between the orders they observed in their
experiment and the dominant word orders in the languages of the world.
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) show that, for the events they tested, people
used a consistent ordering for their gesturing: the Agent was typically gestured
first, followed by the Patient, and followed by the Act. This order is consistent
with the SOV word order, and it was found independently of the dominant
order of the native language of the participants (which was not always SOV).
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) conclude that the Actor-Patient-Act order is a
natural order to mentally represent events.5
In the task described above, people are asked to communicate in a way
they are not used to communicating. They can, however, use iconic gestures in
order to describe the events, such as mimicking the shape of a glass when talking
about a glass, or imitating a ‘carrying’ action. Thus, it can be said that the
participants have a limited inventory of lexical items that they can use. When
putting these lexical items together, participants could rely on the dominant
word order of their native language. But Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) show
that in practice they do not do so. Participants do show systematicity in the
ordering of the lexical items, but the order they choose is independent of their
native language. The same behavior, some systematicity but not influenced
by native language, is observed in the restricted linguistic systems discussed
in chapter 2. Let us focus in more detail on the similarities between those
systems and the experiment described here. The experiment puts participants
in a situation that has the following properties:
1. Participants in the experiment cannot rely on their native language.
2. Participants in the experiment have a limited inventory of lexical items
which they know will lead to communicative success.
3. The main goal of the participants when they produce gesture strings is
making themselves understood, rather than adhering to an existing rule
system.
The same properties hold for restricted linguistic systems:
• Unsupervised second language learners in the Basic Variety stage can-
not rely on their source language, because their audience does not speak
will not consider these in the context of this dissertation.
4The difference in terminology most probably stems from the fact that the authors work
in rather different disciplines.
5For a discussion of the nature of this conclusion, and alternatives to it, see chapter 5.
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that language. They typically know some words already of the target
language; they will put these words together as they see fit in order to
make themselves understood, rather than paying attention to the precise
grammatical rules of the target language (Klein and Perdue, 1997).
• In situations where pidgin languages emerge, speakers cannot use their
native language, but there is usually already a limited lexicon of shared
words. When using these words, the main goal is getting the message
across, and not to adhere to an existing language.
• Children who develop Homesign do not have a native language at all when
they are in this process. They have a limited inventory of largely iconic
gestures that are understood by their family members. The homesigning
child does not work towards mastering an existing sign language; the
system is driven by the need for communication.
• The circumstances under which ABSL and NSL emerged are comparable,
initially, to those under which homesigns emerge, but at a larger scale. In
the Al Sayyid community, ABSL is used by both deaf and hearing people,
but it is clear that none of the hearing people could count on their na-
tive language when communicating with the deaf members. Both systems
emerged spontaneously, and speakers did not ‘work towards’ perfection
of the system. In other words, the sign systems developed, driven mainly
by communicative motivations.
Given these observations, a good way to describe the restricted linguistic
systems ‘in the wild’ is the following: they all emerge in situations where speak-
ers and hearers lack a common language: there is no shared set of conventions.
Faced with this situation, the people involved start to improvise, using what-
ever means they have (iconic signs in the case of emerging sign systems; words
from the target language in the case of Basic Variety speakers; words from
the native language of pidgin speakers) and coming up with new strategies to
put words together.6 And this is exactly the situation that participants in the
improvised communication task are faced with.
Thus, the improvised communication task puts people in circumstances
that resemble those in which restricted linguistic systems arise. This makes
the task a valuable source of evidence. However, the existing systems, despite
their disadvantages, offer something that the lab task cannot offer: natural
circumstances. For instance, the gesture sequences of a homesigning child all
emerged spontaneously and were in no way guided by a lab task. For that
reason, it is good to conceive of the improvised communication task as a way to
supplement (rather than replace) the evidence from existing restricted linguistic
systems. Moreover, in order to take advantage of the natural data from existing
systems, as well as the amount of control that is possible in the lab, a valuable
approach would be to work back and forth between existing restricted systems
and the lab task. That is the approach that I will take in this dissertation.
6Of course, the individual circumstances of the systems will show differences, but, as we
have seen in chapter 2, the systems show similarities.
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Now that I have pointed out the similarities and differences between the
improvised communication task and the restricted linguistic systems, it is time
to look very carefully at the mechanisms that play a role in them, and what they
can tell us about language evolution. That is what I will do in the next section:
I will look at bridge theories (theories that describe the analogy between the
situation of restricted linguistic systems and that of protolanguage speakers in
our evolutionary history) that were provided in recent literature for restricted
linguistic systems. I will compare and analyse them, and provide my own bridge
theory for the improvised communication task. Subsequently, I will discuss
empirical questions that can be studied using the improvised communication
task.
4.3 Cognitive and communicative bridge theo-
ries
In chapter 2, we saw that Jackendoff’s claim that speakers of restricted linguis-
tic systems7 apply fossil principles from protolanguage is intuitively appealing,
but needs to be justified by pointing out why there is an analogy between situ-
ations in which restricted linguistic systems emerge, and protolanguage stages
in the evolution of language.
In other words, we need to establish how exactly the analogy works between
restricted linguistic systems and protolanguage. In Botha and de Swart (2009),
several authors formulate initial steps towards a full specification of such an
analogy. I will focus on the work of two authors: de Swart (2009) emphasises
the role of cognitive structures and Roberge (2009) emphasises principles of
communication. I will compare their views and show that they are different
because of fundamental differences in the kind of data that they are based on.
Moreover, I will show that a cognitive bridge theory necessarily also has com-
municative elements, and vice versa. This opens the possibility of formulating
a bridge theory that combines both principles.
In what follows, I will refer to the views put forward by de Swart and
Roberge as bridge theories, because this is the function that they are supposed
to fulfil; I am aware of the fact that they would probably not be satisfactory
bridge theories in the terms of (Botha, 2009b). Nonetheless, both views are
valuable steps toward a full bridge theory.
4.3.1 De Swart (2009): cognitive structure
De Swart (2009) focuses on the expression of negation in the Basic Variety and
observes that learners go through a stage where negative utterances are organ-
ised by topic/focus structure: they use negation preverbally, as an operator on
7Note that Jackendoff does not use the term ‘restricted linguistic system’; I am using it
here to refer to all phenomena (Basic Variety, pidgin/creole, newly emerging sign languages)
discussed in chapter 2.
Chapter 4. Cognition and communication ‘in the wild’ and in the lab 105
Figure 4.1: A cognitive bridge
theory appeals to similarities
between (1) cognitive struc-
tures present in speakers of re-
stricted linguistic systems and
(2) those in protolanguage
speakers.
Figure 4.2: A communicative bridge
theory appeals to similarities in the
communicative situation between
speakers of restricted linguistic sys-
tems and protolanguage speakers.
that part of the sentence that is in focus (generally the verb). They do this,
even when preverbal negation is not part of the source or the target language.8
On the basis of the data, de Swart (2009) hypothesises that the existence of
negation as an operator on focus information was part of evolutionarily early
language. She does this with an appeal to cognitive structure:
I assume that the cognitive capacity for predicative structures [which
is needed for the particular negative structure mentioned above -
MS ] is available in early humans before language develops. The
pragmatically based combinatorics in the protolanguage stage re-
flects this pre-existing conceptual structure. (de Swart, 2009, p. 95)
Thus, de Swart (2009) stresses the importance of cognitive structures in
justifying evolutionary conclusions from Basic Variety data. That is, cognitive
structures in protolanguage speakers are compared to cognitive structures in
L2 learners, and those structures are held responsible for the structuring of
utterances in the BV as well as in protolanguage. A schematic depiction of this
position is given in figure 4.1.
4.3.2 Roberge (2009): communicative principles
Roberge (2009) sketches a rather different bridge theory in an article about
the creation of pidgins. He proposes to analyse pidgins as a form of language
8See the example of Swedish learners of French in (de Swart, 2009, p. 70–73).
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creation, rather than a degraded form of language.9 After showing several exam-
ples of creative innovations in pidgin languages (Roberge, 2009, p. 120–128), he
proceeds to evolutionary conclusions we can draw from the structures observed
in pidgin languages. A bridge theory, he proposes, should take communicative
processes into account, by comparing the communicative situation of speakers
of a pidgin language to that of our ancestral speakers of protolanguage.
Roberge pictures the situation of our evolutionary ancestors as follows. At
some point in evolutionary history, proto-human society became increasingly
complex (Johansson, 2005, p. 235), and small groups that had their own re-
stricted communication patterns started to communicate among each other.
The emergence of this cross-group communication led to a situation where lin-
guistic features from the different ‘group languages’ competed with each other,
and the ones with the greatest communicative efficacy would remain. The sit-
uation in which pidgin languages emerge can be described in a similar way:
different groups using different languages are forced to communicate with each
other, and they will use structures according to their communicative success.
Thus, the analogy between the pidgin situation and that of our evolutionary an-
cestors should be about the communicative dynamics, and not about cognitive
structures.
Roberge (2009) further hypothesises that the within group communicative
systems of our hominid ancestors were rather limited, and that among group
contact boosted the complexity of communication systems. This was the case
because among-group communication resulted in a larger repertoire of mean-
ingful elements, and this facilitated the creation of new combinations (Roberge,
2009, p. 131). In other words, according to Roberge, the situation of our evolu-
tionary ancestors was as follows: when small groups of hominids with limited
communicative systems started to interact with each other, this led to more
available elements, and these elements were combined into more complex struc-
tures according to their communicative success. Pidgin languages can shed light
on how this proceeded, because in situations in which pidgins emerge, there is
a similar setup. A difference between the pidgin situation and the situation
of our ancestors is that pidgin speakers have full modern languages at hand,
but the fact is that they cannot use them when communicating. So the pro-
cess in pidgin situations (creation of new linguistic features and competition
among linguistic features for communicative success) is the same as that of our
ancestors. A depiction of Roberge’s view is provided in figure 4.2.
To wrap up, we have seen two bridge theories for restricted linguistic sys-
tems. De Swart (2009) claims that the structuring principles that can be seen
in the Basic Variety are principles from cognition. She compares the cognitive
structures present in speakers of the Basic Variety to those in our protolanguage
speaking ancestors. Roberge (2009), on the other hand, sketches a bridge theory
that compares the communicative situation of pidgin speakers and speakers of
protolanguage. In other words, whereas de Swart focuses mainly on cognition,
9The latter is defended by Jackendoff; see chapter 2.
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Roberge, with his focus on communicative success of competing constructions,
describes protolanguage in terms of emerging conventions.
4.3.3 Cognition versus communication
The two bridge theories presented above apply to different systems: the Basic
Variety in one case and pidgin languages in the other. To me, it does not seem
surprising that a cognitive bridge theory was proposed for the Basic Variety
and a communicative bridge theory for pidgin, because the circumstances under
which they emerge are rather different. Speakers of pidgin are in a group of
people speaking different languages and in order to communicate, they have
to go around trying out lexical items from their native languages, as well as
lexical items of the other languages that they may have picked up. Very soon
in this process, a shared lexicon emerges, together with shared principles for
organising utterances, and these together can be seen as an emerging system of
new conventions. In other words, for pidgin speakers, a system of conventions
emerges relatively early in the pidginisation process.
In the Basic Variety, on the other hand, speakers usually have as an audience
speakers of the language they are learning. When they communicate, they can
use lexical items of the target language and maybe some lexical items of their
native language, if they don’t know the right word. Moreover, they can come
up with their own organising principles, but a crucial difference with the pidgin
situation is that the audience of Basic Variety speakers will not copy any of the
invented structures, because they are simply speakers of the target language
and will apply the rules of this language.
To sum up, it is clear that a situation that gives rise to a pidgin language
is more likely to develop shared conventions among speakers and hearers, and
thus a bridge theory based on the emergence of conventions is more applicable
to such situations. Speakers of the Basic Variety are more on their own in
the sense that the hearers in the conversations they have will not share the
structures they come up with. In other words, there is not really an emerging
set of shared conventions, and the structures that come up are ‘invented’ by the
speaker alone, and a bridge theory on the basis of cognitive principles seems
more applicable here. For a summary of the differences between Basic Variety
and pidgin formation, see table 4.1.10
Thus, pidgin is naturally paired with a bridge theory based on communica-
tive principles, and the Basic Variety is naturally paired with a bridge theory
based on cognitive principles. Does this mean that only one of the two is right?
In other words, should we abandon one of the two bridge theories? I suspect
we shouldn’t. My hypothesis is that in protolanguage, both cognitive and com-
municative principles played a role. In the next section, I will explain how I
10In the table, I use the phrase ‘formation of new conventions’. It might be confusing that I
speak of the formation of new conventions in the Basic Variety situation. What I mean is the
principles that govern the Basic Variety, which are, as we have seen in chapter 2, relatively
independent of the source and target language.
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Basic Variety Pidgin formation
Only speakers have to improvise.
Hearers will use the rules of their
native language.
Both speakers and hearers have
to improvise. None of them can use
their native language.
Formation of new conventions is a
one way process (initiated in the
speaker).
Formation of new conventions is
a two way process (speaker and
hearer both participate in the pro-
cess).
Table 4.1: The differences between (early) pidgin speakers and Basic Variety
speakers.
envision this.
4.3.4 Cognition and communication
Above we have seen that there are two possibe answers to the question what is
responsible for the structure of utterances made in restricted linguistic systems
(and, by inference, in protolanguage); namely, cognitive structures or com-
municative interaction. I propose that both cognition and communication are
essential in processes where there is no fully established system of conventions,
and individuals have to improvise in order to get their messages across:
The influence of cognitive structures: When a communicating individual
constructs an utterance (1) with the help of a small established inventory
of lexical items, but (2) in the absence of linguistic rules for combining
these items into sentences, cognitive biases of this individual will influence
the structure of the utterance.
The influence of communicative interaction: Different individuals may
come up with different orders, but the constructions that are understood
best by hearers will be established as linguistic conventions more easily.
But what to think of the two restricted linguistic systems discussed above: the
Basic Variety and pidgin languages? Did we not notice that these two situations
are essentially different, and give rise to different bridge theories? The two sit-
uations, I think, simply represent two extremes of a scale: in the Basic Variety,
cognitive structures are much more influential than communicative interaction,
and in pidgin formation, communicative pressures have a greater influence than
cognitive structures of the individual speakers, just because of the different cir-
cumstances in which they emerge. Still, even de Swart and Roberge would not
deny that in these systems both cognition and communication play a role. Let
us have a look at how I imagine this.
In pidgin formation, cognitive structures might still play a role, besides the
influence of communicative interaction, in the sense that these structures are
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responsible for the utterance structures initially made by individual speakers.
In other words, structures are either kept or abandoned according to their
communicative success (as Roberge sketches the process), but the cognitive
structures of the communicating individuals still have an influence on which
structures are formed to begin with: individual speakers might have cognitive
biases towards certain structures. Thus, the emphasis, in pidgin formation,
might be on communicative interaction, but the decisions made by individuals
(and thus their cognitive biases) still play a role.
On the other hand, something like convention formation plays a role in
the Basic Variety. As described above, the communicative interaction between
language learners and their conversation partners is different from that in pid-
gin, because language learners typically speak the target language with native
speakers of the target language. These native speakers will not collaborate in
establishing new linguistic conventions (like, for example, AgentFirst), because
they already have the conventions (the grammar rules) of their language. Still,
Basic Variety speakers might try out utterances with various structures and
they will maintain the structures that are more successful in communication.
In other words, also in the Basic Variety situation, communicative pressures
might have an influence on the structures that are used.
And there is a second way in which communication might play a role in
the Basic Variety. Think again about the principles according to which BV
utterances are organised: do these principles stem directly from cognition? Are
they simply mirror images of how these speakers organise their thoughts? They
might be, but before we assume that, we should consider what that would mean:
if the structure of utterances in the Basic Variety mirrors our thoughts, these
thoughts should be organised in a language-like, linear way.
Do we organise our thought in some specific linear order? I am not a neuro-
scientist, and I cannot make any hard claims about the organisation of human
thinking, but I do know that at least some of our knowledge is not organised
linearly; for example, mental maps or mental images are not (Kosslyn, 1994). In
other words, when speakers of the Basic Variety want to share a thought, they
might have to go from something non-linear (image-like or otherwise) to some-
thing linear (an utterance). The former does not necessarily have an inherent
order, and the latter does.
Thus, in the process of preparing a thought for communication, speakers
create its structure. They go from a (potentially) non-linear thought to an
utterance with linear organisation. This process is already the beginning of a
communicative process. Of course, human thinking is influenced by language,
and some of our thoughts might be language-like in structure, but I think we
should be careful when ascribing a linear structure to all mental representations.
I realise that even when I put it as carefully as I just did, not everyone
will agree with me that some of human thought has non-linear (for instance,
image-like) properties. For example, Fodor (1975) describes mental images as
‘pictures under description,’ to ‘avoid some obvious inadequacies of pictures’
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(Aydede, 2010). The line of thinking I propose here can be seen as a mild
speculation; I will get back to it in more detail in the next chapter, when I
discuss the results of my experimental studies.
To summarise my view on the structure of thought and its role in commu-
nication, let me compare a normal communicative situation to one of a speaker
of the Basic Variety. Generally, when we speak, we can only utter one word at
a time. When we speak in a normal situation, using our native language, we
simply use the order that is prescribed by the rules of our native language.11
The situation for a speaker of the Basic Variety is different: there is no existing
system of conventions for ordering elements of an utterance12 and by imposing
a certain word order a speaker can give extra information, because symbol posi-
tions can give information about semantic relations (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 238).
One could say that these semantic principles for organising utterances stem
from cognition, but cognitive representations do not necessarily have a linear
order in the way utterances do. Thus, linearising mental representations into
utterances already has a communicative flavour, because it prepares a thought
for communication (to be understood by a hearer).13 I thus propose that when
people have to improvise, and put an utterance together without having a full
system of conventions to fall back on, they might have cognitive biases that
influence the utterance structures they choose. But it is not necessarily the
case that the utterance structures that are found in restricted linguistic sys-
tems are direct mirror images of the mental representations of the speakers. I
hypothesise that the formation of utterances in restricted linguistic systems is
an active process that goes from multidimensional mental representations to
linear structures.
When thinking about bridge theories, like I did above, the distinction be-
tween cognitive and communicative principles helps us draw evolutionary con-
clusions from restricted linguistic systems. I have analysed which situations
cognitive and communicative principles apply to most naturally, but also how
these principles can work together. This analysis will be put to use in the next
section, where I will show that both cognition and communication play a role
when drawing evolutionary conclusions from the lab data.
4.3.5 A bridge theory for improvised communication
Above, I discussed two bridge theories for restricted linguistic systems: one
based on cognitive principles, the other on communicative principles. Moreover,
I made the observation that in restricted linguistic systems, both cognition and
communication play a role. Different situations (the situations I discussed were
pidgin formation and the Basic Variety), however, have different characteristics
11Though it must be said that many languages allow free word order to some extent.
12Of course, there are the conventions of the target language, but as we have seen previously,
speakers of the Basic Variety do not follow these conventions.
13The idea presented here shows rough similarities to Dan Slobin’s notion ‘thinking for
speaking’ (Slobin, 1996).
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and in some, cognitive principles might play a greater role than communicative
principles, and vice versa.
Let us now think about a bridge theory for the improvised communication
task described in section 4.2. How can the gesture strings observed in this
task tell us something about protolanguage? Which principles, cognitive or
communicative, play a role, and how do they interact?
In the improvised communication experiment, there are no conventions con-
cerning word order: people who are asked to convey meanings using gesture
perform this task for the first time. Of course, they could revert to the or-
dering principles of their native language, but Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008)
have shown that participants generally do not do that, because the same or-
der, Actor-Patient-Act, is found in participants with different native languages.
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) conclude from this that the order Actor-Patient-
Act tells us something about the way in which events are represented mentally.
If I would follow this line of thinking, I would end up formulating a cognitive
bridge theory for improvised communication, and say that the structures found
in improvised communication reflect mental structures, and that these mental
structures are in turn comparable to the mental structures present in speakers
of protolanguage. But I would like to suggest that a more dynamic analysis of
the improvised communication task is possible.
Above, I suggested that even when we look at restricted language from a
cognitive perspective, like we did for the Basic Variety, we can still see com-
municative principles at work. I suggested that the organisational principles
observed in the Basic Variety are not purely mirror images of how thoughts
are represented mentally, because not everything we represent mentally is rep-
resented in a linear way. The process of going from a thought to an utterance
involves linearisation of the information: going from something that could be
picture-like (a mental representation) to something in the shape of a string (an
utterance).
This process of linearisation is, I will claim, very important in the improvised
communication experiment. First, let me make clear why linearisation takes
place in this setting. Participants in the experiment see a picture of an event
on a screen, and are asked to convey the information in the picture using gesture
and no speech. When they do that, they cannot represent all the elements in
the picture simultaneously, but they have to make a sequence of gestures. Thus,
they make a transition from picture to string.
Now, why is this essential? Because linearisation is (1) an active process,
and (2) something inherently communicative. It is active, because every time
a picture is shown, it has to be ‘translated’ into a string. It is essentially com-
municative, because the reason that the elements present in the picture have
to be translated into a string is that they have to be communicated.
My claim that a process of linearisation is essential in the improvised com-
munication task leads to a very specific prediction of the behaviour of partic-
ipants carrying out this task. Contrary to what Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008)
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claim, I predict that the Actor-Patient-Act order that they found is not neces-
sarily the only order that will be found, because the linearisation process makes
the participants’ behaviour flexible: they can choose one order for certain situa-
tions, and a different one for others. This is possible because there are no strict,
grammatical rules for order. Moreover, I predict that when they do change the
order in their gesturing sequences, they will do this for communicative reasons.
In other words, they change the order only when they think it makes a dif-
ference for the hearer (observer). Thus, they assume implicitly that different
orderings lead to different interpretations. Below in section 4.3.6, I will specify
how I will investigate these predictions experimentally, but first let me clarify
how the improvised communication experiment connects to hypotheses about
language evolution.
In the improvised communication task, people are asked to communicate in
a way they are not familiar with. Using gesture and no speech, they are forced
to improvise to convey the messages they are asked to convey; they have to start
‘from scratch’. Previous research has shown that people in this situation will by-
pass the dominant order of their native language when sequencing lexical items
in an utterance. What determines the ordering of their utterances? Above I
have sketched situations where restricted linguistic systems emerge as situations
in which new conventions are being formed. In the case of the improvised
communication task, the formation of these new conventions is only just taking
shape: there is only one ‘speaker’, who does not get much feedback about his
communicative success. In other words, communicative pressures, in the way
Roberge pictures them for the pidgin situation, cannot play a large role here,
because there is not enough interaction for such pressures to have an effect.
What does play a role, clearly, are the cognitive biases of the participants
in the experiment. But, as I have described above, I think there is more at
stake than only a simple one to one relation between utterance structure and
structure of mental representations of the participants in the experiment. I
claim that when a participant in the experiment is presented with a stimulus
(a picture of an event) and is asked to convey what is depicted, he or she will
go through a process of linearisation of information: they go from a mental
representation (which is not necessarily linear) to an utterance, in which only
one element at a time can be expressed. My prediction is that communicating
individuals, in the absence of stable linguistic conventions, will linearise infor-
mation differently when order can be exploited to reflect differences in meaning.
In chapter 5, we will see a specific situation where different stimuli ask for dif-
ferent communication strategies. More specifically, we will see an experiment in
which two kinds of events with different semantic properties (extensional and
intensional events) are communicated differently, using different orderings, and
a second experiment in which it is shown that these different orderings lead
to different interpretations. These results suggest that from the early stages
of communication onwards, speakers and hearers are sensitive to meaningful
differences conveyed by word order. In chapter 6, we will see how participants
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organise their improvised gesture strings when we go beyond simple events and
add information about the time of an event.
To summarise, in the improvised communication task, we simulate a situa-
tion in which there are hardly any existing linguistic conventions. The behaviour
we observe from participants tells us something about their cognitive biases,
and their intuitions about successful communication. The fact that, as has been
shown by Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008), participants by-pass the dominant or-
der of their native language shows that participants in the experiment do not
simply fall back on the linguistic rules of their native language in order to com-
municate, but that they use intuitions and biases that are more fundamental
than that.
The key to my bridge theory is the similarity of the situation individuals (in
the experiment and in prehistoric times, respectively) find themselves in: they
have to linearise information into a string, in the absence of a stable system of
conventions. An obvious difference between us and our protolanguage speaking
ancestors is that we have language, and this, of course, influences our behaviour.
Having language must have had an influence on our cognitive capacities, and
for this reason, some people claim that we cannot compare behaviour observed
in modern people to that of our evolutionary ancestors: our minds might work
differently from those of our ancestors. The fact that people in the experiment
bypass the rules of their native language suggests that we should not be too
worried about this:
[T]he ordering found in nonverbal tasks appears to be more ro-
bust than the ordering found in language; speakers of four different
languages used different orders in their spoken sentences, yet all
displayed the same order on two different nonverbal tasks. (Goldin-
Meadow et al., 2008, p. 9167)
What exactly is the status of the orderings found when people bypass their
grammar rules? Of course, I cannot make hard claims about this, but it could
be that in human minds, evolutionarily older and newer systems exist simul-
taneously, and the improvisation task triggers people to use ‘old’ mechanisms.
Ideas parallel to this (that older and newer mechanisms in behaviour or cogni-
tion coexist) are put forward in various disciplines. In computational modeling,
for example, researchers use incremental evolution in order to teach complex
behaviour to neural networks (Gomez and Miikkulainen, 1997). In psychology,
cultural evolution is characterised as cumulative; Tomasello (2001) calls this
the ratcheting effect. And language itself has been characterised, by Hurford
(2011), as a layered phenomenon, exhibiting old and new structures:
In each language, we find vestigial one-word expressions and proto-
syntactic (2-, 3-word constructions) keeping company with more
fully elaborate syntax. All languages have the possibility of convey-
ing propositional information without the benefit of syntax. English
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speakers use a single word, Yes or No and pragmatic inference iden-
tifies the particular proposition which is being confirmed or denied.
No language lacks such words. They are a part of any language —
just not of interest to syntacticians. (Hurford, 2011, chapter 5)
These examples do not provide conclusive evidence that human linguistic
behaviour is a cumulative phenomenon, but it is interesting that similar ideas
have been put forward in different contexts, and it is certainly a worthwhile
direction for further research.
To conclude, I will not claim that the rules of the languages of the world
result solely from the intuitions and biases that play a role in the linearisation
of information (this would be a very odd claim, because there is such a great
variety of languages and linguistic rules), but the improvised communication
experiment does catch an important aspect of what plays a role when a lin-
guistic system emerges. Possibly, even, an evolutionarily old system is at play
(either a cognitive or a cultural system).
4.3.6 From a bridge theory to research questions
Above I have presented a way to collect restricted linguistic data in the lab, and
I have formulated the principles that allow us to draw evolutionary conclusions
from the observations made in the lab. Now it is time to formulate specific
questions that we can investigate using the experimental setup described here.
A good place to start is the description of very simple events (simple propo-
sitions) in modern language, which are described by a verb and its arguments,
like the following examples:
(1) The tree hits Fred.
(2) Fred eats an apple.
In these examples, situations are described in which X does something to Y .
For both sentences, we understand who did what to whom, because we know the
rules of English, and English has a fixed word order. It is interesting to see how
this kind of event is expressed in simple language systems, because utterances
of this type in protolanguage might have been the basis of dominant word
orders in modern languages. Thus, by looking at how simple propositions are
expressed in improvised communication, we can, ultimately, draw conclusions
about the origins of word order. In the next section, I will specify the research
question I will work with, and in chapter 5, I will describe two experiments
that investigate these questions. In the experiment, I will extend the claim put
forward by Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008), that SOV is the basic word order.
A logical next step, after looking at simple propositions, is to look at what
happens if we go one step further: what if we make utterances more complex by
adding information to a simple proposition? Simple propositions, in a language
system where there is no verb inflection, are very much bound to the here and
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now : there is no obvious way to specify that an event happened at some other
time. But we have already seen in chapter 3 that thinking and communicating
about things that are not here and now is a very central human capability that
might have been a key step in the emergence of language. One would expect
this property to show up in restricted linguistic systems. Consequently, the
question is: how is the information that an event happened in the past or the
future expressed in restricted linguistic systems? In section 4.5, we will first
have a look at mechanisms from existing restricted linguistic systems, and on
the basis of that, I will formulate research questions that will be investigated
in chapter 6.
4.4 Expressing simple propositions: the origins
of word order
In chapter 3 we have observed that many sentences in natural language express
simple propositions, and these simple propositions are expressed by a verb
and its arguments. These simple propositions are an interesting place to start
looking at the emergence of linguistic conventions, because the way in which
simple propositions are expressed in a language has a strong connection with
the dominant word order in that language.
Languages with a fixed word order have a conventionalised way to present
the verb and its arguments: each element has a fixed place. (Languages that do
not have a fixed word order, might use other means to make clear who plays
what role in a described event, for example with the help of case marking, but
the majority of the languages of the world have a (relatively) fixed word order
(Dryer, 2011).) This has advantages over just concatenating words without a
conventional order:
With just symbol concatenation, eat apple Fred and eat Fred apple
might be used to convey exactly the same message. In this particular
case there would be no problem, because of the pragmatics of the
words involved. But in hit tree Fred, did Fred hit the tree or did
the tree hit Fred? Though the larger context might tell us, the
pragmatics of the words alone do not. (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 247)
Whereas full languages typically have a conventional way to order the ele-
ments of sentences, restricted linguistic systems do not have hard rules about
the order of the elements in utterances, although some semi-systematic patterns
have been observed. The question we can now ask is the following:
How is the trajectory from language systems with no organisational
principles to full language with fixed word order? Which processes
(cognitive or communicative) played a role in establishing these word
orders?
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In order to find an answer to this question, we will first look at word order
in the languages of the world, subsequently at the dominant word orders found
in restricted linguistic systems, and finally, we will investigate word order in
the improvised communication task in the lab, in chapter 5.
4.4.1 Word order in the languages of the world
There is a great deal of variety in the languages of the world. In the case of
basic word order, the preferred order of Subject, (direct) Object and Verb in
transitive sentences like ‘the dog chases the cat’, all possible orders are repre-
sented: SOV, SVO, VSO, VOS, OSV and OVS (Dryer, 2011). Not all orders
occur equally often, though. Orders that start with O are quite rare, and orders
starting with S are the most common. The types SOV and SVO together make
up about 76% of the totality of languages (Dryer, 2011). Not surprisingly, these
two word orders have received a lot of attention. Both Newmeyer (2000) and
Gell-Mann and Ruhlen (2011) claim that protolanguage had a dominant SOV
order. Langus and Nespor (2010) give an overview of historical and compara-
tive linguistic sources reporting that the SVO order is the preferred structure
for syntax.
In what follows, we will see that the two types SOV and SVO emerge as
the most common word orders in restricted linguistic systems.
4.4.2 Word order in restricted linguistic systems
In chapter 2 we have seen an overview of restricted linguistic systems that de-
scribed the circumstances in which these systems appear, as well as some of
their organising principles. Now we will have a look, specifically at the domi-
nant word orders in these systems, in order to see if these restricted systems
can provide conclusive evidence about the emergence of word order in modern
languages. Before I start, note that to describe the orders in restricted linguis-
tic systems, I use ‘S’, ‘V’, and ‘O’ instead of ‘Actor,’ ‘Patient’ and ‘Act,’ the
terms used above to describe the elements in improvised communication. I re-
alise that my usage of S,V and O is potentially problematic, exactly because
of my claim that restricted systems are governed by semantic principles and
not by syntactic rules. On the other hand, S, V and O are used elsewhere (e.g.,
Hurford (2011)) to describe word order in restricted linguistic systems, and
even to describe gesture sequences in improvised communication (Langus and
Nespor, 2010).
In the Basic Variety, the following structure is observed: NP1-V-(NP2)
(Perdue, 1993). This is consistent with the word order SVO. As noted in chapter
2, the fact that all target languages are SVO languages, could be responsible for
the SVO ordering found in the Basic Variety (Hurford, 2011). In chapter 2, it
was shown that speakers sometimes deviate from SVO word order. Interestingly,
this is done in specific situations, as is shown in the example on page 37:
‘stealing bread girl,’ uttered by a Punjab learner of English in a situation
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System dominant order modality
Basic Variety SVO spoken
Pidgin/creole SVO spoken
homesign (S)OV signed
ABSL (S)OV signed
NSL SOV and OSV signed
Table 4.2: Dominant word orders in restricted linguistic systems.
where ‘girl’ is focus information. This could indicate that a semantic principle
like FocusLast applies here (Hurford, 2011, chapter 5.7).
Pidgins and creoles are reported to be mainly SVO order (Hurford, 2011),
although some Niger-Congo creoles are SOV (Holm, 1988). The orders found
for pidgin and creole might be influenced by their superstrate and substrate
languages.
In homesign, the Subject is very often not expressed, and the remaining
Object and Verb are expressed in OV order (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2009).
In Al Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL), like in homesign, the
Subject is relatively often not expressed. Sandler et al. (2005) report that the
dominant word order is again OV, although other orders are found as well.
Whenever the Subject is expressed, this results in SOV order. As described
in chapter 2, verbs are sometimes split into two separate verbs, so that for a
sentence like ‘man pushes woman,’ a sign sequence ‘MAN PUSH - WOMAN
FALL’ is created; thus, an SV-OV pattern is used here.
In Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL), there is also a general preference
to put the verb in final position. Many word orders are found though; Senghas
et al. (1997) report, for example, that for transitive verbs with an animate
Subject and an inanimate Object, the orders OSV and SOV are both used
(p. 555). They contrast this with transitive verbs with two animate arguments
(such as ‘a man pushes a woman’), in which the verb is split into two separate
verbs, and the Subject is always signed in the first part, and the Object in the
second (‘MAN PUSH - WOMAN FALL’).
From the observations above, we conclude that the two word order types
SVO and SOV, the most common among the languages of the world, play an
important role in restricted linguistic systems as well. Modality seems to have
an influence as well (see table 4.2). Spoken restricted systems (Basic Variety
and pidgin/creole) seem more likely to have SVO order than manual systems
(homesign, ABSL, NSL), which tend to have mainly (S)OV order. Could it be
that SVO order cannot exist in manually signed language systems? This would
certainly seem likely given the data considered here, but in chapter 5, I will
show that this is not the case.
The data above also show that word order is not so strict in restricted
systems, and in the next section I will discuss the possibility that the way in
which speakers vary their word order is evolutionarily interesting.
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4.4.3 Variation in word order
In many of the restricted linguistic systems discussed above, something like
a dominant word order can be defined, but other orders are used besides the
dominant word order. This is not surprising when we think about it. Restricted
linguistic systems are systems in which linguistic conventions are still in devel-
opment; there are no hard rules yet. We have also seen that the cases where
speakers deviate from the dominant word order have interesting semantic prop-
erties. In NSL, the subject is only put in front position when it is important to
convey the information that the subject is indeed the agent. In situations where
the direct object is inanimate, it will be immediately clear that the subject is
the agent, and in these situations it is not a problem to use OSV word order. In
the Basic Variety, speakers sometimes deviate from the dominant SVO order,
in cases where the agent is clearly focus information.
Thus, in restricted linguistic systems, one can speak of dominant word or-
ders, but it is more interesting to look at those situations where speakers vary
their word order. This may sometimes be caused by circumstantial, uninterest-
ing factors, like the source language of the speaker in the case of SOV strings
used by speakers of the Basic Variety. In other cases where word order devi-
ates from the dominant word order, there are interesting semantic properties
at stake, and we see reflections of the semantic/pragmatic principles described
by Jackendoff.
In my opinion, restricted linguistic systems should be seen as situations in
which there are emerging conventions, which are partly responsible for the word
orders that can be observed in them. On the other hand, there is variation in
word order by individual speakers, and this variation occurs in specific semantic
or pragmatic circumstances. The structures that emerge in these situations are
the result of cognitive biases of the speaker, plus the way the speaker linearises
a mental representation into a string (cf. section 4.3.4) in order to communicate
successfully.
In chapter 5, we will start from this observation and look at variation in
word order by participants in the improvised communication experiment. The
experimental setting allows us to create very precise stimuli, with which spe-
cific semantic or pragmatic circumstances can be investigated. We will use this
ability by studying the influence of the distinction between extensional and
intensional verbs, a distinction described and analysed in semantics and phi-
losophy of language, on the structuring of utterances.
4.5 Adding information to a proposition: tem-
poral displacement
The second topic I will focus on by means of an experimental study has to do
with complexification of simple utterances. What if a speaker wants to convey
a message that has more information than only a description of an action and
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its participants? An example of such a more complex message is one in which
not only an event is described, but it is specified when the event took (or will
take) place.
In chapter 3 it was already pointed out that a crucial feature of human
cognition and language is that we can think and talk about things that are not
here and now. In other words, we can think and exchange information about
things that are remote in space and time.
Full languages have sophisticated means to express information about events
that are remote in time. Early forms of language most likely did not have the
means to do this. But if talking about temporally remote things is such a crucial
feature of language, we can ask ourselves:
Did our evolutionary ancestors express information about the past
and the future? If they did, how did they do it in a linguistic system
that is simpler than modern languages? Which processes (cognitive
and/or communicative) play a role in temporal displacement?
In the remainder of this section, I will first focus on temporal information
in full languages, then look at the expression of temporal information in re-
stricted linguistic systems, in section 4.5. Subsequently, we will investigate how
temporal information is expressed in the improvised communication task in the
lab, in chapter 6.
4.5.1 Temporal information in modern languages
There is a large body of literature about the expression of temporal informa-
tion in modern languages, as modern languages have sophisticated means to
express temporal information, and there are large differences between different
languages as to how temporal information is expressed. The following is only
a very crude summary, just enough to give the reader an idea of what kinds of
temporal information can be expressed in modern languages.
The many existing grammatical features in modern languages that have to
do with time are used to express information about tense and aspect. Tense
expresses at which point in time an event took place or will take place. Aspect
expresses the speaker’s viewpoint on the event: is the event finished, or still
going on? In many languages, tense and aspect are expressed through inflection
on the verb. Here are some simple examples in English: ‘I will cycle to the office’
refers to the future; ‘I cycled to the office’ refers to the past; ‘I was cycling to
the office’ refers to the past too, but takes a different viewpoint, by emphasising
the ‘ongoingness’ of the situation. I will now give a brief overview of how tense
and aspect are described systematically in linguistics.
Reichenbach (1947) describes the possibilities of tense and aspect using
three notions, ‘point of the event’ (E), ‘point of speech’ (S) and ‘point of ref-
erence’ (R), which links E and S. These points are situated on the time axis,
and the verbal tenses of languages can be expressed in terms of the positions
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of the three points with respect to each other.14 The relation between R and S
tells us whether we focus on something in the past, the present or the future:
when past tense is used, R comes before S; when present tense is used, S and
R coincide; when future tense is used, R comes after S. In other words, tense
specifies the reference point R on the time axis, with respect to the point of
speech.
The relation between R and E says something about the viewpoint on the
event: R can coincide with E, or come before or after it. For example, we can
model the difference between I saw John and I had seen John with the help of
the relation between R and E. For the simple past form I saw John, R comes
before S (because it is past tense), and R coincides with E:
(3) I saw John.
E,R — S
For the past perfect form I had seen John, R comes before S, but R comes
after E: we ‘look at’ the event from a point where the event is already in the
past:
(4) I had seen John.
E—R—S
The tense forms of modern languages can be described using Reichenbach’s
E, R and S. But verb forms are not the only means to express temporal infor-
mation in languages. Temporal adverbs can be used to express both temporal
and aspectual information. We will now have a look at adverbs of temporal
location, adverbs that specify event times; these adverbs also play a role in
restricted linguistic systems (see the next section).
Adverbs of temporal location are used to indicate where on the time axis an
event that is described takes place. Thus, whereas a sentence like I saw John
gives us the information that the event (me seeing John) took place somewhere
in the past, in the sentence I saw John yesterday, the time of the event is
specified more precisely. But one should note that it is not E (the time of the
event) directly that is specified by a temporal adverb, but rather the reference
point R. This can be seen from the example I had seen John yesterday. In this
example, ‘yesterday’ does not refer to the point in time where I saw John, but
to R, which lies after E. In other words, when I say I had seen John yesterday,
it can be the case that I met John the day before yesterday (Reichenbach,
1947).
To summarise, verb forms in languages specify the relations between R
and E and between R and S. Temporal adverbs determine the time of R. In
a simple past sentence (I saw John yesterday), ‘yesterday’ specifies R, and
thereby, indirectly, the time of the event (E), because these two coincide. In a
14Reichenbach (1947) applies his system to English; it has been shown that to model
the tense forms of e.g. French, one needs more than Reichenbach’s E, R and S (Verkuyl
et. al., 2005).
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past perfect sentence (I had seen John yesterday), ‘yesterday’ specifies R, and
the verb form tells us that the time of the event comes before R.
De Swart (1999) makes Reichenbach’s analysis of temporal adverbs more
precise by taking topic and focus structure into account. As pointed out in
chapter 3, the placement of a temporal adverb expresses topic-focus structure.
Compare the following two sentences, from de Swart and de Hoop (2000):
(5) Jane left at six o’clock.
(6) At six o’clock, Jane left.
Sentence (5) is a typical answer to the question ‘when did Jane leave?’, whereas
sentence (6) is a typical answer to the question ‘what happened at six o’clock?’.
Note that this is not a hard rule: when the intonation is adapted, sentence (5)
can also be an answer to the question ‘what happened at six o’clock?’. What is
crucial about these two constructions is that sentences in which the temporal
adverb is fronted are more suitable to introduce a temporal frame for the main
clause (de Swart, 1999). A temporal frame is a given time on the time axis, in
the context of which the rest of the utterance can be interpreted. Or, put in
Reichenbach’s terms, it specifies the temporal location of R.
In the next section, we will see that the data suggest that restricted linguistic
systems use this mechanism (introducing a temporal frame by using a fronted
temporal adverb) in order to specify the time at which an event takes place.
4.5.2 Restricted linguistic systems: the displacement strat-
egy
As we have seen above, most modern languages use inflection on the verb to
express temporal information. In restricted linguistic systems, however, verbs
are generally not inflected, or at least not in a systematic way. This means that
the standard way to refer to past and future is not available in restricted lin-
guistic systems. Despite this, as we will see below, past and future are referred
to in restricted linguistic systems. Speakers of restricted linguistic systems can
do this by employing temporal adverbials. This means that, speaking in terms
of Reichenbach, they are able to specify a reference point R on the time axis.
In other words, when they describe an event in combination with a temporal
adverb, R is specified. But they do not have the grammatical means to distin-
guish between cases where E coincides with R and cases where E comes before
R, because they lack the verb forms to express this distinction. This is not
necessarily problematic, because R can simply be assumed to coincide with E.
The temporal adverb is then used to specify the time at which an event took
place.
Let us have a look at some examples. Benazzo (2009) discusses the expres-
sion of temporal information in the Prebasic Variety. This is a stage in the
learning process of second language learners who learn a language outside the
classroom, and it precedes the Basic Variety stage. In the Prebasic Variety,
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speakers do not use many verbs, and utterances are generally organised around
noun phrases. Utterances typically consist of target-language-like nouns, ad-
verbs and adjectives. Thus, in the Prebasic Variety, the inventory of speakers
is very limited, even compared to that of Basic Variety speakers. Still, Prebasic
Variety speakers refer to events in the past and in the future.
The following example shows utterances of a Spanish learner of French
(Benazzo, 2009, p. 28):
(7) [interviewer asks: what about your husband?]
en* el* hopital
(Spanish: in the) hospital
(8) demain ++ permis
tomorrow [pause] permit (=to leave the hospital)
(9) et lundi a` l’hopital
and Monday to the hospital
The utterance in (7) is about the current situation, so no event time is specified
(the event time then follows the time that was talked about previously in the
conversation, which is in this case ‘now’). The utterances in (8) and (9) are
about other points in time, and there, the expressions ‘tomorrow’ and ‘Mon-
day’ are used to introduce a temporal frame for the events that are described
(‘permit’ and ‘to the hospital’ respectively). As indicated above, the events are
taken to coincide with the temporal frame that was introduced. In other words,
‘permit’ (to leave the hospital) will take place tomorrow, and ‘to the hospital’
will take place on Monday.15
Thus, in the Prebasic Variety, temporal adverbs are fronted in order to
specify the time of an event, when an event does not take place now. Similar
constructions are found in the Basic Variety (Benazzo, 2009, p. 29):
(10) [interviewer asks: what are you doing here? Are you working?]
avant je [travaj] / maintenant non
before I work / now no
Again, the event time is specified with help of adverbs in the initial position.
The same behaviour is observed in homesign (Benazzo, 2009, p. 40):
(11) [someone talks about his working situation:]
before [pointing over shoulder] GOOD
now [pointing downwards] SO SO
Thus, reference to past and future is made by marking an event time with an
adverb, and this information is put in the sentence-initial position. In other
words, in restricted linguistic systems, adverbs are used to mark a temporal
15Because of the expressive limitations of speakers in the Prebasic Variety, their utterances
are context dependent, and depend heavily on pragmatic inferences.
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frame, and thereby they displace the event that is talked about from the here
and now. I will call this strategy the displacement strategy.
Full languages apply this strategy as well, but because inflection of the verb
is possible in full language, it is possible to specify more fine grained infor-
mation, such as the distinction between I saw John yesterday and I had seen
John yesterday. In these examples, R and E are specified separately. Restricted
linguistic systems cannot do that: they can only specify an R, and then it is
implicitly assumed that E takes place at R. In other words, restricted linguistic
systems are less expressive than full languages because much of the information
is left implicit. But this does not mean that in restricted linguistic systems, ref-
erence to the past and the future is impossible, for the displacement strategy
can be applied in order to do that.
In chapter 6, we will investigate whether the displacement strategy is ap-
plied when people are asked to communicate about the past and the future in
the improvised communication experiment. It would be striking if participants
in the lab would apply the same strategy as the speakers and signers of the
restricted systems mentioned here.
In this way, the improvised communication experiment is applied to verify a
structure observed in other restricted linguistic systems. But on top of that, the
experiment makes it possible to look in further detail at the interplay between
the displacement strategy and the way simple propositions are described: does
the displacement strategy influence the way in which simple propositions are
expressed? This question will be investigated in chapter 6 as well.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have described a way in which we can collect more restricted
linguistic data: by creating a lab situation in which participants have to im-
provise in order to get their messages across: the improvised communication
experiment. This experimental method offers us a way to collect data in a more
controlled manner than was possible before.
I proposed that we can draw conclusions about the structure of protolan-
guage from the strings observed in the improvised communication experiment.
In the absence of a stable system of conventions, participants in the experiment
have to linearise information into a string, just like our protolanguage speaking
evolutionary ancestors had to do.
Subsequently, I proposed two research topics that we can investigate using
the improvised communication experiment. The first concerns the expression of
simple propositions: observing how an action and the participants in an action
are talked about in improvised communication can eventually help us to find
out more about the emergence of dominant word orders in modern languages.
The second concerns the expression of temporal information, which is a way to
add information to a simple proposition. It will give us insight into the way in
which utterances that express simple propositions can be extended into more
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complex ones.
The next two chapters will be empirical in nature: they present the lab
experiments that I have conducted to investigate the two research topics intro-
duced here.
CHAPTER 5
Improvised communication and the semantic origins of
word order1
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 1 of this thesis we have seen that, once we acknowledge that lan-
guage is not a monolithic whole and emerged gradually, the investigation of
protolanguage as a hypothetical stage in the emergence of language is a logi-
cal step. In chapter 2, it was shown that one way to investigate the structure
and function of protolanguage is by looking at restricted linguistic systems.
Analysis of data from various restricted linguistic systems suggests that these
systems are governed by semantic (and pragmatic) principles. These principles
might therefore have played a role in protolanguage. This step from restricted
language to hypotheses about the emergence of language, as we have seen, is
not completely unproblematic. One remaining issue is the fact that data col-
lection is labour intensive and that the data is not collected in a controlled
environment. Another issue with existing restricted linguistic systems is the
kind of inference we make from the data to the evolutionary conclusions: what
exactly is the nature of this kind of reasoning? How can we justify it? In the
existing literature, this is still underdeveloped.
A close investigation of the discipline of semantics in chapter 3 showed
that existing characterisations of meaning fall into three categories, and each
approach stresses the importance of one aspect of meaning: meaning as the
1Part of the research presented in this chapter was originally published as Schouwstra
et al. (2011).
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relation between language and cognition, meaning as the relation between lan-
guage and the world, and meaning as a conventional phenomenon.
A characterisation of meaning in cognitive terms is the most straightforward
account when meaning is investigated in an evolutionary context. It is, however,
important to acknowledge that the other two views of meaning are important
when the emergence of language is discussed; this becomes clear when issues
like compositionality and grammaticalisation are discussed.
It was shown in chapter 4 that as far as restricted linguistic systems are
concerned, the conventional nature of language is pushed to the background
somewhat, because language users in these situations typically depend on im-
provisation and there is only the beginning of a system of newly formed con-
ventions. In such situations, individual decisions about how to communicate
are thus very important. It should be taken into account, however, that when
people construct utterances in a restricted system, this does not simply reflect
the structure of their cognitive processes: when they construct utterances, they
linearise information into a string.
The goal of this chapter is, first of all, to describe and extend an exper-
imental approach put forward in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008), which forces
people to communicate about simple situations in an improvised manner: by
using gesture instead of speech. I will argue that this kind of experimental ap-
proach can be used to supplement and extend the evidence that is found in the
restricted linguistic systems described in chapter 2.
The particular study presented in this chapter concerns the emergence of
word order. It has been suggested in the literature (see, e.g., Newmeyer (2000))
that the word order of protolanguage was SOV. A similar scenario is suggested
in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008). In this chapter, additional complexity is intro-
duced to this issue and it is shown that semantic properties have an influence on
utterance construction in improvised communication, and may therefore have
had an influence on word order in evolutionarily early languages.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008)
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) investigate how people sequence information when
they are asked to communicate about simple events using gesture and no
speech. Forty adults (speakers of 4 different languages: English, Chinese, Span-
ish and Turkish) were asked to describe simple events depicted in vignettes
using only gesture and no speech. Each vignette depicted a motion event: a
simple event containing an actor, patient and some act, in which the act in-
volved motion.2 Before they carried out the gesturing task, the participants
2These events are typically described by transitive sentences; the study also contained
intransitive actions, but those are not taken into account here.
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were asked to describe each vignette in a simple declarative sentence in their
native language.
A striking difference was found between the order in these sentences and
those in the gestured sequences. The different semantic elements in the vi-
gnettes were put in different orders when described in a spoken sentence, de-
pending on the language of the participant. E.g., English is an SVO language,
and the vignettes were described in Actor-Act-Patient order when put in a
sentence. Turkish, on the other hand, is an SOV language and the typical or-
der of the semantic elements of the vignettes was thus Actor-Patient-Act.3 In
other words, when using normally spoken language, participants typically fol-
lowed the order of their native language. When they were asked to act out
the vignettes without using speech, however, they did not follow the order of
their native language. Instead, all participants used the same order in this task:
Actor-Patient-Act.
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) point out that this order, Actor-Patient-Act,
corresponds with the sentence order SOV, which is one of the two most com-
mon word orders in the languages of the world. Moreover, they present a non-
communicative task. People were given a set of 3 transparant pictures, each
portraying one part of the event (so, separate transparancies were made for
the actor, the patient and the act). In order to complete the picture of the
event, the transparancies had to be stacked. No instructions were given about
the order in which they had to be stacked, but people showed consistency in
their stacking orders: there is a general preference for Actor-Patient-Act order
in this setup as well.
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) conclude from this that Actor-Patient-Act
(SOV) may reflect a natural sequencing for representing events. They speculate
that this order is not an outgrowth of communicative efficiency but rather the
way in which events are represented mentally in individuals, and they refer to
the results of the non-communicative task to support this claim.
5.2.2 Langus and Nespor (2010)
In Langus and Nespor (2010), the starting point is a view of the human fac-
ulty of language as a modular system, in which different cognitive systems are
responsible for different tasks: the conceptual system provides the meaning of
linguistic utterances, the sensory-motor system produces and perceives the ac-
tual sounds and signs of language, and the computational system of grammar
links meaning with sounds by generating the structure of sentences.
Langus and Nespor contrast the conclusion drawn by Goldin-Meadow et al.
that there is “a strong predisposition for the SOV order in simple improvised
communication,” with the observation that ‘convergent evidence in theoretical
linguistics points to the universality of SVO as the basic word order for the
3See the previous chapter for more information on the dominant word orders in the lan-
guages of the world.
128 5.2. Background
computational system of grammar’ (Langus and Nespor, 2010, p. 3). They
note that the same dichotomy between SVO and SOV can be seen in two cases
of atypical language acquisition: in creoles, SVO order is observed often, and
in homesign, the object-verb order is generally seen.
Langus and Nespor hypothesise that an SOV (Actor-Patient-Act) order in
the gesturing of simple events is the order that is preferred whenever the compu-
tational system of grammar is by-passed, and results from a direct interaction
between the sensory-motor system and the conceptual system. Only in cases
where people need their computational module, Langus and Nespor suggest,
would people prefer SVO order.
They present four experiments to support these claims. In the first exper-
iment, speakers of Italian and speakers of Turkish were used, the setup was
similar to that of Goldin-Meadows experiment, and the results from Goldin-
Meadow et al. (2008) were replicated.
In the second experiment, the improvised communication of complex events
was investigated. For this experiment, vignettes were used that represent com-
plex situations, such as, e.g., [the man tells the child [that the girl catches a
fish]]. It was found that both Turkish and Italian participants gesture the sub-
ordinate clause after the main clause, an order typical of SVO languages. It is
concluded that, apparently, the SOV order in improvised situations does not
generalise to more complex SOV language-like constructions and that partic-
ipants thus did not use their computational system of grammar to produce
the strings.4 Moreover, they concluded from the results of experiment 1 and
2 together, that all participants (the Italian participants in experiment 1, and
the Turkish participants in experiment 2) bypass the structure of their native
language when communicating in this improvised gesturing setting.
In the third experiment it was shown that in gesture comprehension, SOV
order is preferred as well: it led to the shortest reaction times in a gesture
comprehension task carried out with Turkish (SOV) and Italian (SVO) partic-
ipants. Thus, the word order of one’s native language is bypassed in both the
production and interpretation of improvised communication, and SOV ordering
is preferred instead.
In the fourth experiment, they investigated speech comprehension, using,
again, speakers of Turkish and Italian. In order to test this, they created prosod-
ically flat strings of words in the native language of the participants. The strings
corresponded to the scenes in the vignettes and they were put in all possible
orders of Subject, Object and Verb (SOV, SVO, OSV, OVS, VSO and VOS).
After hearing each string, participants were asked to choose between two vi-
gnettes, one of which corresponded with the speech string. The reaction times
of the participants per item were analysed.
As expected, the participants showed a preference for speech strings in the
order of their native language, i.e., Turkish participants were fastest with SOV
4This conclusion might seem puzzling. We will get back to it later in this chapter, in
section 5.7.4.
Chapter 5. Improvised communication 129
strings and Italian participants were fastest with SVO strings. Looking at all
six possible orders together, however, revealed consistent preferences among
Turkish and Italian participants. For Italians, all orders in which the verb
occurred before the object (SVO, VOS and VSO) resulted in faster reaction
times than orders in which the verb occurred after the object (SOV, OVS and
OSV). This was true for the Turkish participants as well, despite their good
performance on SOV order. Langus and Nespor conclude that this is evidence
showing that the computational system of grammar privileges the Verb-Object
orders (Langus and Nespor, 2010, p. 17).
Closer analysis of the two groups of word orders, however, suggests a differ-
ent explanation: the ‘slow’ group of word orders, consisting of SOV, OVS and
OSV, contains two orders where O comes before S (OVS and OSV), whereas
the other, faster, group contains only one order where this is the case (VOS).
Greenberg (1963), shows that word orders where O precedes S are very rare
among the languages of the world and it is suggested that this is because O<S
is hard to comprehend (van Leeuwen, 2010). Thus, the occurrence of O<S in
two of the three word orders in the slower group offers an alternative explana-
tion of the findings, and the results cannot be seen as support for Langus and
Nespor’s claim that orders in which V comes before O are faster.
5.2.3 The origins of word order
The authors of the articles discussed above agree on one thing: they claim that
SOV order, found in the gesturing sequences for motion events is in some way a
reflection of conceptual structure, i.e., the structure of mental representations:
Our data suggest that the ordering we use when representing events
in a nonverbal format is not highly susceptible to language’s influ-
ence. Rather, there appears to be a natural order that humans (re-
gardless of the language they speak) use when asked to represent
events nonverbally. (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008, p.9167)
Another conclusion that is drawn in both publications is that the results
from these improvised communication experiments are important in the dis-
cussion about the emergence of language.
Goldin-Meadow et. al. suggest, as indicated above, that humans represent
events in SOV order, and that this order is independent of the language we
speak. This order, they suggest, might have been important in the early stages
of the emergence of language:
[T]he ordering seen in our nonverbal tasks may shape language in
its emerging stages. (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008, p. 9167)
Langus and Nespor draw a similar conclusion. They claim that simple com-
munication prefers SOV order and they connect this to the emergence of lan-
guage:
130 5.3. Motion events vs. intensional events
Our results suggest that also our linguistic abilities coexist with,
and possibly derive from, a more primitive form of communication
that relies on the direct mapping between the conceptual and the
sensory-motor system. (Langus and Nespor, 2010, p. 21)
5.2.4 Communication, or mental representation?
Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) claim that the ArPA order found in the partic-
ipants’ gesturing cannot come from communicative pressure, because partici-
pants used the same order when they were asked to do a non-communicative
task (the transparancy task described above). For this reason, they speculate
that, as mentioned above, ArPA may reflect a natural sequencing for repre-
senting events.
But what does it mean for semantic elements to be sequenced? As I ob-
served in chapter 4, semantic elements that occur together in an event can be
mentally represented in many ways, some of which do not have any inherent
order (for example in a mental map or a mental image). So, linearisation of
these elements only takes place when we are forced to impose an order on the
semantic elements.5 A situation that typically forces us to linearise information
is communication: when we communicate about events (using either speech or
gestures), we cannot provide all the information at the same time and we are
forced to form a sequence: provide the informational elements one by one. Be-
cause sequencing and communication co-occur so clearly, we do not want to
rule out the influence of communication and communicative pressures in the
gesturing experiment.
To sum up, Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) have initiated an interesting ex-
perimental method which shows that people bypass the grammatical rules of
their native language when they are asked to communicate manually. Goldin-
Meadow et al. (2008) tested one kind of events: motion events. Langus and
Nespor (2010) investigated how more complex events were gestured. In the
next section, I will introduce intensional events, a class of events that have
the same level of complexity as motion events, but that are semantically dif-
ferent from motion events. Below, I will show that intensional events behave
differently from motion events in the improvised communication task.
5.3 Motion events vs. intensional events
5.3.1 An intuitive difference
Goldin-Meadow et al speculate that Actor-Patient-Act (ArPA) ‘may reflect a
natural sequencing for representing events.’ As an explanation for this particu-
5As noted in chapter 4, advocates of a strong account of Fodor’s Language of Thought
hypothesis will not agree at this point. I will discuss the role of communication further at
the end of this chapter.
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lar order they quote results from related research, showing that the Actor and
Patient might be situated before the Act, because entities are cognitively more
basic and less relational than actions (Gentner and Boroditsky, 2001). More-
over, Patients and Acts are cognitively tied (Goldin-Meadow, 2003), which
would link Patient to Act, and result in the ArPA order for gesturing (Goldin-
Meadow et al., 2008, p. 9166).
This explanation seems intuitive, especially for the particular kind of events
that were used in the experiment described in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008),
namely motion events. But are motion events representative for all possible
events? I will claim that there is a category of events, intensional events, for
which the ArPA order is not as intuitive as it is for motion events. Intensional
events differ from motion events semantically and we will hypothesise that dif-
ferent semantic properties lead to different gesture orderings in the improvised
communication task. But first, let us focus on the differences between motion
events and intensional events.
The events used in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) are all events in which
someone does something to someone or something else. In these situations, the
ontological status of Actor and Patient are similar. E.g., in the example of a girl
covering a box, we can summarise the situation as follows: (1) there is a girl,
(2) there is a box, and (3) the girl covers the box. In other words, in order for
a sentence describing this situation to be true, both the subject and the direct
object need to exist, and they need to relate to each other in the right way.
Let us compare this situation with a situation in which a princess wants an
apple. In this example, the ontological status of the Actor and the Patient are
not equal: in order for a sentence describing this situation to be true, we need
the princess to exist, but the ‘ontological demands’ on the apple are different:
a princess can want an apple without the actual apple being around, or she can
want an apple but not one in particular. It is even possible for the princess to
want something that does not exist at all, as in ‘The princess wants a unicorn.’
The crucial difference between the two events thus resides in a difference
between the verbs that describe the actions going on in them: both ‘cover’ and
‘want’ are transitive verbs (they occur with a subject and a direct object),
but ‘cover’ is an extensional verb, whereas ‘want’ is an intensional verb. Other
examples of intensional verbs are ‘seek’, ‘admire’, and arguably also ‘see’ and
‘draw’. In the literature, interesting properties of intensional verbs have been
described and inventories of intensional verbs have been drawn up (Forbes,
2010; Moltmann, 2008). Let us have a look at them.
5.3.2 Defining intensional transitive verbs
The terms ‘intensional’ vs ‘extensional’ are used because of the role that exten-
sions (the object a term refers to) and intensions (the meaning of a term) play
in the interpretation of these verbs. In order to interpret an extensional verb,
the extension of its complement (the direct object) is important, whereas for
the interpretation of intensional verbs, the extension of its complement is less
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important than its meaning. This is a first, intuitive definition. But how are
intensional verbs defined exactly? In order to get a more precise characterisa-
tion of the differences between extensional and intensional transitive verbs, I
will give a brief overview of three ‘marks’ of intensionality that were described
in Forbes (2010): substitution-resistance, the availability of unspecific readings,
and existence-neutrality.
Substitution-resistance
In sentences with extensional verbs, it is possible to substitute the direct object
with one that refers to the same object, without changing the truth value of
the sentence. This is illustrated in the following examples:
(1) John lives next to Mark Twain.
(2) John lives next to Samuel Clemens.
Because Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain, sentence 1 is true in exactly the same
situations as sentence 2. If we substitute the extensional verb ‘live next to’ for
an intensional verb, ‘admire’, this is no longer possible.
(3) John admires Mark Twain.
(4) John admires Samuel Clemens.
It might be the case that sentence 3 is true, but that John does not realise
that his grumpy neighbour Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain. In that case, ‘John
admires Mark Twain’ is true, while ‘John admires Samuel Clemens’ is false.
The availability of unspecific readings
In sentences with intensional verbs, it is possible that the direct object remains
unspecific. An example of this is the following sentence:
(5) Mary seeks a man.
For this sentence, an interpretation is possible where Mary seeks a man, but
not one man in particular. Contrast this with the verb ‘kiss’. We cannot say
(6) Mary kissed a man, but not one in particular.
Existence-neutrality
In sentences with intensional verbs, it is possible for the direct object not to
exist at all. By contrast, for extensional verbs, the direct object needs to exist
in order for the sentence to make sense. It is possible to seek a unicorn, but
not to stumble across one.
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5.3.3 Subclasses of intensional verbs
Intensional verbs will always show at least one of the three properties described
above. Some verbs manifest all three kinds of behaviour, but there are many
verbs that meet only one of the criteria. For certain verbs, it is not always clear
whether a particular criterion is met.
The following subclasses of intensional verbs can be distinguished:
• ‘Classical’ intensional verb: search for
• Psych verbs: dream of, think of
• Perception verbs: hear, see
• Creation verbs: build, draw, knit, sculpt
The class of intensional verbs is thus a rather diverse group and there is no
general agreement on either the names of the subcategories, the verbs that
should be included in them, or even whether all categories listed above are
truly intensional.
One might, for example, question the intensional properties of perception
verbs: if John sees a house, doesn’t he just see an existing external object? But
the fact that a sentence like ‘When John listened to a cello, he heard a violin’
is possible, shows that there is, after all, something special about complements
of perception verbs. In support of this view, see the following characterisation
of perception verbs, as presented in Moltmann (2008):
The complements of perception verbs [. . . ] do not describe the exter-
nal object that may be perceived, but rather the way the perceived
object appears.
In other words, for perception verbs, like for other intensional verbs, it is not
the external object that is important for their interpretation, but the intension.
This shows that perception verbs have at least an intensional flavor.
A special class of verbs that have been discussed in the literature are creation
verbs. To give a very brief summary of this discussion (Zucchi (1999) provides
more details), there are two opposing intuitions. The first is reflected in Bennett
(1977),6 who states that when a sentence like ‘John is building a house’ is
uttered, this has a reading in which the house does not exist. The fact that
there is this reading, Bennett claims, should be explained by analysing the verb
‘build’ as intensional.
Parsons (1990), appeals to the following examples, to argue that creation
verbs are different from intensional verbs:
(7) Mary built a house.
(8) Mary looked for a unicorn.
6Cited in (Zucchi, 1999, p. 190).
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Whereas it is possible that the unicorn in sentence (8) does not exist, the house
in sentence (7) must exist. Therefore, the class of intensional verbs and that of
creation verbs must be different classes. When analysing a progressive sentence
like ‘Mary is building a house,’ he maintains that for this sentence to be true,
the house should exist; and similarly so for the circle in a sentence like ‘John
is drawing a circle,’ because “[p]eople do refer to unfinished houses as houses
and even—though more reluctantly—to unfinished circles as circles” (Parsons,
1990, p. 178).
It is clear now that especially in the case of creation verbs it is not clear
whether they are really intensional in nature. Below, when we will look at
the behaviour of intensional verbs in an experimental setting, we will take the
widest definition of ‘intensional’ and include all verbs that have an intensional
flavor. A more fine-grained analysis of creation verbs versus other intensional
verbs will be given in section 5.4.3.
5.3.4 Intensional events and gesturing order
We have described semantic differences between two kinds of events: extensional
(motion) events and intensional events. How will the two behave in the impro-
vised communication setting? An interesting link between semantic properties
and word order is provided in Jackendoff (2002). Jackendoff suggests that in
simple language systems without full syntax, semantic principles play an organ-
ising role in short utterances. We will assume that the gesture strings produced
in the improvised communication task are such a ‘language system without full
syntax’, and thus hypothesise that semantic properties of events are important
in the improvised communication setting and will influence the order of the
gesturing.
Let us look again at the event princess wants apple. This event is typically
described with an intensional verb, and can thus be called an intensional event.
As was pointed out above, there is something special about the direct object in
such events: the apple in the ‘want-event’ is not necessarily a concrete object. If
we would make a step-by-step analysis of the event, it would look like this: (1)
there is a princess, (2) there is something the princess wants, and (3) that is an
apple. This analysis reflects the fact that there is something special about the
Patient: it is in some sense dependent on the Agent and the Act. The hypothesis
we advance is that the semantic differences between extensional and intensional
events lead to different orderings when these two classes of events are linearised
for communication.
To test this hypothesis, we set up an improvised communication experiment
where people are asked to convey the meanings, in an improvised manner, of
both motion events and intensional events. We predict that for motion events,
which are all typically described by extensional verbs, participants will use
ArPA order, similarly to what was shown in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008). In
intensional events, however, there is something special about the ontological
status of the Patient. We have seen above that the direct objects in such events
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are less concrete. Based on the observation in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008,
p. 9166) that information that is cognitively more basic is expressed before
more complex information, I predict that the Patients in an intensional event
will be placed at the end of the gesturing sequence, resulting in a gesturing order
of ArAP. In order to make sure that the influence of the native language of the
participants is ruled out, we will test participants of two native languages:
Turkish (which has SOV as dominant order) and Dutch (which has SVO as
dominant order).7
5.4 Experiment 1: gesturing motion events and
intensional events
This experiment tested the influence of the semantic properties (motion vs in-
tensional events) of an event on gesture ordering in improvised communication.
5.4.1 Method
Participants
16 participants (5 male and 11 female) were recruited from Utrecht University
and the Utrecht School of the Arts in Utrecht, the Netherlands. All were native
speakers of Dutch (which is an SVO language), and none of the participants
had any knowledge of a conventional sign language.
19 participants (10 male and 9 female) were recruited from Bogazici Univer-
sity in Istanbul, Turkey. All were native speakers of Turkish (which is an SOV
language), and none of the participants had any knowledge of a conventional
sign language.
All participants (Turkish and Dutch) received a small monetary compensa-
tion for participating.
Items
The set of items consisted of 20 pictures of motion events (e.g. ‘Pirate throws
guitar’, ‘Princess carries vase’), and 20 pictures of intensional events (e.g. ‘Cook
thinks of sock’, ‘Leprechaun sees tall building’). Each motion event had a cor-
responding intensional event, with the same actor and patient, but a different
action.
All actors (subjects) in the pictures had particular external characteristics
(e.g. a princess with a crown, a pirate with a hat), in order to encourage partic-
ipants to really gesture all elements in the picture. All patients (direct objects)
7Strictly spoken, Dutch is not an SVO language; it belongs to the subclass of V2 languages.
The difference between SVO and V2 only surfaces in certain constructions, and not in those
used in the experiment. In other words, the events used in the experiment, when described
in Dutch, will be described in SVO order and for this study Dutch can safely be used as an
SVO language.
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Figure 5.1: Two example items: ‘pirate throws guitar’ and ‘cook thinks of sock’
were inanimate objects.8 All pictures had been pre-tested for clarity. Each pic-
ture was shown either in its original version or as a mirror image, to control
for the left-to-right order of the elements in the pictures.
For the experiment, two versions were created, each consisting of 10 pictures
of motion events and 10 pictures of intensional events. The items were presented
in random order.
Procedure
Participants were shown pictures of events on a computer screen. They were
asked to convey the meaning of each picture to the experimenter (who could not
see the computer screen), by using only gestures and no speech. Each picture
remained visible on the screen while the participant was gesturing. Participants
were told to keep gesturing until they thought they had conveyed the meaning
of the picture; no information was given about the amount of gestures to be
used.
Before the actual experiment started, participants were shown four prac-
tice items. During the practice stage of the experiment, the experimenter gave
feedback about whether or not she understood which meaning was conveyed.
No spoken feedback was given during the experiment.
After the gesturing part of the experiment, participants were shown the pic-
tures again, and were asked to describe each event using a declarative sentence
8This was done to exclude any effects of animacy as described in Meir et al. (2010), in
which for events with two animate entities, ArAP gesture order was found as the dominant
order.
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in their native language.
5.4.2 Data analysis and results
The video recordings were coded for gesturing order by two independent coders
(80,6% agreement). All gesturing sequences for which there was no consensus
were filtered out (62 of 320 recordings). Occasionally, participants produced
gesture strings describing an action that did not match with the intended action
on the picture; these were removed as well (10 recordings).
other
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motion events intensional events
Figure 5.2: Proportions of gesturing orders observed in experiment 1: for motion
events, a high proportion of ArPA was observed, and for intensional events, a
high proportion of ArAP was observed.
The overall results are shown in figure 5.2. The chart shows the percentages
of ArPA strings, ArAP strings and other orders. The category of ‘other’ orders
(which is only a minority of the totality of strings) consisted of strings like
PArA, AArP, or strings with either less or more than three gestures. It is clear
from the graph that the majority of motion events were gestured in ArPA order,
whereas the majority of intensional events were gestured in ArAP order.
The data were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA. The within
subject factors were Picture-type (intensional or motion) and Order (ArPA or
ArAP); the between subjects factors were Version (version 1 or 2) and Language
(Turkish and Dutch). We found a significant interaction between Picture type
and Order: F (1, 31) = 268.911, p = .000. No significant interaction was found
between the main interaction and the effect of version (p = .836) or language
(p = .208).
Pairwise Bonferroni corrected comparisons reveal that among gesture strings
of motion events, the proportion of ArPA order was high (M = .714, SE =
.036), whereas the proportion of ArAP order was low (M = .106, SE = .035).
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Among gesture strings of intensional events, the proportion of ArAP order was
high (M = .576, SE = .046), whereas the proportion of ArPA order was low
(M = .119, SE = .024). See figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Mean proportions of ArPA and ArAP gesturing orders for motion
events (in the first graph) and intensional events (in the second graph). Error
bars indicate standard error of the mean.
5.4.3 Post hoc analysis: creation verbs
Above we have seen that in the literature, there is quite some discussion on the
question whether creation verbs like draw, build and sculpt are truly intensional
in nature. Because we cannot exclude the possibility that creation verbs are not
intensional, it is interesting to compare the gesturing sequences for creation
verbs with those of other intensional verbs.
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA, using the within subject fac-
tor Picture-type (creation events and other intensional events) and between
subjects factors Version (version 1 or 2) and Language (Turkish or Dutch). We
found that Picture-type significantly influenced the proportion of ArAP ordered
strings: F (1, 29) = 4.679 and p = .039. Pairwise Bonferroni corrected compar-
isons show that the proportion of strings in ArAP order was smaller when
people were communicating about a creation event (M = .445, SE = .064)
than when they were communicating about other intensional events (M = .602,
SE = .058). There was no significant interaction with the main effect of Version
(p = .787) or Language (p = .138).
Thus, the proportion of ArAP gesturing strings for creation events is signif-
icantly lower than of those for other intensional events. However, ArAP is still
the most commonly used string for creation verbs, just like for other intensional
verbs. In other words, creation events behave like other intensional events, but
less consistently so.
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Figure 5.4: Different actions giving rise to different gesturing orders: ArAP for
intensional events and ArPA for extensional events.
5.4.4 Discussion
For motion events, the results obtained in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) were
replicated, but for intensional events, different gesture sequencing was observed:
the Patient was placed after the Act, resulting in an ArAP order (see figure
5.4). This confirms our hypothesis that semantic properties of the verb (or more
precisely, the action depicted) influence the ordering of elements in improvised
communication.
5.5 A word on methodology
Using gesture in a lab setting in order to make people communicate in an
improvised manner is a relatively new approach. Hence, it is interesting to
focus specifically on the methodology used in these experiments. That is what
I will do in this section: I will review some of the methodological problems
in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) and Langus and Nespor (2010). For each, I
point out how we have adapted the setup in our experiment to overcome these
problems and improve the experimental design.
5.5.1 Methodological issues: Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008)
As described above in section 5.2.1, vignettes depicting motion events were used
in the experiment described in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008). Of the forty vi-
gnettes, 20 were intransitive (i.e., ones that are typically described by a sentence
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with an intransitive verb), and 16 were ‘transitive actions’. Of the transitive
actions, 8 involved movement in place (e.g., ‘boy tilts glass’, or ‘captain swings
pail’), and 8 involved movement crossing space (e.g., ‘man moves garbage can
to motorcycle man’, ‘girl gives flower to man’). The items depicting movement
across space depict, apart from an agent, a patient and an act, also an endpoint
(described by the indirect object), e.g., man in ‘girl gives flower to man’. These
items thus contain four elements instead of three, which makes the gesturing
of these events more complicated, and that is reflected in the results: relatively
few participants included the Patient in their gesturing sequence for this class
of events. We therefore decided not to use any vignettes depicting movement
across space.
Omission in the gesture sequence of one of the three elements in the picture
was a problem that occurred not only for the events crossing space, but also for
other events. On page 9167 in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008), it is noted that of
the results, 501 gesture strings contained two relevant elements, and only 113
contained three.
One of the reasons for this might be that in the setup of the experiment,
both the experimenter and the participant were able to see the screen with a
picture of the event. Due to this setup, there was no strict necessity for the
participants to really communicate all the details of the event depicted. In our
experiment, the placement of the screen was such that only the participant
could see the screen.
In some of the gesture strings, the patient and the action were gestured in
one instead of two separate gestures, which is another cause of the high per-
centage of two gesture strings. A closer look at the items used in the experiment
reveals that some of the items trigger this strategy more than others. Examples
of items for which patient and act were collapsed into one gesture are ‘boy stirs
spoon’ and ‘man plays guitar’ (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008, table S1). When
people gesture a guitar, they usually do this by ‘playing’ it (and not by, e.g.,
indicating its shape). Thus, the action (playing) and the patient (guitar) are
taken together in one gesture. In our experiment, we solve this issue by taking
combinations of action and patient that are not prototypical combinations. For
example, instead of using ‘man plays guitar’ as an item, we use ‘man throws
guitar’ (see figure 5.1).
A third reason for the omission of elements in the gesturing might be that
the subject is easily forgotten. We will say more about this below, when dis-
cussing methodological issues in Langus and Nespor (2010).
5.5.2 Methodological issues: Langus and Nespor (2010)
In the construction of their experiment, Langus and Nespor (2010) have taken
into account some of the problems that occur in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008).
In their first experiment, Langus and Nespor use 32 drawn vignettes depict-
ing events in which ‘someone does something to someone or something else’
(Langus and Nespor, 2010, p. 5). In other words, all of their items depict
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transitive actions. They remark that in each vignette, ‘each of the three con-
stituents unambiguously matched the category of the Subject, the Object or
the Verb.’ (Langus and Nespor, 2010, p. 5). This means that for an event like
‘a girl catches a fish’, the opposite, ‘a fish catches a girl’ is not a viable option.
Moreover, all constituents of the events (subject, object and verb) were equally
frequent, and occurred in different combinations with other constituents during
the experiment. We decided to use the same approach in our experiment.
We do find some potential problems in their experimental setup, however.
First of all, participants in the experiment were instructed to describe each
vignette using 3 gestures. We think that this instruction is too informative and
might prompt participants to think about the purpose of the experiment.
Despite the explicit instruction to use three gestures, many participants
in Langus and Nespor’s experiment used 2-gesture strings: the gesture strings
contained all three elements in only 58.6% of the cases in Italian speaking
participants and 63.2% in Turkish speaking participants (Langus and Nespor,
2010, p. 295). In two-gesture strings, the Subject was omitted most often. In
our experiment we avoid the issue of omitted Subjects, by giving all Subjects
specific characteristics, like a pirate with an eye patch and a witch with a big
hat.
5.5.3 Representing events in images
In Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008), short animations were used to represent the
events that were to be gestured by the participants. In Langus and Nespor
(2010), on the other hand, only pictures were used to represent the events. In
our experiment we use pictures only, for practical reasons. It is very well possible
to represent events by means of a picture, but if we want the participants to
understand which event is meant, it is worthwhile to think carefully about how
a picture best represents an event.
There are many ways to analyse events and to divide the class of events in
subclasses. One of the ways, put forward in Vendler (1957), is to distinguish
between four types of eventualities: states, activities, accomplishments, and
achievements.
An activity, such as John’s walking uphill, is a homogeneous event:
its sub-events satisfy the same description as the activity itself and it
has no natural finishing point or culmination. An accomplishment,
such as John’s climbing the mountain, may have a culmination, but
is never homogeneous. An achievement, such as John’s reaching the
top, is a culminating event (and is therefore always instantaneous).
And a state, such as John’s knowing the shortest way, is homoge-
neous and may extend over time, but it makes no sense to ask how
long it took or whether it culminated. (Casati and Varzi, 2010)
Most of the items used in the experiments by Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008)
and Langus and Nespor (2010) fall into the category of either activity or ac-
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time
event
Figure 5.5: A snapshot of an event
complishment. Looking at the pictures used by Langus and Nespor, we must
realise that in a picture, only a snapshot of the event is given (see figure 5.5).
What snapshot exactly is taken to represent the whole event might have an
influence on how the event is going to be described by the participant.
For activities, taking a snapshot should not pose any problems. For example,
pushing a cart is a homogeneous process. Whichever snapshot we make of this
activity, we will see a representative picture of what is going on.
Taking a snapshot of accomplishments might result in problems. Some ac-
complishments have a resultative state. For example, catching a fish has as a
resultative state the possession of a fish, or throwing a ball into a box has as a
result that the ball is now located inside the box. If we want people to act out
such events, we do not want them to focus too much on the resultative state
(for the simple reason that we would like to see what they do with the actor,
patient and act in the event itself, not in the resultative state).
Some accomplishments, on the other hand, have a preporatory phase. For
example, shooting an elephant involves aiming for the elephant, and aiming is
something quite different from shooting. So it is important, when depicting an
accomplishment with a single image, to choose a snapshot that is still within
the action itself, to avoid too much attention being paid to either the result of
the action or the preparation. The figures we used in the experiment are listed
in Appendix 7.3. An example is the event in which a princess cuts a scarf. The
result state of this event would be a scarf in two pieces. To make sure that
participants will not start to attempt to gesture that, we depicted the event at
a stage where there is still clearly one whole scarf.
Of course, this is not a recipe for making a perfectly representative image
of every kind of event, but keeping the properties of processes and accomplish-
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ments in mind when preparing images for the experiment certainly helps to
produce effective images.
5.5.4 From production to interpretation
To wrap up, we have seen that events with different semantic properties (exten-
sional vs. intensional) give rise to different gesturing orders (ArPA vs. ArAP).
Interpreting this along the lines of the theory presented in chapter 4, this would
mean that people linearise mental representations of events differently in dif-
ferent circumstances: when a Patient is more abstract, or dependent on the
Act, the information is linearised in an ArAP order, and an ArPA order is
chosen otherwise. I have claimed that linearisation of information, going from
a non-linear mental representation to a string, is something that is inherently
communicative. In other words, the order that is imposed on utterances is done
so for communicative reasons: to make it easier for hearers (observers) to get
the message. If this is indeed the case, we would expect to see an influence of
order on the interpretation of gesturing sequences. This hypothesis is tested in
the next section.
5.6 Experiment 2: the interpretation of gesture
strings
It has become clear from the experiment described above that the semantic
differences between motion events and intensional events have an influence on
gesture production in the improvised communication task, resulting in ArPA
order for extensional (or motion) events, and ArAP order for intensional events.
I have claimed that these orders are the result of a process of linearisation, in
which a non-linear mental representation is forced into a string, which has linear
order, and that this process is a communicative process (see chapter 4). If that
is true, and the formation of utterances in the improvised communication task
is indeed a communicative process, then we would expect to see an influence
of the ordering of elements in a string on the interpretation of this string.
In order to test this, we set up an experiment in which participants were
asked to watch videos of gesture strings. Each video contained a string of ges-
tures with three elements: an Actor, a Patient and an Act. The essential element
in this experiment is that the recorded Acts were ambiguous. We recorded ges-
tures that could be interpreted in two ways: as an Act creating an extensional
event, or as an Act creating an intensional event. An example is depicted in fig-
ure 5.6: this Act can be interpreted as build or as climb, because the gesturing
is somewhat vague.
Using the ambiguous Acts, we created a series of ambiguous gesturing se-
quences in two orders: ArPA and ArAP. In the production experiment, ArPA
order was used for motion events, and ArAP was used for intensional events.
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Under the assumption that our hypothesis that this was done for communica-
tive purposes is true, we expect ArPA strings to be interpreted as motion events
and ArAP strings as intensional events (van Leeuwen, 2010).
5.6.1 Method
Items
We created short movie clips showing an actor gesturing simple events. The
verbs were gestured in such a way that the events acted out could be interpreted
either as a motion event or as an intensional event.
An example of the way in which these ambiguous items were gestured is
given in figure 5.6, in which the ambiguous Act ‘climb/build’ is shown. Thus, the
gesture in the figure can be interpreted as a climbing action, as well as a building
action. We created two videos of each ambiguous verb by adding a gestured
subject and object to the transitive event. There were two different orders:
[Actor-AmbiguousAct-Patient] and [Actor-Patient-AmbiguousAct]. Examples
of two videos using the same material are shown in figure 5.7 and 5.8. Each
video consists of exactly the same video material, but the elements are put in
two different orders. Because participants were presented the two answering
options before watching the video, the Actor and Patient in each video were
relatively easy to recognise.
The following ambiguous events were used; for every item in the list, the
option marked with m creates a motion event, and the option marked with i
creates an intensional event.
• Pirate dropsm/searchesi ball.
• Princess breaksm/sculptsi vase.
• Leprechaun cutsm/drawsi pizza.
• Witch eatsm/wantsi banana.
• Witch paintsm/paintsi table.9
• Girl sleeps onm/dreams ofi book.
• Girl kissesm/thinks ofi doll.
• Princess talks tom/talks abouti snowman.
• Pirate throwsm/hearsi guitar.
• Cook stirsm/smellsi soup.
• Leprechaun hitsm/feelsi book.
• Witch climbsm/buildsi house.
Of the 12 video pairs, two versions (Version 1 and 2) were created. The
videos were randomly categorised as belonging to version 1 or 2, taking care that
each version consisted of 6 videos in ArAP order, 6 videos in ArPA order. Four
9In the first interpretation a witch painting an existing table is meant; in the second a
witch painting a table on a canvas.
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Figure 5.6: An ambiguous action: ‘climb’ or ‘build’.
Figure 5.7: An ambiguous gesture string in ArAP order: witch-climb/build-
house. Each still represents an element: ‘witch’ was gestured by indicating the
shape of the hat; ‘house’ was gestured by indicating the shape of a rooftop.
Figure 5.8: An ambiguous gesture string in ArPA order: witch-house-
climb/build. The video material used for this video was exactly the same as for
the video depicted in 5.7; only the order is different.
146 5.6. Experiment 2: the interpretation of gesture strings
fillers, items with unambiguous actions, were added to each version. The videos
were shown to participants in a two alternative forced choice task; pictures of
the corresponding intensional and extensional (motion) events were shown as
the two answer possibilities.
Participants
Forty one native speakers of Dutch (16 male, 25 female) were recruited from
the Utrecht University library in Utrecht, the Netherlands.
Forty native speakers of Turkish (12 male, 28 female) were recruited from
the library at Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey.
The participants did not receive a monetary compensation for participating.
Procedure
The participants were shown videos on a laptop screen and were asked to
choose, after each video, the picture that fitted best with the event acted out
on the video. First two practice items with unambiguous verbs were shown,
followed by the ambiguous items and fillers. The ambiguous items and fillers
were presented in random order. The two answer possibilities were shown before
each video,10 and again afterwards. The order of the two answer possibilities
was also randomly determined.
The experiment was conducted on a laptop in the library, and took about
ten minutes to complete.
5.6.2 Data analysis and results
Upon re-analysis of the video clips we decided to exclude two videos from the
results: ‘Pirate dropsm/searchesi ball’ and ‘Girl kissesm/thinks ofi doll’. These
two videos differ from the others in the sense that the ambiguous actions they
depict consist of two sub-gestures,11 whereas for all other ambiguous actions,
only one gesture is used.12
The data was analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA. The within
subjects factor was Order (ArPA or ArAP gesturing order), and the between
subjects factors were Version (version 1 or 2) and Language (Turkish or Dutch).
We found a significant main effect of Order: F (1, 77) = 23, 454, p = .000. No
significant interaction was found of Language (p = .691). However, a significant
interaction on the main effect of Version was found (p = .004). The latter might
be an (undesired) result of the fact that some videos showed a bigger effect than
10A pilot had pointed out that without showing the two answer possibilities before the
video, the task was too hard (participants were unprepared when watching the video, and
were not able to make a choice after the video).
11A drop-gesture followed by a search gesture for the former, and a think of gesture followed
by a kiss gesture for the latter.
12Including the two deleted item in the analysis still yields significant main effect of video
order: F (1, 77) = 17.798, p = .000.
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Figure 5.9: Mean proportions of videos interpreted as motion event for ArPA
and ArAP video order. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
others. Given the fact that the two versions were created randomly (see above
on page 144), this effect is harmless.
Pairwise Bonferroni corrected comparisons show that for ArPA gesturing
sequences, a motion answer was chosen more often (M = .711, SE = .019)
than for ArAP gesturing sequences (M = .569, SE = .020). See figure 5.9.
5.6.3 Discussion
The two different gesturing orderings led people to interpret the gesturing dif-
ferently: ArPA gesturing strings were more likely to be interpreted as motion
events than SVO strings were, and ArAP gesturing strings were more likely
to be interpreted as intensional events than ArPA strings were. So we are safe
to conclude that the order of gesturing has an influence on the interpretation
of the gesture strings. This supports our hypothesis that choosing a different
ordering in order to convey different kinds of meanings serves a communicative
purpose.
The effect of order in this experiment was not as strong as the effect found
in the production experiment. One of the reasons for this might be that this
experiment was conducted, not in a lab, but in a public place, the university
library. This may have led to more noise in the data.
Moreover, when choosing an interpretation for each video, participants
could do this on the basis of many factors, because they were not instructed to
make their choice on the basis of the gesturing order. In other words, partic-
ipants may have based their choice for a particular interpretation of a video,
not on the gesturing order, but for example on the shape of the gestures or the
facial expression of the actor. This may have added noise to the data as well.
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Despite these noise factors a significant difference was found, which makes
the results even more striking.
5.7 General discussion
5.7.1 Overview of the results
Section 5.4 showed that the semantic properties of events have an influence
on the gesturing order in improvised communication: ArPA order is used for
extensional (motion) events, and ArAP order is used for intensional events.
Section 5.6 showed that when people interpret gesturing sequences, the
ordering of the gestures influences the way they interpret these events: for
gesturing sequences with ambiguous actions, an extensional interpretation was
chosen significantly more often after an ArPA sequence than after an ArAP
sequence.
5.7.2 Word order in communication
In previous publications, similarities were pointed out between the improvised
communication task and newly emerged sign languages like Al Sayyid Bedouin
Sign Language and Nicaraguan Sign Language (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008,
p. 9167). These similarities led to the hypothesis that results from the impro-
vised communication experiment can tell us something about the emergence of
language in general: it was argued that ArPA word order “may reflect a natural
disposition that humans exploit not only when asked to represent events non-
verbally, but also when creating language anew” (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008,
p. 9167). This in turn connects well to the claim made in Newmeyer (2000),
that the earliest human language had rigid SOV word order.
The production experiment described in this paper shows that it is not
ArPA word order as such that is important in the improvised communication
task, but rather the meanings that are to be conveyed: extensional events lead
to ArPA ordering, whereas intensional events lead to ArAP ordering. This
shows that in emerging communication systems, meaning and structure have
more to do with each other than previously thought. Moreover, it suggests
that ordering information in utterances in these systems is quite an active
process, rather than simply a reproduction of how information is represented
mentally. To repeat my analysis from chapter 4, what essentially happens in the
experiment is the following: people are presented with a 2-dimensional image
of an event, and then they are forced to linearise the information depicted in
the image into a sequence. When making a sequence of the different elements,
they are forced to impose an order on the information. So it is only in making
the information public, in being involved in communication, that ordering plays
a role. As is shown in the experiment in section 5.4, people show systematicity
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in the ordering they choose. This systematicity can be seen as the beginnings
of, or precursor of, syntactic rules.
The experimental results suggest that semantic properties of the events com-
municated about in improvised communication play a role in the structuring of
the information, and that this is essentially a communicative phenomenon. But
communication is a process that has two perspectives: that of the speaker, and
that of the listener, or interpreter. If the suggestion formulated here is right,
then the relation between two kinds of events and the two different orderings
should play a role, not only on the speaker side of the communicative process,
but also on the side of the interpreter.
The second experiment described in this chapter shows that the order of
gesturing does indeed have an influence on the interpretation of the gesture
strings. This supports the hypothesis that the distinction found in gesture
production between ArAP and ArPA ordering for intensional events and motion
events respectively, has a communicative function.
5.7.3 Comparison with restricted linguistic systems
Effects of meaning on structure in simple language systems have been found
in other linguistic phenomena where improvisation is required. In chapter 2
we have seen a description of the Basic Variety: in the process of acquiring a
second language outside the classroom, adult learners go through a stage that
has been characterized as being (1) determined by a small number of organi-
sational principles, (2) largely independent of the source or target language of
the learner and (3) simple but relatively successful for communication. Some
examples of organisational principles of the Basic Variety are FocusLast (‘put
the information that is in focus, new information, at the end of the sentence’)
and AgentFirst (‘the NP referent with the highest control comes first’). Similar
organisational principles were described for, e.g., pidgin languages (Jackendoff,
2002). We have also seen—in chapter 2—that the fact that the organisational
principles described above are found consistently in linguistic phenomena like
the Basic Variety and pidgins, and seem to be independent of the native lan-
guage of their users, makes these phenomena interesting for the language evolu-
tion debate: they might tell us something about the structure of evolutionarily
early language (Jackendoff, 2002; Schouwstra, 2010).
As described in chapter 4, the circumstances under which people create
systems like the Basic Variety and pidgins are very particular and also often
undesirable. Moreover, the circumstances under which these restricted systems
emerge are not controllable, and the data is therefore not very clean. Finally,
the focus of data collection for these systems was mainly on production, and
not on comprehension. Therefore, it would be valuable if we would be able
to collect this kind of data in a controlled environment, like in a laboratory.
The improvised communication task provides us with exactly this: if we see
the task as a setting where restricted linguistic systems are produced, we can
obtain data in the ideal way described above. The improvised communication
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task can be seen as an environment where restricted linguistic systems are pro-
duced, because the setting shares many properties with the settings of existing
restricted linguistic systems. In the experiment, like in those situations, sub-
jects cannot use their native language to express themselves and are forced to
improvise, using whatever they have in their restricted inventory. The impro-
vised communication task thus offers us a way to collect data about the earliest
stages of language emergence in a controlled manner.
Moreover, the view of the improvised communication task as a restricted
linguistic system allows us to compare the influence of semantic structures in
existing studies into, e.g., the Basic Variety and pidgin languages to that in lab
situations. Thereby, one can go back and forth between data from existing lin-
guistic systems and lab data from the improvised communication experiment,
using both phenomena to formulate sharper hypotheses about the mechanisms
governing protolanguage. In the previous chapter, we have made observations
about existing restricted systems concerning dominant word order. Let us now
compare these results to the lab results obtained in this chapter.
In section 4.4.2, it was observed that in existing restricted linguistic sys-
tems, two word orders that seemed dominant are SVO and SOV. These cor-
respond with the ArPA and ArAP orders observed in this chapter. However,
the effect observed in the experiments described in this chapter of a distinction
between intensional and extensional events, has not been observed in existing
restricted linguistic systems. This might have several reasons. For pidgin and
Basic Variety, we have seen that the word order of simple expressions may
be influenced by the full languages spoken by the speakers in these situations
(Substrate/superstrate language in the case of pidgin, and source language in
the case of Basic Variety). For newly emerging sign languages, it may even be
the case that there is some effect of the intensional/extensional distinction on
word order, but one that has not been observed previously, because no one
focused specifically on this effect. Finally, a crucial difference between the lab
experiment and the existing restricted systems is that participants in the lab
study have no existing conventions whatsoever to rely on: they are presented
with a task they have never done before. Speakers of pidgin, or Homesign, for
example, do have the beginnings of an established system of conventions to rely
on (see chapter 4, for a characterisation of pidgin in terms of emerging conven-
tions). It might very well be the case that these emerging conventions prevent
the usage of different word orders for different situations. We will take this issue
up in chapter 7, where future research concerning this issue is sketched.
Furthermore, it was observed that in none of the newly emerging sign lan-
guages (homesign, ABSL and NSL) was SVO found as a dominant word order.
It was suggested that this might have to do with the modality: it could be that
in the manual modality it is simply only possible to first describe the partici-
pants in an Act, before describing the Act itself. The first experiment in this
chapter has shown that this is not the case: when describing intensional events,
participants first describe the Act and then the Patient.
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Finally, the principle AgentFirst, that was suggested, in Jackendoff (2002),
as a governing principle for the Basic Variety and for pidgin, is very clearly
also at work in the lab experiment: almost without any exception, all gesturing
strings started with Actor rather than Patient or Act.
5.7.4 On modularity
In section 5.2.2 we have seen the improvised communication experiments as
carried out in Langus and Nespor (2010). They draw the conclusion that:
[T]he prominence of the SOV and the SVO orders among the world’s
languages originates from different cognitive systems: SOV is the
preferred constituent order in the direct interaction between the
sensory-motor and the conceptual system; the SVO order is pre-
ferred by the computational system of grammar. (Langus and Ne-
spor, 2010, p. 307)
With the results of our experiments, we offer a different explanation. There
is no fixed word order for improvised communication, but in improvisation
situations, strings are generated dynamically, and word order has a semantic
origin. This explanation connects well to other sources of evidence about the
origin of word order, as we have seen in restricted linguistic systems.
Moreover, our experiments offer a better explanation for the results of the
second experiment in Langus and Nespor (2010). Let me briefly recapitulate
what was shown in this experiment.
In the experiment, the improvised communication of complex events was
investigated. Vignettes were used that represent complex situations, such as,
e.g., [the man tells the child [that the girl catches a fish]]. It was found that
both Turkish and Italian participants gesture the subordinate clause after the
main clause, an order typical of SVO languages. In Langus and Nespor (2010)
it is concluded that the SOV order in improvised situations does not generalise
to more complex SOV-language-like constructions and that participants thus
did not use their computational system of grammar to produce the strings.
This interpretation is puzzling, because later in the article they interpret a
preference for SVO order as originating from the computational module. Thus,
it is not clear in the context of this article, which module is responsible for
what and on the basis of which assumptions this is the case.
In my view, the complex situations that were used (all of which involved
thinking or telling) are all instances of intensional events and thus it is not
surprising that a gesture ordering was found for these complex situations that
is consistent with SVO.
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5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that when people are forced to communicate
about simple events in an improvised manner, this does not necessarily lead
to ArPA ordering of utterances. Rather, the semantic properties of the Act
that is described are decisive in the ordering of gestures in the improvised
communication task.
In previous research (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008) it was pointed out that
it is striking that ArPA order was observed in these non-verbal communication
experiments, because this corresponds with SOV word order, and this is one
of the two most common word orders in the languages of the world. The order
that we have found besides ArPA, namely ArAP, corresponds with the other
most frequent dominant word order in the languages of the world: SVO. Thus,
it might be the case, but this is pure speculation, that the experiment points
out the source of the two most common dominant word orders in the world. But
it was already suggested in chapter 4 that it may not be dominant order, but
rather variation in word order that is an interesting phenomenon in language
systems where there is no fully established system of conventions: in which
cases do people change the order in which they present information?
The experiments in this chapter support the view that in language systems
without full syntax, semantic properties play an organising role, a process that
is also seen in other linguistic situations where improvisation is required. More-
over, we have shown that different ordering of the constituents in improvised
communication sequences results in different interpretations. This supports the
view that choosing different utterance structures in order to express different
kinds of meanings has a communicative function.
CHAPTER 6
The temporal displacement strategy
6.1 Introduction: adding temporal information
to a proposition
The previous chapter focused on the ways in which semantic characteristics of
events play a role in the linearisation of information. In other words, in which
order are an act and its participants described in communication? We have
shown, in the previous chapter, that thematic relations play a role in the linear
organisation of improvised utterances: there is a general tendency to express
information about the individual with the role of Agent first; this is consistent
with what has been found in many restricted linguistic systems. Moreover,
the experiments carried out in the previous chapter showed that the semantic
nature of the event has an influence on the linear organisation of the elements in
communication: for extensional events Patients are described before the Act,
and for intensional events, the Act is described before the Patient (I have
abbreviated these orders as ArPA and ArAP). It was shown that this not only
works for production in improvised communication, but also for interpretation.
An interpreter of improvised utterances uses information from the order of
presentation to determine the meaning intended by the speaker. Thus, the way
in which the verb and its arguments are ordered in improvised communication
has a communicative function.
Thus, chapter 5 investigated the linearisation of propositional information.
This chapter investigates what happens when information is added to a propo-
sition. I will do this by looking at what happens when one wants to describe,
of an event, when it takes place. In other words, what happens when I would
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like to convey the information that Fred hit the tree, but I would like to add
the information that this happened yesterday?
In chapter 4 we have seen that in full language, one can introduce a temporal
frame by putting a temporal adverb in front of a sentence. The temporal adverb
specifies the place on the time axis about which something is going to be
said. This is in Reichenbach’s terms the reference point R. The verb form says
something about the relation between R and E, the time of the event. An
example to illustrate this is the contrast between Yesterday I met John, for
which R and E coincide, and Yesterday, I had met John, for which E comes
before R (in other words, the sentence specifies a point on the time axis after
the ‘meeting-John-event’).
In restricted linguistic systems, there is no verb inflection, so the relation
between E and R cannot be expressed. Still, speakers in such systems do express
information about the past and the future, and they do this by applying the
temporal displacement strategy. The temporal displacement strategy tells a
speaker to place a temporal adverb in the initial position of an utterance, in
order to specify the reference point R. By lack of verbal inflection, the relation
between E and R remains underspecified, and it is therefore assumed that E,
the event, takes place at R. This means that an utterance like Yesterday John
tree hit describes the event in which John hit a tree, which took place yesterday.
This chapter investigates, first of all, whether this pattern can be repro-
duced in a lab experiment. Moreover, we would like to know if the usage of the
temporal displacement strategy really is a result of the participants bypassing
the rules of their native language. In the previous chapter, we have seen that
when people communicate simple propositions in an improvised manner, they
by-pass the grammar of their native language. When the expressions become
slightly more complex, will people still bypass their native grammar? There are
two possible answers to this question:
• Langus and Nespor (2010) suggest that, when engaged in improvised com-
munication, people bypass the grammar rules for their native language
when they communicate about simple situations, but that this changes
when they communicate about more complex situations: then, they claim,
the computational module in a speaker’s cognitive system is activated,
and they start using grammar rules. See section 5.2.2 for more details
about the modular conception of cognition that underlies this view. It is
possible that adding temporal information to a simple proposition trig-
gers participants to no longer bypass the grammar rules of their native
language.
• The data from existing restricted linguistic systems suggest that when
people have to communicate in an improvised manner, they organise
their utterances according to semantic and pragmatic principles, even
when their utterances become more complex. E.g., de Swart (2009) shows
that speakers of Basic Variety bypass the grammatical rules of both their
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native language and the target language when they express negative in-
formation, and Benazzo (2009) describes various source/target language-
independent ways to express temporal information observed in the Basic
Variety (one of which is the temporal displacement strategy).
In this chapter, I will show evidence that supports the second of these
options. Thus, the behaviour of participants in a lab study on improvised com-
munication replicates the observations from restricted linguistic systems ‘in the
wild’. This finding strengthens the hypothesis that we can use the improvised
communication experiment to collect restricted linguistic data. Moreover, the
experiment allows us to look in more detail at the principles that play a role
when people construct utterances in an improvised manner. We will explore
what happens when temporal information is added to a simple proposition:
how are the two kinds of information put together?
In section 6.2 a pilot study is presented and section 6.3 describes a full
experiment based on the pilot. Section 6.5 interprets these results, proposes a
model of the way in which different levels of information are put together in
improvised communication, and sketches the evolutionary implications of this
model.
6.2 The displacement strategy in the lab: a pilot
study
I set up a pilot study in which people were asked to communicate in an impro-
vised manner, by using only gesture and no speech (similar to experiment 1 in
the previous chapter). In the study, the aim was to make people communicate
about events that took place in the past or that will take place in the future,
and to see if people follow the displacement strategy that was observed in other
restricted linguistic systems.
In the improvised communication experiment, like in restricted linguistic
systems, people are not able to use verbal inflection. It is possible, however, to
refer to the past and the future by using temporal adverbs. In English, it is
possible to insert a temporal adverb, either at the beginning or at the end of a
sentence, like in the following examples:
(1) Tomorrow, the king will take a shower.
(2) The king will take a shower tomorrow.
In the experiment, English sentences were offered, and people were asked to
convey the information by using only gesture and no speech. If participants
apply the displacement strategy, they will be likely to put the temporal adverb
at the beginning of their gesturing sequence.
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6.2.1 Method
Twelve participants were recruited from the University of Edinburgh. All were
native speakers of English (an SVO language) and none of the participants were
familiar with any conventional sign language. The participants did not receive
a monetary compensation for participating.
The set of items consisted of 15 spoken sentences. Each spoken item was
followed by a three second silence and subsequently a short tone. Of the 15
items, 4 contained temporal information, all expressed by a temporal adverb as
well as verbal inflection. The temporal adverbs that were used were tomorrow,
yesterday, at six o’clock and at night. Temporal adverbs were placed either
at the beginning (Tinitial), or at the end of the sentence (Tfinal), such as in
the example sentences (1) and (2). All sentences in which a temporal adverb
occurred were intransitive sentences (although one could argue that ‘to take a
shower’ is transitive, but ‘take a shower’ was generally gestured with only one
gesture).
Each participant received two items under the Tinitial condition, and two
items under the Tfinal condition. The temporal and ‘non-temporal’ items were
presented in random order.
Participants were asked to listen to each spoken sentence through head-
phones. They were told that each sentence described a simple situation, and
that they had to describe each situation by using only gesture and no speech.
6.2.2 Results
Gesturing sequences were observed and written down by the experimenter. No
video recordings were made of this pilot study. Of 48 strings with temporal
information, 3 were not usable because the participant indicated that he/she
did not know how to gesture the temporal information.
Of the remaining 45 temporal gesturing strings, 22 were generated under the
Tinitial condition. Of these 22 strings, 21 had the temporal adverb in the initial
position. In other words, participants showed a tendency to put the temporal
information in the same position as it was in the recorded sentence. Of the
remaining 23 strings under the Tfinal condition, however, only 13 followed the
sentence order; in 10 gesture strings, the temporal adverb was placed in the
initial position. See table 6.1.
Thus, in improvised communication, there seems to be a tendency, when
a temporal adverb is presented in sentence-final position, to deviate from this
order and put the temporal adverb in the initial position, thereby applying the
temporal displacement strategy.
6.2.3 Discussion
This pilot study was very small, but it already indicates that the displacement
strategy may be found in a lab situation.
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input: spoken sentences output: gesture strings
Tinitial: 22
Tinitial 21
Tfinal 1
Tfinal: 23
Tinitial 10
Tfinal 13
Table 6.1: Gesturing orders and their frequencies used by the participants,
sorted by input type.
There are, however, some methodological problems, and an issue concerning
the interpretation of the results. The latter is the problem that we cannot
be sure whether people prefer to put temporal information at the beginning
of utterances only when they are in an improvisation situation, or that the
tendency to front temporal adverbs is a more general tendency. In other words,
it could be that the participants would show the same behavior when just using
their native language, and we cannot be sure that the behaviour we observe
is specific for improvised communication. It would be better if we could ask
participants to produce both spoken sentences and gesture sequences, similarly
to what was done in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008).
When executing the pilot study, it became clear that not every participant
felt comfortable communicating by using only gesture. For those who were
most uncomfortable, gesturing about temporal information was especially hard.
Some participants in the pilot study indicated that they could not think of a
way to convey the temporal information. Of the temporal expressions that were
used in the pilot study, the expression at six o’clock proved to be the easiest to
convey by using gesture. I thus decided that the next experiment should have
temporal expressions like this.
Further, the fact that the stimuli were spoken sentences was not ideal. In
some cases, it was clear that participants were mentally repeating the sentence
to themselves. This could have affected the order of their gesturing. It would
thus be better to use pictures instead of spoken sentences, similarly to what
was done in the experiment in the previous chapter.
6.3 Experiment: gesturing temporal
displacement
6.3.1 Introduction
After observing the problems with the pilot study, some adjustments were
made to the design, and an experiment was conducted with more items and
more participants. We chose to use pictures—instead of spoken sentences—as
stimuli, so that we could ask the participants to first describe the items using
speech and then using only gesture (similarly to what was done in Goldin-
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Figure 6.1: Example item: Gnome eats pizza at three o’clock.
Meadow et al. (2008)).
In the pictures, temporal information is depicted by a clock showing a time;
see the example in figure 6.1. Participants thus only had to communicate about
events taking place at a certain time. This is the kind of temporal information
that turned out to be the easiest to convey in the pilot study.
6.3.2 Expressing temporal information in Dutch
Participants were first asked to describe each picture using a Dutch sentence,
and subsequently, they were asked to gesture. Because the structure of Dutch
sentences with temporal information is not exactly parallel to English, let me
describe the orders that are acceptable for normal spoken Dutch, when, e.g.
figure 6.1 is described. In English, the two possible orders are ‘A gnome eats
pizza at three o’clock’ and ‘At three o’clock, a gnome eats pizza’. In Dutch,
there are three possibilities (the order of the sentences is indicated below each
example):
(3) Om
At
drie
three
uur
o’clock
eet
eats
de
the
kabouter
gnome
pizza.
pizza.
(TVSO)
(4) De
The
kabouter
gnome
eet
eats
om
at
drie
three
uur
o’clock
pizza.
pizza.
(SVTO)
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(5) De
The
kabouter
gnome
eet
eats
pizza
pizza
om
at
drie
three
uur.
o’clock.
(SVOT)
Thus, the temporal information (T) can be put at the beginning (3), the end
(5), or in the middle, between the verb and the direct object (4). Note that
when the adverb is fronted (like in (3)), the word order of the rest of the
sentence changes. This occurs because Dutch is a V2 language: the verb is
always the second constituent of a declarative sentence. Dutch behaves like an
SVO language for simple expressions, such as the following example:
(6) Een
A
kabouter
gnome
eet
eats
pizza.
pizza.
(SVO)
In this example, the verb is the second constituent of the sentence. But when
a temporal adverb is the first constituent of the sentence, such as in example
(3), the word order of the rest of the sentence inverts in order to keep the verb
in second position.
To sum up, in spoken Dutch three orders are possible to express the infor-
mation in the picture, and each order has the temporal adverb in a different
place: start, middle or end. Moreover, the word order of subject and verb is
influenced by the placement of the temporal adverb: if the adverb is fronted,
the order of the rest of the sentence is Verb-Subject-Object (VSO).
6.3.3 Aims and predictions
Word order in speech and gesture
In chapter 5 we have seen that when people communicate about simple events
in an improvised manner, they by-pass the grammatical rules of their native
language. If this behaviour extends to more complex expressions, we expect to
see no occurrences of the TVSO structure that is particular for Dutch grammar.
Alternatively, if more complex utterances would trigger participants to start
using grammar rules, such as was suggested by Langus and Nespor (2010),1 we
would indeed observe TVSO gesturing sequences.2
1See the previous chapter for more details about the studies carried out in Langus and
Nespor (2010).
2In this chapter, I will use ‘S,’ ‘V,’ and ‘O’ instead of ‘Ar,’ ‘P,’ and ‘A’ to refer to gesturing
sequences. I am aware that the latter are more suitable to describe sequences in a system
that is governed by semantic principles and not by syntactic rules, but I will use S, V and O
because they increase readability.
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First of all, we compared the participants’ placement of the temporal adverb
in speech and gesture. In spoken Dutch, one is free to use any of the three word
orders mentioned above. In gesture, if participants indeed apply the temporal
displacement strategy, we expect participants to be more likely to put the
temporal adverb in a frontal position than in speech.
Secondly, we tested whether the TVSO word order, that is specific for Dutch
grammar, is found in the gesturing orders of the participants. As we have
seen above, when the temporal adverb is fronted, Dutch grammar prescribes a
change in the order of the rest of the sentence: this should then become VSO
order. If participants are indeed bypassing the rules of their native language,
we expect the TVSO order to occur less often in the gesturing strings than in
the speech strings.
Influence of order of presentation
To test whether the order in which the information on the picture is presented
has an influence on gesturing order, we presented the stimuli in two ways.
On each picture there is temporal information (the clock time in the upper
right corner) and propositional information (the event displayed in the center
of the picture). When showing a picture to a participant, we cannot be sure
which information is looked at first. Therefore, we presented the information in
stages (see figure 6.2): for some pictures, the temporal information was shown
first, and the event information was added later. In other pictures, the event
information was shown first, and the temporal information was added later. If
the order of presentation is relevant for the participants, it will show in the
results.
Intensional and extensional events
Finally, we tested the interaction between the gesturing of temporal information
versus propositional information (or event information). The events used in
the experiment were either intensional (e.g., ‘pirate thinks of shopping cart’
in figure 6.2) or extensional events (e.g., ‘gnome eats pizza’ in figure 6.1). In
the previous chapter, it was shown that when participants communicate about
these two kinds of events in an improvised manner, they prefer to use SVO order
for intensional events, and SOV order for extensional events. If the improvised
communication task indeed makes participants bypass the grammar rules of
their native language, then we expect this preference to remain the same when
temporal information is added to the events.
6.3.4 Method
Participants
Sixteen participants (9 male, 7 female; age range 17–26) were recruited from
Utrecht University. All participants were native speakers of Dutch; none of them
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Figure 6.2: These examples show the two orders in which the information was
presented in the experiment. At the top, (1) a black screen with a fixation cross,
(2) the event information, (3) the event information plus the temporal infor-
mation. At the bottom, (1) a black screen with a fixation cross, (2) temporal
information, (3) the event information plus the temporal information.
162 6.3. Experiment: gesturing temporal displacement
were familiar with any conventional sign language. The participants received a
monetary compensation for participating.
Stimuli
16 pictures of simple events with a picture of a clock indicating a time between
1 and 10 o’clock in the upper right corner were used as stimuli. Of the events in
the pictures, 8 were extensional events (motion events) and 8 were intensional
events (see chapter 5). Pictures were presented in random order. There were
two practice items (one extensional and one intensional).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts. In part one, participants were shown
the items on paper and were asked, for each item, to describe the information
presented on the picture in Dutch. Spoken sentences were recorded on the
laptop using Audacity.
In the second part, participants were told that they would get to see the
same pictures again, but now they should convey the information on the pic-
tures using only gesture and no speech. The pictures were shown on a screen
and the information on each picture was presented in stages. In eight items, the
event information was shown first, and the temporal information was added
afterwards (as in figure 6.2). In the eight remaining items, the temporal in-
formation was shown first, and the event information was added afterwards.
Participants could use the mouse button to click through the two stages, in
order to see the complete scene. Between the two stages, a delay of at least 2
seconds was built in, in order to make sure that the participants would really
see the information in stages.
Two practice items were used for both the speech part and the gesturing
part of the experiment. During the gesturing part, the experimenter gave feed-
back about whether all the information on the picture was conveyed. During
the actual experiment, the experimenter was sitting behind the screen and did
not give any spoken feedback. The participants were filmed using the built-in
webcam of the laptop.
6.3.5 Data analysis
The speech strings from the first part of the experiment were transcribed and
coded for order. The videos were analyzed by two independent coders. The
items for which the participant had started to gesture before all the information
(the temporal information as well as the event information) was visible, were
excluded (5 of 256 items). The remaining 251 items were coded for gesturing
order by two independent coders, with 94.8% agreement. Items for which there
was no agreement were excluded (13 of 251 items).
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order # items %
SVOT 128 50.0
TVSO 39 15.2
SOVT 37 14.5
SVTO 21 8.2
STOV 13 5.1
other 18 7.0
total 256 100
order # items %
TSVO 104 43.7
SVOT 47 19.7
TSOV 36 15.1
SOVT 33 13.9
TVSO 2 1.3
other 16 6.3
total 238 100
Table 6.2: Speech orders used
by the participants and their
frequency.
Table 6.3: Gesture orders used
by the participants and their fre-
quency.
Let me give a brief overview of the orders that were found in the speech
part and the gesturing part of the experiment. This is just to provide a very
general overview; the results of the statistical tests will be discussed in the next
section.
When speaking, participants used more different orderings than expected
on the basis of the three example sentences above (sentences (3), (4) and (5)).
This is because some participants formulated sentences like the following.
(7) Een kabouter die pizza eet om drie uur.
A gnome that eats pizza at three o’clock.
(SOVT)
(8) Een kabouter die om drie uur pizza eet.
A gnome that eats pizza at three o’clock.
(STOV)
Thus, for the spoken descriptions of the items, 5 different orders were found;
see table 6.2 for an overview of these orders and their frequency. The cate-
gory ‘other’ consists of those sentences where people repeated information, or
omitted information in their description. When gesturing, on the other hand,
participants were completely free to choose any order they wanted, but still,
there were only four dominant orders; see table 6.3 for these orders and their
frequency. The category ‘other’ in that table represents those orders where par-
ticipants repeated gestures or otherwise used an order different from the four
dominant orders.
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Figure 6.3: Mean proportions of strings with the temporal adverb in initial
position in speech and gesture. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
T first TVSO % TVSO
speech 39 39 100%
gesture 158 2 1.3%
Table 6.4: Occurrence of VSO order in strings where T is first, in speech and
gesture.
6.3.6 Results
Placement of T in speech and gesture
The placement of the temporal information in the speech strings was com-
pared to that in gesture strings. A repeated measures ANOVA shows sig-
nificant main effect for modality on the placement of the temporal adverb
F (1, 15) = 15.940, p = .001. Pairwise Bonferroni corrected comparisons show
that the temporal adverb was placed in the initial position more often when par-
ticipants were gesturing (M = .629, SE = .113) than when they were speaking
(M = .155, SE = .086). See figure 6.3.
Occurrence of VSO order
The inversion of word order after fronting of the temporal adverb in speech was
compared to that in gesture, see table 6.4. In 39 (of 256) speech strings, the
temporal adverb was placed in the initial position, and in all of these, the word
order was TVSO. Of the gesture strings, 158 (of 238) had the temporal adverb
in initial position, and in only 2 occurrences was the specific order TVSO (the
dominant orders were TSOV and TSVO).
There is a significant difference between the two modalities with respect to
the occurrence of TVSO order in those strings where T is put in initial position
χ2(1)=179.076, p < .0001.
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Figure 6.4: Mean proportions of strings with SOV order for extensional and
intensional events. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Influence of order of presentation
It was verified whether the order of presentation of the information (tempo-
ral information and event information) in the items had an influence on the
placement of the temporal adverb: did participants change the placement of the
temporal adverb in their gesturing if the information was presented in a differ-
ent order? Using a repeated measures ANOVA, we found no significant main
effect of order of presentation of the information (temporal information first
vs. event information first) in the pictures on the placement of the temporal
adverb F (1, 15)=1.931, p=.185.
Intensional and extensional events
It was investigated whether the difference between intensional and extensional
events would lead to different orderings. A repeated measures ANOVA shows a
significant interaction between the gesturing order of the event information and
the kind of event (intensional or extensional). F (1, 14)=37.062, p=.000. Pair-
wise Bonferroni corrected comparisons show (see figure 6.4) that participants
use SOV order more often for extensional events (M=.581, SE=.093) than for
intensional events (M=.066, SE=.015).
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 The temporal displacement strategy in the lab
The study aimed to investigate what happens when participants in an impro-
vised communication task are asked to convey complex propositions. It was
investigated, first of all, whether the temporal displacement strategy observed
in adult homesign and the Basic Variety would be replicated in the lab and,
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secondly, how the temporal and the propositional information in the gesturing
sequences of the participants interacted.
The placement of the temporal information in the gesture strings was com-
pared to two things. First of all, to the placement of the temporal adverb in
the spoken sentence. Secondly, to the order of presentation of the information
in the items (in each item the information was presented in stages; see the
description in section 6.3.3).
Participants were expected to place the temporal information at the be-
ginning of the gesturing string more often than in the speech string, because
for improvised communication, the only known way to indicate that a certain
event takes place at a certain time is by applying the temporal displacement
strategy. This hypothesis was confirmed.
In the gesturing part of the experiment, each item was presented in stages.
In eight of the 16 items, the temporal information was presented first, and
in the remaining eight items, the event information was presented first. One
could expect that this order matters to participants, because in the first case,
the information is presented like this (I am using the example that was used in
figure 6.2):
(9) There is a time (five o’clock). At this time a pirate thinks of a shopping
cart.
In the second case, the information is presented like this:
(10) There is a pirate who thinks of a shopping cart. This takes place at
five o’clock.
Put differently, only in the case of example (9) does the temporal information
introduce a temporal frame; in the other example, the temporal information
is focus information. Despite the fact that the items in the experiment were
presented in these two ways, this had no effect on the order of the gesture
strings. Thus, the participants were not influenced by the order of presenta-
tion. This suggests that in improvised communication, the temporal displace-
ment strategy was not influenced by the informational status that was given to
the elements in the presentation of the items. In other words, even when tem-
poral information was suggested to be focus information in the presentation
of an item, participants used it to define a temporal frame for the remaining
information (see chapter 4).
We can thus conclude that the temporal displacement strategy that was
found in existing restricted linguistic systems (as described in chapter 4) has
been reproduced in a lab situation. This strengthens the claim put forward in
chapter 4 that we can use the improvised communication experiment to collect
restricted linguistic data. Because a lab experiment gives us more control than
natural situations, the improvised communication task allows us to look in
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more detail at the principles that play a role when people construct utterances
in an improvised manner. In the experiment we looked in more detail at the
structure of the gesturing strings that were produced to investigate how the
temporal information and the propositional information influenced each other.
6.4.2 The structure of complex improvised utterances
To investigate how the temporal and the propositional information interact in
improvised communication, we studied two issues. First of all, we compared
the occurrence of an order that is specific for Dutch grammar in the spoken
sentences to that in the gesturing strings. Because Dutch is a V2 language,
whenever a temporal adverb is put in first position, the remainder of the sen-
tence is ordered differently (namely, as VSO). It was found that in improvised
communication, this order is hardly ever used (it was used in only 2 cases).
Secondly, we investigated whether people would apply the same orderings
that were found in the previous chapter, when communicating about exten-
sional and intensional events. We found that, despite the addition of temporal
information, participants still typically gestured extensional events in ArPA or-
der and intensional events in ArAP order. In other words, the strategy that was
observed in chapter 5 to use different orders to convey information about sim-
ple events, depending on whether these events are extensional or intensional
in nature, remains visible even when information is added and the message
becomes more complex.
We can conclude from this that people use different strategies when they
are engaged in improvised communication than when they speak their native
languages, and that they bypass the rules of their native languages. This was
already shown for simple (intensional and extensional) events in the previous
chapter and in previous publications by Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) and Lan-
gus and Nespor (2010), but it is thus confirmed for more complex events in this
chapter (contra Langus and Nespor (2010)).
It was found in the study presented in this chapter that when a simple
proposition is combined with information about its temporal location, these
two kinds of information are combined in one utterance, but they seem to
remain separate to a certain extent:
• The temporal information (T) is expressed before the propositional infor-
mation (TSVO and TSOV gesturing orders), or sometimes after it (SVOT
and SOVT gesturing orders), but it never breaks it up (see table 6.3).
• The fact that temporal information is expressed does not interfere with
the ordering patterns found previously: SOV order is still preferred for
extensional events and SVO order is preferred for intensional events.
It looks like the information in these complex utterances consists of two
separate parts: a core part, in which information about the simple proposition
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Figure 6.5: Partitioned organisation of a complex expression: simple proposi-
tional information embedded in additional information.
is expressed, and the periphery (the two outer edges), in which information
about its temporal location is expressed, as depicted in figure 6.5.
In figure 6.5, it is the simple proposition that forms the core of a complex
expression. In this simple proposition, the organisational principles are of a
semantic nature: they tell us how the verb and its arguments should be or-
ganised.3 When temporal information is added to a simple proposition, this is
added to one of the edges of an utterance: most often the beginning and alter-
natively the end of the utterance. In a way, it seems logical that the temporal
adverb is not mixed with the information about the event: the temporal adverb
determines the temporal location of the whole event.
By contrast, looking at full-fledged languages, we see that temporal informa-
tion is given mainly through inflection of the verb.4 The temporal information
has moved into the ‘core’ part of an utterance and has become part of it. The
comparison of improvised communication with full language reveals that tem-
poral information has moved from the edges of an utterance into the utterance.
This shift from the edges to the inside of an utterance can be observed in
other domains, for example that of negation. In de Swart (2009), the expression
of negation in varieties of language learners is described. The paper compares
the Prebasic Variety to the Basic Variety. The Prebasic Variety is a stage in
the learning process of second language learners who learn a language outside
the classroom, and it precedes the Basic Variety stage. When negative infor-
mation is expressed in this stage, the negator appears at one of the edges of an
utterance. See these examples from (de Swart, 2009, p. 66):
(11) veel
much
eten
eat
nee
no
3AgentFirst is one example of such a principle; it tells the speaker or hearer that the
argument with greatest control comes first. The semantic properties of the event play a
role at this level too: extensional events first need all arguments, before the action itself is
described (Actor-Patient-Act), and intensional events are organised according to the principle
Actor-Act-Patient.
4Of course, temporal adverbs are also used in full languages, but they are optional, whereas
verb inflection is obligatory for the majority of languages.
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(12) nein
no
tasche
bag
eh
eh
links
to the left
For negative information, like for the temporal information, it is in some sense
logical to put the negator at one of the edges of an utterance: it is the propo-
sition as a whole that is negated. Still, when learners reach the Basic Variety
stage, they start to embed the negator in the sentence, such as in this example
from (de Swart, 2009, p. 69):
(13) ik
I
niet
not
∗hapis∗
prison
gaan
go
Thus, as the language becomes more sophisticated, negation moves from the
edges of an utterance into the core of the utterance. To draw a general conclu-
sion from these observations, it appears that the complexification of language
followed a route in which information was first added to the outer edges of
simple utterances, and later absorbed into the core of an utterance with the
further development of language.
I speculate that the process we have observed in this section, of information
moving from the edges to the core of an utterance, co-occurs with the grow-
ing influence of newly emerging conventions. This can be purely an effect of
repeated interaction among language users, or it can be driven by the need to
formulate more precise messages. This is only a speculation, and the experi-
ment in this chapter does not offer us any evidence on how and why this pattern
would occur, but it can certainly be tested empirically. In the next chapter, I
will briefly discuss ways to investigate this possibility.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigated what happens when we ask people to convey
complex information, that is, propositional information plus information about
the time at which the proposition is true. It turned out that when people are
asked to communicate in an improvised manner, there is a general preference to
convey information about the time of the event at the beginning of an utterance.
They use the beginning of the utterance to sketch the circumstances under
which the event described in the remainder of the utterance takes place. This
finding is in accordance with the displacement strategy observed in existing
restricted linguistic systems like adult homesign and Basic Variety. The fact
that we have replicated the displacement strategy in the lab supports the claim
that the improvised communication task can be used in addition to existing
restricted linguistic systems, to gain indirect evidence about the emergence of
syntactic structure.
When looking in detail at the strings that were produced in the study
presented in this chapter, we have seen that the expression of information
about the time of an event does not influence the way in which the rest of the
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utterance is expressed. Temporal information is expressed at one of the edges
of an utterance, and the internal structure of the part that expresses a simple
proposition does not change under the influence of the presence of temporal
information. By contrast, in full-fledged languages, temporal information is
incorporated in the verb, as it is typically expressed through verbal inflection.
I have thus specified a possible pattern according to which language could have
become more complex: information added to a simple proposition is introduced
at one of the edges of an utterance in simple language systems, and becomes
part of the core of an utterance in more complex language systems, including
full language.
CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
In this chapter I review the conclusions and results from the chapters of my
dissertation. I will start out by providing an overview of all the chapters in
this dissertation, and subsequently I will reflect on these results. Lastly, I will
sketch directions for future research.
7.1 Overview of the chapters
7.1.1 Semantic protolanguage and restricted linguistic
systems
Meaning deserves more attention than it gets in the language evolution debate.
Instead of focusing solely on possible steps in evolutionary history that have led
to structural complexity of language, we should take meaning into account as
well. Not only meanings of individual words, but meaning as a compositional
phenomenon. Human language is compositional, and this means that complex
meaningful structures can be analysed in terms of the parts they consist of,
and the way in which these parts were put together. In this way, humans can
build complex meanings from simpler ones. Compositionality could have started
very simple, in a stage where only few meaningful items were put together. This
intermediate step would then bridge the gap between simple communication
and full syntactic language. In other words, an account of the emergence of
compositionality might give us the emergence of syntactic complexity ‘for free’.
Currently, many scholars agree that the step from non-language to full lan-
guage was not one giant leap, but there have been one or more intermediate
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steps. One way to talk about these intermediate stages in the evolutionary his-
tory of language is to use the notion of protolanguage. Many different accounts
of protolanguage have been provided in the literature, and I review some of
them in section 1.4. I conclude that different accounts of protolanguage stress
different mechanisms that could have played a role in the emergence of lan-
guage. These different accounts are not necessarily mutually exclusive: many
processes might have played a role at the same time.
A place where meaning and protolanguage come together is in the seman-
tic protolanguage account. It is an account of protolanguage based on the
idea put forward by Jackendoff (2002) that there has been a stage in which
language was governed by semantic (or pragmatic) principles like AgentFirst
and FocusLast. If this stage has indeed existed, its organisational principles
can be seen as a predecessor of fully syntactical language rules. In chapter 1, I
formulate the main questions for my dissertation:
• Is there further evidence for a semantic protolanguage?
• What are the mechanisms in semantic protolanguage?
In chapter 2, I give an overview of ways to collect empirical evidence about
the emergence of language. Because we do not have any direct evidence about
the beginnings of language, the evidence that we resort to is indirect evidence.
One of the ways to collect indirect evidence is the study of so-called restricted
linguistic systems. From a discussion of these systems, the general picture ap-
pears that when people cannot use or learn language in a normal way, they
still organise their utterances in a semi-systematic way, using principles that
do indeed seem semantic or pragmatic in nature.
Some problems with this approach remain, however. One of these problems
is that in order to draw more well founded evolutionary conclusions, we need
to specify the principles on the basis of which we can draw these evolutionary
conclusions (a bridge theory). Secondly, it would be good to be able to collect
more data, in a more controlled manner, i.e., in a lab situation instead of in
natural settings.
7.1.2 Meaning and evolution
Before the issues brought forward in chapter 2 are tackled, I focus in more detail
on meaning in chapter 3. The answer to a question like ‘what is meaning?’
depends on the setting in which the question is asked. In philosophy, many
scholars have thought about the nature of meaning without taking its evolution
into account. The different characterisations these scholars have come up with
are useful, because they show what is important about meaning in full language.
From an overview of accounts of meaning, I distill three intuitions:
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reference The things words and sentences refer to are important when
we want to know their meaning.
intention and belief When a speaker makes an utterance, he typically
intends his audience to come to believe something.
convention Our utterances have the meanings they have because these
utterances have been used by other speakers in similar situations.
These intuitions can be seen as competing definitions of meaning, but they
can also be seen as different ways to shed light on a multi-faceted phenomenon.
When meaning is studied from an evolutionary perspective, different de-
mands are placed on the definition of meaning. Once we look at the emergence
of meaning, we cannot simply assume that there are abstract objects called
meanings (such as is done in propositional accounts of meaning). I focus on
two possible trajectories from animal behaviour to full linguistic behaviour in
humans: one sketched by Peter Ga¨rdenfors, the other by Ruth Millikan.
Peter Ga¨rdenfors postulates that cognition develops before meaning. In his
view, private mental representations constitute the basis for sophisticated com-
munication. This view implies that apes, our closest cousins, may have well
developed cognitive skills, but simply do not communicate in a similarly so-
phisticated fashion. Other authors who wrote about the emergence of meaning
in human language take this position as a starting point (Fitch, 2010; Hurford,
2007). Ruth Millikan focuses less on cognition. She emphasises the conventional
properties of language, and compares language to other cultural phenomena:
behavioural patterns which are copied by individuals, like the habit of shaking
hands when meeting in many western societies.
There is much to say for a Ga¨rdenfors-like approach to the emergence of
meaning, which emphasises the relation between cognitive structures in lan-
guage users, and their utterances, because it points our attention to cognitive
properties of our ancestors (animals). Their cognitive capacities are ancestors of
features of our linguistic capacities. Much interesting research has been carried
out already to describe these links (Fitch, 2010).
The line of thinking introduced by Ruth Millikan points our attention away
from cognitive structures to conventions, to language as a public phenomenon.
Millikan denies that there is a one to one relationship between the meaning of
an utterance and what is mentally represented by the speaker or the hearer.
Emphasising the conventional nature of linguistic meaning and grounding con-
ventional behaviour biologically, she takes the communicative nature of lan-
guage into account.
Ga¨rdenfors’s and Millikan’s views represent two ways of thinking about the
evolutionary trajectory that language took: a cognitive and a communicative
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road to meaning in full language.
A cognitive road to meaning: an evolutionary scenario in which cog-
nitive capacities are central, and are held responsible for the structure
of the emerging language.
A communicative road to meaning: an evolutionary scenario in
which the dynamics of communication and the formation of
conventions are central.
These two trajectories represent different emphases in thinking about the
emergence of meaning: one that stresses private, cognitive processes in indi-
viduals, and one that stresses public, communicative processes. I have claimed
that in order to arrive at a balanced picture of the emergence of language, both
sides need to be taken into account.
7.1.3 Cognition and communication in the wild and in
the lab
Armed with these principles and insights about meaning and its emergence
I focus on semantic protolanguage again in chapter 4. Data from restricted
linguistic systems can be used as evidence for the existence of a semantic pro-
tolanguage stage, but some problems must be addressed: more data is necessary
in order to make a semantic protolanguage account well founded and detailed
enough to formulate precise hypotheses about the actual principles that have
played a role in semantic protolanguage.
To obtain more empirical data, I propose to conduct lab experiments in
which participants are forced to communicate in an improvised manner by
using only gesture and no speech.
In order to formulate well founded evolutionary claims on the basis of re-
stricted linguistic systems, we need a proper bridge theory. A bridging theory
takes us from empirical data to conclusions about protolanguage, and clari-
fies how the analogy between restricted linguistic systems and protolanguage
works.
In recent literature, two such accounts have been provided. There is a bridge
theory in which the analogy between restricted systems and protolanguage is
claimed to be cognitive, and another one in which the analogy rests on commu-
nicative pressures. According to the first, there is an analogy between the cogni-
tive structures in speakers of restricted language and speakers of protolanguage.
The assumption behind this is that cognitive structures are directly responsible
for the structure of utterances. According to the second approach, there is an
analogy between the situation of protolanguage speakers and speakers of re-
stricted language. The utterance structures that show up in restricted linguistic
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systems are similar to protolanguage, it is claimed, because the communicative
pressures are similar. Thus, this bridge theory makes use of the assumption
that communicative pressures are responsible for the structure of utterances.
I provide an analysis in which I first show that different restricted systems
emerge in slightly different circumstances, and these circumstances might in-
fluence their structure. For that reason, I show, a full-fledged bridge theory has
to take into account both cognitive and communicative aspects. Restricted lin-
guistic systems emerge in situations where there are newly emerging linguistic
conventions. Because these conventions are not fully in place, the way they are
in normal language, speakers and hearers have to improvise when constructing
and interpreting utterances. When speakers in such situations put an utterance
together without having a full system of conventions to fall back on, they may
have cognitive biases that influence the utterance structures they choose. But
it is not necessarily the case that the utterance structures that are found in
restricted linguistic systems are direct mirror images of the mental representa-
tions of the speakers. I imagine that the formation of utterances in restricted
linguistic systems is an active process that goes from multidimensional mental
representations to linear structures.
This process of linearisation of information is (1) an active process, and (2)
something inherently communicative. It is active, because every time an indi-
vidual wants to communicate propositional information, it has to be translated
into a string. It is essentially communicative, because the reason that a mental
representation is translated into a string is that it is communicated. My pre-
diction is that in the absence of stable linguistic conventions, communicating
individuals will linearise information differently when this serves a communica-
tive purpose.
Thus, the key to my bridge theory is the similarity of the situation in-
dividuals (in the improvised communication setting and in prehistoric times)
find themselves in: they have to linearise non-linear mental representations into
a string, in the absence of a stable system of linguistic conventions. The ab-
sence of linguistic conventions forces people to bypass the way in which they
would normally structure information and build sentences (according to the
rules of their own language), and I speculate that it triggers an evolutionarily
old strategy: to structure information according to its semantic properties. This
speculation would imply that the old strategy has been ‘overruled’ by newer
strategies (syntactic structure) in the course of evolutionary history, and this
connects to ideas expressed elsewhere in the language evolution debate, such
as the ones expressed in Hurford (2011); Tomasello (2001).
7.1.4 Improvised communication
In the final chapters I present improvised communication studies, looking at the
expression of simple propositions, and more complex propositions. In chapter
5, I start from the observation made in Goldin-Meadow et al. (2008) that
Actor-Patient-Act (or SOV) is the order in which simple events are represented
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mentally. I show that besides the extensional (motion) events used in Goldin-
Meadow et al. (2008), a second kind of event must be distinguished, namely
intensional events. These events have different semantic properties. Whereas
for extensional events, there is simply an Actor, a Patient and an interaction
between the two in an Act (for motion events, the Act involves motion), for
intensional events, the Patient is more abstract, because it either does not exist,
is not specific, or otherwise is dependent on the Act.
In an improvised communication study, I show that the different semantic
properties of these two kinds of events lead to two different gesturing orders:
Actor-Patient-Act (SOV) for extensional events and Actor-Act-Patient (SVO)
for intensional events. This confirms my prediction that different semantic prop-
erties of events will make speakers change the way they linearise information,
when they communicate in the absence of an existing system of conventions.
In order to show that this linearising behaviour is there for a communicative
purpose, I describe a second study, in which participants are asked to interpret
improvised behaviour. Using videos with ambiguous actions, I show that de-
pending on the order in which the elements in a string are presented (SVO or
SOV), people choose different interpretations (intensional or extensional ones).
The fact that different orderings lead to different interpretations confirms that
the different orderings have a communicative purpose.
Chapter 6 investigates how more complex information is expressed in im-
provised communication. In other words, what happens when information is
added to a simple proposition? How is this communicated in a simple language
system?
The chapter describes an improvised communication experiment in which
participants were asked to convey, not only information about simple events,
but also about the time at which the event took place. In existing restricted
linguistic systems such as adult homesign and the Basic Variety, it has been
observed that people can use relatively simple means to convey that a certain
event does not take place now, but rather in the past or the future. They do
this by applying the temporal displacement strategy: by placing a temporal
adverb at the beginning of an utterance, the event described can be located on
the time axis at some other moment than now. Participants in the improvised
communication study were found to replicate this strategy. Moreover, it was
found that in the utterances observed in the experiment, simple propositional
information is never interrupted by temporal information, because temporal
information is always expressed at one of the edges. Finally, the principles that
govern the transmission of simple propositional information (such as the dis-
tinction between extensional and intensional events observed in chapter 5) were
not influenced by the presence of temporal information. This suggests that sim-
ple propositional information and temporal information make up two separate
partitions. The propositional information forms the core of an utterance and
temporal information is added at the outer edges.
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7.2 Answers to the central questions
The goal of this dissertation was to explore the semantic account of protolan-
guage by answering the two questions formulated above: Is there further ev-
idence for a semantic protolanguage? What are the mechanisms in semantic
protolanguage? I will formulate these answers here.
7.2.1 Further evidence for semantic protolanguage
Jackendoff (2002) hypothesised that there has been a stage in the emergence
of language in which multiple words were concatenated according to semantic
and pragmatic principles rather than syntactic rules. These semantic principles
are less strict than the syntactic rules we have in full language, and they derive
directly from the semantic properties of the words they apply to. Examples
of such principles are AgentFirst (when describing a situation, mention the
individual with the highest control first) and FocusLast (information that is in
focus should be at the end of an utterance). Evidence for the existence of such
a protolanguage stage has been derived from language systems that emerge in
situations where people cannot use or learn an existing language. These systems
are called restricted linguistic systems, and examples are pidgin, Basic Variety
and newly emerging sign languages.
In this dissertation, I have added a source of evidence to this list: the im-
provised communication experiment. When participants in such an experiment
are asked to communicate using gesture and no speech, they have to improvise,
using an inventory of highly iconic gestures. Previous experiments had already
shown that people in such an experiment bypass the grammatical rules of their
native language. The experiment can thus be seen as an environment in which
the beginnings of a newly emerging language system are made.
I have argued that gesture strings observed in the improvised communica-
tion task can tell us something about protolanguage because they put people
in a situation that is similar to that of our protolanguage speaking ancestors.
There is no full system of linguistic conventions, and when speakers make ut-
terances, the organisation of these utterances will depend on how a speaker
goes from a non-linear mental representation to a string (of sounds or ges-
tures). The way in which information is linearised into strings (utterances) is
thus dependent on the cognitive biases of the speaker, but it is at the same
time a communicative phenomenon, because the linearisation of information is
something that is done for communication.
7.2.2 The mechanisms in semantic protolanguage
I have shown that when people are engaged in improvised communication, the
organisation of their utterances will depend on the kind of event they describe.
Besides the class of extensional events, events in which someone (Actor) does
something (Act) to someone or something (Patient), I have defined the class of
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intensional events. In intensional events, the Patient is more abstract than in
motion events, because it either does not exist, is not specific, or is dependent
on the Act. When communicating about intensional events, participants in the
experiment deviate from the Actor-Patient-Act order that was previously found
for extensional events (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008), and use Actor-Act-Patient.
This behaviour is independent from their native language. An interpretation
study reveals that the two different orders lead to different interpretations,
and thus, the claim that variation in word order is applied for communicative
reasons is confirmed.
When people engaged in improvised communication go beyond simple propo-
sitions and add information about the time of an event, they prefer to put this
at the beginning of an utterance. This was first observed in existing restricted
systems (Benazzo, 2009), but I have replicated this pattern in an improvised
communication study. This study further reveals that the presence of temporal
information does not influence the way in which the propositional information
is expressed. The two kinds of information seem to operate on different levels.
7.3 Cognition and convention in newly emerg-
ing languages: directions for future research
In this dissertation, situations in which new language systems develop are de-
picted as follows. In situations without a full blown language, there is no system
of grammar rules that tells a speaker how to organise his utterances. When a
speaker wants to convey a thought, he is forced to linearise this thought, be-
cause language (spoken as well as signed) forces us to use string-like utterances.
The way in which a communicating individual linearises information is influ-
enced by cognitive biases. Once an utterance has been produced, it has made
its way out into the world: a hearer interprets the utterance, and it is possi-
bly repeated, depending on its communicative success. As soon as a certain
structure is repeated multiple times, conventions might be formed about the
organisation of utterances, and these newly formed conventions might become
the grammar rules of the newly formed language.
Thus, in newly emerging languages, cognition initially plays a role in the
communicating individual, and determines how information is linearised into a
string. Communicative pressures start to play a role after utterances are used
among individuals, and constructions are repeated or discarded, according to
their communicative success (see figure 7.1).
The improvised communication experiments I conducted focus on gesture
production and interpretation separately, using only one speaker or one inter-
preter. In such a setting, newly emerging conventions play a marginal role,
because there is no chance for communicative pressures to have an effect.
It would be an interesting direction of research to investigate what happens
once we do allow communicative pressures among communicating individuals
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Figure 7.1: From cognition, via linearisation to utterances, and from single
utterances, via communicative pressures to linguistic conventions.
to play a role. This would be possible if we would conduct the improvised
communication experiment in a repeated interaction setting: participants
are asked to produce and interpret gesturing sequences alternately, in several
consecutive rounds. Previous research, with graphical communication tasks,
has shown that in an interactive setting, less detailed (more symbolic and less
iconic) and more effective graphical signs are produced after a series of inter-
actions between participants (Garrod et al., 2007). This can be seen as the
emergence of a shared set of conventions.
In repeated interaction experiments with improvised gestured communica-
tion, I would like to investigate the influence of the emergence of conventions
on gesturing patterns. The experiment will focus on the distinction between
intensional and extensional events. If these two kinds of events are used in an
interactive improvised communication experiment, will this result in two dif-
ferent orderings (similar to what was shown in chapter 5), or will one of the
two orderings disappear after several rounds of interaction? Together, impro-
vised communication and social transmission can provide a clearer picture of
how cognitive and communicative biases come together to give us linguistic
structure.
This is only the beginning: we are still far from understanding where human
language came from, and this dissertation has only laid the bare basis of an
approach to investigate the emergence of language which takes meaning seri-
ously. But it does show that doing experiments to study the origins of language
is indeed fruitful and offers many possibilities for future research.

Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5
Production experiment
The following is a list of descriptions of the items used in the production exper-
iment. Test items were ‘gnome pushes cart,’ ‘princess dreams of car,’ ‘princess
throws sax,’ ‘witch pulls car,’ and ‘pirate thinks of cart.’ All images are pro-
vided below.
version A version B
cook cuts sock princess cuts scarf
cook knits sock princess knits scarf
cook swings saxophone pirate swings guitar
cook throws saxophone pirate throws guitar
gnome builds tower witch builds house
gnome climbs tower witch climbs house
gnome eats pizza witch eats banana
gnome wants pizza witch wants banana
pirate carries ball princess carries vase
pirate looks for ball princess looks for vase
pirate dreams of guitar cook dreams of saxophone
pirate hears guitar cook hears saxophone
princess drops vase pirate drops ball
princess sculpts vase pirate sculpts ball
princess hangs scarf cook hangs sock
princess thinks of scarf cook thinks of sock
witch paints house gnome paints tower
witch sees house gnome sees tower
witch cuts banana gnome cuts pizza
witch draws banana gnome draws pizza
182 Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5
Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5 183
184 Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5
Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5 185
186 Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5
Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5 187
188 Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5
Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5 189
190 Appendix A: Stimuli Chapter 5
Interpretation experiment
The three images below represent the three stages for each item of the interpre-
tation experiment: first, the two answer possibilities were shown, subsequently,
the video was shown, and finally, the two answer possibilities were shown again,
and the participant was asked to make a choice.
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The following is a list of descriptions of the videos used in the experiment.
Each video was played either in ArAP or ArPA order (depending on the ver-
sion; each version had 6 videos in ArAP order and 6 in ArPA order), and the
answer possibilities were always the two possible interpretations of the action,
presented as images in random order.
• Pirate dropsm/searchesi ball.
• Princess breaksm/sculptsi vase.
• Leprechaun cutsm/drawsi pizza.
• Witch eatsm/wantsi banana.
• Witch paintsm/paintsi table.1
• Girl sleeps onm/dreams ofi book.
• Girl kissesm/thinks ofi doll.
• Princess talks tom/talks abouti snowman.
• Pirate throwsm/hearsi guitar.
• Cook stirsm/smellsi soup.
• Leprechaun hitsm/feelsi book.
• Witch climbsm/buildsi house.
The videos are available on http://www.phil.uu.nl/∼mariekes/ic-items/.2
1In the first interpretation a witch painting an existing table is meant; in the second a
witch painting a table on a canvas.
2At least, they are at the time that this dissertation is published; if this url is no longer
available, please contact the author.

Appendix B: Stimuli Chapter 6
Pilot study
Temporal adverbs:
• tomorrow
• yesterday
• at six o’clock
• at night
Sentences combined with temporal adverbs:
• The vase breaks.
• The boy rides a bicycle.
• The box falls over.
• The king takes a shower.
• The chicken moves in circles.
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Temporal information experiment
The experiment used the images of the production experiment in chapter 5.
These images were combined with an image of a clock, such as in the following
example.
The following is a list of descriptions of all items.
• A gnome builds a building at seven o’clock.
• A pirate thinks of a shopping cart at six o’clock.
• A cook throws a saxophone at eight o’clock.
• A pirate swings a guitar at nine o’clock.
• A gnome eats pizza at three o’clock.
• A princess hangs a scarf at nine o’clock.
• A cook cuts a sock at five o’clock.
• A cook thinks of a sock at six o’clock.
• A pirate searches for a ball at one o’clock.
• A gnome sees a building at one o’clock.
• A cook hears a saxophone at two o’clock.
• A princess drops a vase at four o’clock.
• A princess knits a scarf at six o’clock.
• A pirate thinks of a guitar at ten o’clock.
• A princess dreams of a car at ten o’clock.
• A gnome pushes a cart at two o’clock.
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands
Semantische prototaal en beperkte taalsystemen
Mijn proefschrift biedt een perspectief op taalevolutie waarin betekenis centraal
staat. Betekenis krijgt in het debat over het ontstaan van taal weinig aandacht,
omdat men zich doorgaans vooral op de (complexe) syntactische structuur van
taal concentreert. Ik laat juist zien dat mijn aanpak vanuit betekenis op een
zinnige manier aan dat debat kan bijdragen. Met betekenis van taal bedoel
ik niet alleen de betekenis van individuele woorden, maar vooral de betekenis
van combinaties van woorden: taal heeft de bijzondere eigenschap dat complexe
betekenissen door sprekers van een taal gebouwd kunnen worden door woorden
met eenvoudige betekenissen samen te voegen. Mijn proefschrift onderzoekt de
hypothese dat er, voorafgaand aan syntactisch complexe taal, een stadium is
geweest waarin taal werd gestuurd door semantische principes. Als dit stadium
er inderdaad geweest is, zou dat een brug slaan tussen primitieve communicatie
en moderne, complexe taal.
Ik geef deze hypothese vorm door een claim te maken over prototaal, en
te zeggen dat prototaal semantisch georganiseerd was. Prototaal is een hypo-
thetisch tussenstadium in het ontstaan van taal en in de literatuur zijn veel
voorstellen gedaan over het karakter van prototaal (bijvoorbeeld: holistische,
lexicale en muzikale prototaal). Hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift geeft een over-
zicht van deze invullingen en concludeert dat de notie van prototaal een nuttig
conceptueel hulpmiddel is om hypothesen op te stellen over de evolutionaire
geschiedenis van taal. Ik concludeer bovendien dat de verschillende vormen van
prototaal mogelijkerwijs naast elkaar hebben bestaan, maar geef daarbij aan
dat ik mij verder zal concentreren op semantische prototaal.
Semantische prototaal is terug te voeren op het idee van Jackendoff (2002),
dat in een bepaald stadium in het ontstaan van taal semantische en pragmati-
sche principes als AgentFirst en FocusLast een rol speelden in het structureren
van talige uitingen. In zijn boek ‘Foundations of Language’ geeft Jackendoff
al enkele voorbeelden van bewijs voor het bestaan van die principes, maar
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het doel van mijn proefschrift is om een grondig onderzoek te starten naar de
levensvatbaarheid van de semantische prototaal-hypothese.
Hoofdstuk 2 laat verschillende manieren zien om empirisch bewijs te ver-
zamelen over het ontstaan van taal. Dit bewijs is noodzakelijkerwijs indirect,
omdat we nu eenmaal geen opnamen hebben van het taalgebruik van onze
evolutionaire voorouders. De methode die centraal staat in dit proefschrift is
het kijken naar beperkte taalsystemen, om daaruit conclusies te trekken over
evolutionair vroege taal (prototaal). Ik geef een overzicht van observaties van
pidgintalen (taalsystemen ontwikkeld in situaties waarin verschillende groepen
geen gemeenschappelijke taal hebben en toch willen communiceren), home-
sign (gebaarsystemen ontwikkeld door dove kinderen die opgroeien in gezinnen
waarin geen gebarentaal wordt gesproken), de Basic Variety (een stadium in het
leerproces van volwassen tweede taalleerders) en spontaan ontstane gebarenta-
len in dovengemeenschappen. De verschillende situaties waarin deze observaties
zijn gedaan hebben gemeen dat taalgebruikers geen gebruik kunnen maken van
hun moedertaal; ofwel omdat hun toehoorders die niet zullen begrijpen (zo-
als dat bij tweede taalleerders het geval is), ofwel omdat ze niet in staat zijn
een moedertaal te leren (zoals bij homesigners). Uitingen in deze systemen
zijn vaak kort, en bevatten doorgaans weinig grammaticale elementen, zoals
functiewoorden, naamvallen of werkwoordsvervoegingen. Toch zijn ze redelijk
succesvol voor communicatie.
Ik laat zien dat de systemen overeenkomsten vertonen, en dat Jackendoffs
principes AgentFirst en FocusLast inderdaad terug te zien zijn. De algemene
indruk is dus dat als mensen niet hun eigen taal kunnen gebruiken, ze hun
uitingen wel degelijk structuur geven. De organisatorische principes die ze ge-
bruiken, lijken inderdaad semantisch van aard.
Er is echter geen goede manier om de verschillende systemen grondig met
elkaar te vergelijken, en bij veel van de empirische data die voorhanden is
zijn grote meningsverschillen over de interpretatie ervan. Mijn voornaamste
conclusie is dan ook dat, om semantische prototaal een stevige empirische basis
te geven, er meer empirisch materiaal nodig is. Het verzamelen van data uit
beperkte taalsystemen is alleen erg bewerkelijk. Bovendien zou het mooi zijn
als we data zouden kunnen verzamelen in een meer gecontroleerde omgeving,
zodat we heel specifieke hypotheses kunnen testen. Aan het slot van hoofdstuk
2 kondig ik een methode aan die dit biedt: experimenten met ge¨ımproviseerde
communicatie in het lab. Op deze methode kom ik in het laatste deel van mijn
proefschrift terug; het middelste gedeelte concentreert zich op een gedetailleerde
analyse van het begrip betekenis. Zo’n analyse geeft ons de mogelijkheid om in
preciezere termen te praten over de empirische data en de conclusies over de
evolutie van taal die daaruit getrokken worden.
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Betekenis en evolutie
Hoofdstuk 3 buigt zich over definities van betekenis. Het antwoord dat men zal
krijgen op een vraag als ‘wat is betekenis?’ hangt af van degene die dat antwoord
geeft. Ik kijk naar definities van betekenis in drie verschillende contexten: die
van de filosofen, die van denkers over evolutie en die van taalkundigen.
In de filosofie is betekenis een veel bestudeerd fenomeen. Uit een overzicht
van verschillende definities destilleer ik drie centrale intu¨ıties over de essentie
van betekenis:
referentie De dingen in de wereld waarnaar woorden en zinnen verwijzen
zijn belangrijk als we iets willen weten over hun betekenis.
intentie en overtuiging Als een spreker een uiting (zin) formuleert,
heeft hij doorgaans de intentie om zijn toehoorders tot een bepaalde
overtuiging te laten komen.
conventie Onze talige uitingen hebben de betekenis die ze hebben omdat
ze zo gebruikt zijn door andere sprekers in gelijkwaardige situaties.
Ik gebruik deze intu¨ıties niet als competitieve noties, maar als verschillende
manieren om naar betekenis te kijken, waarbij ik betekenis zie als een feno-
meen met verschillende facetten. Ze zullen in de latere hoofdstukken van mijn
proefschrift dan ook terugkomen.
Als we naar betekenis kijken vanuit een evolutionair perspectief, zien we
dat er andere eisen worden gesteld aan definities ervan. We kunnen niet zo-
maar aannemen dat betekenissen abstracte objecten zijn, maar we moeten een
verklaring geven voor de evolutionaire geschiedenis ervan. Ik bekijk twee mo-
gelijke scenario’s voor het ontstaan van betekenis in menselijke taal: de eerste
werd voorgesteld door Peter Ga¨rdenfors; de tweede door Ruth Millikan.
Ga¨rdenfors gaat er, kort gezegd, vanuit dat cognitie is ontwikkeld voor taal:
private (persoonlijke) mentale representaties worden gezien als de basis voor
geavanceerde communicatie. Een gevolg van deze aanname is dat mensapen
(onze naaste verwanten in het dierenrijk) volgens Ga¨rdenfors heel goed ver
ontwikkelde cognitieve vermogens zouden kunnen hebben, die ze echter niet
voor communicatie gebruiken. Andere auteurs die schrijven over de evolutio-
naire oorsprong van betekenis lijken (impliciet) uit te gaan van het scenario
zoals Ga¨rdenfors het voorstelt, en er wordt veel vergelijkend onderzoek uitge-
voerd naar de cognitieve vermogens van mensen en van andere dieren. Er is
echter ook een manier om te kijken naar het ontstaan van betekenis en taal,
zonder cognitie zo centraal te stellen. Die komt naar voren in het werk van
Ruth Millikan.
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Millikan concentreert zich in haar werk op conventies en legt daarbij de
nadruk op taal als publiek fenomeen. Ze ontkent dat er een een-op-een-relatie
is tussen de betekenis van een zin en de mentale representatie van degene die
zo’n zin uitspreekt. In plaats daarvan benadrukt ze de conventionele kant van
taal (zie het kader hierboven voor een definitie), en geeft ze een biologische
fundering voor conventies in menselijk gedrag.
Cognitie en communicatie ‘in het wild’ en in het
lab
Gewapend met de principes uit hoofdstuk 3 concentreer ik me in hoofdstuk 4
weer op semantische prototaal. Observaties uit beperkte taalsystemen kunnen
gebruikt worden als bewijs voor het bestaan van zo’n stadium, maar om de
problemen uit hoofdstuk 2 het hoofd te bieden, wend ik me tot een nieuwe
experimentele methode: ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie. Volgens deze methode
wordt aan proefpersonen gevraagd om te communiceren over eenvoudige afbeel-
dingen, zonder te spreken en door middel van gebaren (uitbeelden). Eerdere
toepassingen van deze methode lieten zien dat proefpersonen bij het uitbeel-
den een volgorde gebruikten die afweek van de dominante woordvolgorde van
hun moedertaal. Bovendien gebruikten sprekers van verschillende moedertalen
altijd dezelfde volgorde: Actor-Patient-Act (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008). Deze
volgorde is consistent met de woordvolgorde Subject-Lijdend voorwerp-Object,
en dit wil zeggen dat een gebeurtenis waarin een man een bal gooit, steevast
wordt gecommuniceerd als ‘man-bal-gooien’.
Voordat ik laat zien dat semantische principes inderdaad een rol spelen in
ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie, ga ik in op de conclusies over taalevolutie die
we op basis van de experimenten zouden kunnen trekken.
Ik vergelijk de situatie waarin proefpersonen in het experiment verkeren
met de situatie van onze evolutionaire voorouders. Zowel de proefpersonen in
het experiment als onze voorouders bevinden zich in een situatie waarin er nog
geen volledig ontwikkeld systeem van lingu¨ıstische conventies is. In beide situa-
ties zullen sprekers (in het geval van het experiment is het beter om te spreken
over gebaarders, maar ik zal ook hier de term sprekers gebruiken) een bepaalde
mentale representatie hebben, die ze aan iemand duidelijk willen maken. Het
verschil tussen een mentale representatie en een zin (of een serie gebaren) is de
vorm. Een mentale representatie kan best de vorm van een afbeelding hebben,
maar als je iets zegt of uitbeeldt, moet je noodgedwongen een aaneenscha-
keling van symbolen maken (een string). Bij het omzetten van een mentale
representatie naar een communicatieve uiting spelen cognitieve voorkeuren een
rol, en deze cognitieve voorkeuren vallen, zo beweer ik, nagenoeg samen met de
semantische principes die eerder genoemd werden voor semantische prototaal.
Het feit dat proefpersonen in het experiment geen gebruik maken van de
grammaticale regels van hun moedertaal wijst erop dat ze blijkbaar gebruik
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maken van een fundamenteler systeem, een systeem dat onderliggend is aan
taal.
Ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie
In de laatste twee hoofdstukken van mijn proefschrift, hoofdstuk 5 en 6, doe
ik verslag van experimenteel onderzoek. In hoofdstuk 5 begin ik bij de eer-
der gevonden resultaten waarin er een vaste volgorde werd gevonden in de
ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie over eenvoudige gebeurtenissen: Actor-Patient-
Act (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2008). Ik laat zien dat er naast de gebeurtenissen
die werden gebruikt in dit experiment (extensionele gebeurtenissen), nog andere
gebeurtenissen zijn, die andere semantische eigenschappen hebben: intensionele
gebeurtenissen. Intensionele gebeurtenissen zijn abstracter dan extensionele ge-
beurtenissen, omdat ze gaan over dingen die niet per se aanwezig zijn, of die niet
specifiek zijn. Een paar voorbeelden: ‘Een man gooit een bal’ is een extensionele
gebeurtenis, maar ‘Een man zoekt een bal’ is een intensionele gebeurtenis. Dit
is zo, omdat het mogelijk is dat de man niet naar een bepaalde bal op zoek is.
In een eerste experiment laat ik zien dat proefpersonen verschillende geba-
renvolgordes gebruiken voor de twee soorten gebeurtenissen: Actor-Patient-Act
voor extensionele gebeurtenissen (dat is gelijk aan het eerder uitgevoerde on-
derzoek) en Actor-Act-Patient voor intensionele gebeurtenissen. Met andere
woorden, als een proefpersoon een situatie moet uitbeelden waarin een man
een bal zoekt, zal hij dat steevast doen in deze volgorde: ‘man-zoeken-bal’.
Ik laat daarmee zien dat verschillende semantische eigenschappen van datgene
waarover gecommuniceerd wordt, leiden tot verschillende woordvolgordes.
Om te laten zien dat deze volgordes een communicatieve functie hebben,
presenteer ik een tweede experiment, waarin proefpersonen gevraagd werd vi-
deo’s met series gebaren te interpreteren. De acties in elke video waren am-
bigu, zodat elke string van gebaren twee dingen zou kunnen betekenen; zie
de afbeeldingen op pagina 145. De video’s werden in twee volgordes gepre-
senteerd (Actor-Patient-Act of Actor-Act-Patient) en proefpersonen kregen na
elke string de keuze uit twee interpretaties. Het onderzoek laat zien dat de
volgorde van de gebaren inderdaad invloed heeft op de interpretatie van de
ambigue gebaren. Dit wijst erop dat het veranderen van de gebarenvolgorde
voor extensionele en intensionele gebeurtenissen een communicatieve functie
heeft.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt wat er gebeurt als proefpersonen complexe informa-
tie moeten overbrengen door middel van ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie. Deze
complexe informatie ontstaat bijvoorbeeld als er aan de informatie over een ge-
beurtenis informatie over het tijdstip van de gebeurtenis wordt toegevoegd. In
bestaande talen gebruiken we veelal werkwoordsvervoegingen om aan te duiden
of een bepaalde gebeurtenis in het verleden, heden de toekomst plaatsvindt.
Van beperkte taalsystemen weten we dat werkwoordvervoeging er niet mo-
gelijk is. In die systemen wordt echter wel gepraat over verleden en toekomst.
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Sprekers gebruiken temporele adverbia aan het begin van de zin, om aan te
geven dat gebeurtenissen niet nu plaatsvinden, maar op een tijdstip in het
verleden of de toekomst (Benazzo, 2009).
Ik presenteer een experiment met ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie, waarin
proefpersonen over eenvoudige gebeurtenissen, plus de tijd waarop deze ge-
beurtenissen plaatsvonden, moesten communiceren. Het experiment laat zien
dat mensen in het lab dezelfde methode toepassen als die was geobserveerd in
beperkte taalsystemen.
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste conclusies van dit proef-
schrift. De hypothese dat er, voorafgaand aan syntactisch complexe taal, een
stadium is geweest waarin taal werd gestuurd door semantische principes wordt
niet langer alleen ondersteund door empirische observaties uit beperkte taal-
systemen, maar ook door resultaten van experimenten. Daarmee heb ik een
bijdrage geleverd aan het debat over het ontstaan van taal en onmiskenbaar
duidelijk gemaakt dat de rol van betekenis in het ontstaan van taal niet ge-
negeerd kan worden. Om dat te bereiken heb ik een experimentele methode
(ge¨ımproviseerde communicatie) verder ontwikkeld en een brug geslagen tus-
sen deze methode en de eerder genoemde data uit beperkte taalsystemen.
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